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Abstract
This dissertation is principally concerned with investigation of digital watermarking methods
suitable for non-media data types and manifesting the new trend of applications for such
watermarking methods. Digital watermarking is a technique for embedding secret information
within a digital content in a manner that does not interfere with normal usage of that content.
It was first used as an effective method for attesting to the originality of digital contents and
to discourage unauthorized copying.
A large corpus of watermarking techniques has arisen for digital images, audio and video
data, but the challenges and issues of non-media data watermarking have not been fully inves-
tigated. One of the contributions of this dissertation is in proposing a new taxonomy model
for digital watermarking methods to cater for more complex data types such as time-series,
graph-structured data, data streams, and so forth. The rationale for this taxonomy is that
the ultimate goal for many of today’s data collection is gaining knowledge by means of data
mining strategies. Therefore, the data watermarking process should not interfere with the data
mining process and needs to be kept as transparent as possible. This implies that the type of
data will not only affect the data mining methods but also data watermarking techniques.
In alignment with the taxonomy to be presented, this dissertation demonstrates several
novel watermarking methods for three types of data namely biomedical data, sensor stream-
ing, and spatiotemporal data. Particularly in respect of sensor streaming data, two digital
watermarking methods are presented that are resilient against multiple data aggregation as
well as de-synchronisation. The former feature is particularly useful for secure in-network data
aggregation in sensor networks, where multiple signatures from different sensors may need to be
verified quickly. The latter feature is useful to discern the de-synchronisation problem between
watermark encoder and decoder, for which hiding synchronisation marks serves as a solution.
Finally, this dissertation examines how digital watermarking methods can be deployed as an
effective lightweight security tool for Internet of Things applications.
Glossary
alphabet The total number of unique symbols that are possible in a
given sequence.
auto-correlation A self-similarity measure for sequences. Defined for a se-
quence s(i) of length l as
As(τ) =
l−1∑
i=0
s(i)s(i+ τ)
This is a measure of how closely different parts of a sequence
resemble each other.
balance
A sequence is balanced if the sum of all elements in one iter-
ation of the sequence equals zero, and the element values are
uniformly distributed.
blind A watermark where neither the original data is needed, nor
is a local copy of the watermark created for comparison. In-
stead, some property of the embedded watermark is exploited
to reveal its presence or to extract its contents.
context
Any information that characterizes the situation of an object
(a thing in IoT terminology) such as time or location. Some
researchers identify context as processed information obtained
from raw collected data.
xx
GLOSSARY xxi
contextual query A query with contextual information being passed in the
search query, such as role or location attributes of data re-
quester plus the queried data object.
contextualization The process of enriching data with contextual information.
This implies the existence of necessary infrastructure for con-
text acquisition and reasoning.
cross-correlation The most common similarity measure for watermarking. De-
fined for two sequences s(i) and r(i) of length l as
Cs,r(τ) =
l−1∑
i=0
s(i)r(i+ τ)
This is a measure of how closely different parts of the two
sequences resemble each other.
data aggregation
A process of gleaning information from multiple data streams.
In this thesis, only linear aggregation operations such as sum-
mation and average have been studied.
data granularity The level of data detail, or precision of information that can
be identified. The choice of data granularity is application
dependent.
data obfuscation A privacy-preserving process to deliberately degrade data
quality (or data granularity) for protecting sensitive informa-
tion. In some works, the term ‘data cloaking’ is used inter-
changeably with this term.
data provenance The history of creation and manipulation of a piece of data.
Understanding provenance is crucial to the accuracy and
trustworthiness of data.
GLOSSARY xxii
distortion-free water-
mark
A watermark that is embedded without any modification in
data values. For instance, the watermark information might
be embedded within the order of data values. In this sense,
the watermark is actually a secret permutation only known
to the data owner.
DLFSR Dynamic Linear Feedback Shift Register. A method of in-
creasing the security of LFRS-generated numbers often with
the aid of multiple LFSR compositions. This results in a shift
register with dynamic clocking.
DP Differential Privacy. A randomized algorithm M provides -
differential privacy, if for all pairs of adjacent databases x and
x′ and any set of possible outcomes S ⊆ Range(M),
Pr[M(x) ∈ S] ≤ Pr[M(x′) ∈ S]× e
where  > 0 denotes privacy level.
field
A set of elements in which it is possible to add, subtract,
multiply and divide.
forensic construction A method of indexing information in a way that data alter-
ations can be identified by an auditor.
fragile A watermark that cannot be recovered after any change has
occurred to the host data. Some authors have added to this
definition by using the fragile watermark to reveal parts that
have changed.
GLOSSARY xxiii
GF(q)
The Galois Field that contains q elements. If q is a prime
number, then the integers modulo q form the elements of field
GF (q).
homomorphic encryp-
tion
(A fully) Homomorphic encryption is a scheme that allows
(simple) computations over encrypted data without being able
to decrypt. For instance a basic RSA algorithm is a multi-
plicatively homomorphic encryption scheme.
host data (Also called cover data) The original data into which a wa-
termark is to be embedded.
IoT
Internet of Things. It is a paradigm that refers to the network
of interconnected objects (things).
LFSR
Linear Feedback Shift Register. A well-known construction
for generating pseudorandom numbers. The sequences pro-
duced by a single LFSR (with normal clocking) provided that
is configured with a primitive polynomial, have excellent sta-
tistical properties but poor linear complexity.
linear complexity (also called linear span) The minimum subset of a sequence
needed to be able to estimate the rest of the sequence.
mergeable watermarks
Watermarking codes that are robust against linear aggrega-
tion operations.
GLOSSARY xxiv
merit factor A measurement criterion for ‘goodness’ of sequences that was
originally proposed as a means of comparing one dimensional
sequences for (aperiodic) correlation measures.
MWI The Multiple Watermark Interference and is defined as the
mutual interference between multiple watermarks that are su-
perimposed on a single host data. The MWI is semantically
coherent with multiple-access interference in radio commu-
nications, where the interference of orthogonal codes spread
over a shared channel becomes substantial by increasing the
number of users.
PQRST Characteristics
The main feature points of an Electrocardiogram (ECG) sig-
nal in terms of cardiac diagnosis. These points appear as the
extreme (minimal/maximal) values of the ECG signal.
PRD The Percent Root mean square Difference and represents av-
erage the error between two sets of data as a fraction of each
data value. Defined between a signal x(n) and its distorted
version x˜(n) as
PRD =
√∑N
i=1(x(i)− x˜(i))2∑N
i=1 x(i)
2
× 100
where N is the signal length.
primitive polynomial (Also called irreducible polynomial) A polynomial that gen-
erates all elements of an extension field from a base field. In
particular, a polynomial of degree n over the finite field GF (2)
is primitive if it has polynomial order 2n − 1.
pseudo-context Any contextual information, the privacy of which does not
need necessarily to be preserved necessarily, but it affects the
disclosure granularities of sensitive data.
GLOSSARY xxv
pseudorandom (also pseudonoise or PN) A deterministic method of gener-
ating numbers that resemble the behaviour of truly random
numbers in a statistical sense.
robust
A watermark that (ideally) cannot be removed. In practice, a
sufficient requirement is that removal of the watermark causes
unacceptable damage to the host data. ‘Unacceptable’ is ap-
plication defined.
semi-fragile
A fragile watermark that will tolerate ‘innocent’ processes but
not a deliberate attack. This allows users some leeway in
adjusting host data optimally to the local conditions.
sequence ensemble (Also called family) A grouping of sequences constructed in
a similar manner which shares common properties and has a
well-defined cross-correlation among members of the group.
Note that the members of an ensemble are (cyclically) shift
distinct.
shift distinct sequences Periodic sequences that cannot be obtained from a shift equiv-
alent of each other.
SNR The Signal to Noise Ratio and represents an average of the
error between two sets of data as a fraction of each data value
in logarithmic ratio. The relationship between the SNR and
PRD can be obtained by SNR = 40− 20 log(0.01PRD).
GLOSSARY xxvi
watermark attack
Any operation which changes the host data (and therefore the
embedded watermark). Such an attack can be deliberately
designed to prevent watermark recovery, or an ‘innocent’ op-
eration such as data quantization.
watermark constellation A two dimensional correlation pattern displayed as a gray-
scale intensity image with pixel values in the range of [0,255].
Chapter 1
Introduction
It was the best of times, it was
the worst of times.
Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two
Cities
Since the late 1990s, digital watermarking has been widely used for hiding messages within a
given content with different purposes such as authentication, copyright protection, fingerprint-
ing and so on. This leads us to a discussion of information hiding in general and steganography
in particular. Steganography and digital watermarking are two related fields that share many
technical approaches but there are fundamental differences between them [Fridrich, 2009].
While steganography aims to hide information in such a way that it should not be even possi-
ble to detect the existence of a secret message, in digital watermarking, the effective coupling of
a message to the digital content is of value and therefore the watermark embedding process is
usually known. Moreover, in steganography, the host data can be a mere ‘decoy’ and may have
no relationship to the secret message. In contrast, a watermark usually carries supplementary
information about the host data such as sender identifier or data provenance –the history of
creation and manipulation of a piece of data.
Apart from differences, both techniques can be portrayed as a way to make embedded
information ‘disappear’ within the host data. This perspective raises the possibility of encryp-
tion techniques as a solution for hiding information. However, encryption is not successful in
diverting attention away from suspected data, but also after decryption all the protection is
lost which means there is no guarantee that the legitimate data decoder does not distribute the
information [Wayner, 2009]. In fact, watermarking and encryption are more complementary
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than competitive approaches and can be used in conjunction to provide maximum security.
Generally a watermarking system consists of two components: watermark encoder or em-
bedder and watermark decoder or detector. The watermark encoder embeds a watermark
message M , possibly utilising a secret key K, within given data D (also referred to as cover
data or host data). Occasionally, one might want K to depend on D in order to provide side-
information to the decoder or use asymmetric keys to boost the security of the watermarking
scheme. The encoder generates a marked dataset Dm using an encoding function f such that
Dm = f(D,M,K). The output of the encoder Dm is recorded for later use or transmitted
through a channel. This channel is often subjected to either data-processing distortion or at-
tacks that attempt to remove any trace of M from the modified dataset Dm. When a client
wants to check the watermark, the transmitted watermarked data Dˆm is presented as an input
to the watermark decoder. The decoder investigates if the watermark information is present
in the given input Dˆm and, if so, outputs the encoded message i.e. M = g(Dˆm,K), where g()
is the decoding function.
Figure 1.1 depicts the general building blocks of a watermarking system. The dotted line
in this figure shows the possibility of having access to the original data D in the decoding
procedure. When presented, this is called informed watermark detection. The absence of
access to the original is called blind watermark detection. Since some watermarks have no
message at all – it is their mere presence that is the message such as instanced by [Cox and
Miller, 2002]– the output of g() could be a binary value (watermark-present or no-watermark).
Figure 1.1: Block diagram of a watermarking system.
The performance of a watermarking system is tightly related to the three properties be-
ing invisibility, robustness and embedded message capacity. Visibility (also called invisibility,
transparency or imperceptibility) means that the embedding process should not introduce any
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visible distortion in the host, or at least it needs to be invisible to humans. Capacity or data
payload indicates the optimum amount of information that can be embedded in the host data.
i.e. the size of the message M . Robustness typically accounts for the capability of watermark to
survive common host data operations, which do not explicitly aim at removing the watermark
or at making it unreadable.
These requirements are often contradictory; the less hidden information, the stronger invis-
ibility could be attained at the cost of decreased watermark robustness. In contrast, the higher
data capacity improves the robustness while the invisibility constraint might be violated. This
apparent contradiction can be demonstrated by a ‘magic triangle’ model [Dittmann et al.,
2006], where invisibility, robustness and capacity are in the upper, left and right corners of
the triangle respectively. Figure 1.2 demonstrates the triangle between these watermarking re-
quirements. The embedding parameters for the watermarking scheme fa are turned to provide
high robustness. The price for the high robustness is poor transparency and low embedding
capacity. Therefore, fa is located close to the robustness corner of the triangle. On the con-
trary, watermarking scheme fb is tuned for a high invisibility. This results in a low robustness
and a low capacity. Therefore, fb is located close to the invisibility corner. Depending on the
targeted application, a trade-off must be sought in order to satisfy these requirements on any
point inside the magic triangle.
Figure 1.2: Magic triangle of invisibility, robustness, and capacity.
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1.1 Digital Watermarking of Non-media Data Type
Taking account of the current picture of research on digital watermarking, there is a strong need
for a comprehensive review of digital watermarking for non-media types of data. Therefore,
this dissertation starts with the question: What information hiding or digital watermarking
technique is appropriate to use, considering the specific features of a particular type of data
with regards to the targeted application objective?
To resolve this question, we first study the data type taxonomy model defined in terms of
data mining rules. One of the interesting aspects of a data mining process is the wide variety of
data types that are available for analysis. Each data type has specific features that necessitate a
different technique being used in the context of a particular data mining application [Aggarwal,
2015]. This data variety would affect the digital watermarking formulation as well.
1.1.1 Simple Data Type Model versus Complex Data Type Model
Broadly speaking, there are many features of data, by which they can be characterized. The
basic data types typically refer to multidimensional data as a collection of data records in
relational databases. The records consist of attributes of types nominal, binary, ordinal, and
numeric. As opposed to this simple type of data, the complex data types can be classified as
follows.
• Sequence data. This type of data includes an ordered list of items and can be further
categorized into time-series, symbolic sequences, and biological data [Han et al., 2011]. A
times-series is a sequence of numerical data typically recorded at equal time intervals. A
symbolic sequence can be considered as the categorical analogy of a time-series, which is
not observed at equal time-intervals such as a sequence of user actions at a Website. Pro-
teins and nucleotides are examples of biological sequences that carry important semantic
structure for genetic analysis.
• Graph structured data. This type of data such as social network data or Web graphs,
conforms to a graph structure so that the data values correspond to the graph vertices,
whereas the relationships among those values correspond to the edges in the graph. Addi-
tionally, data encoded with Markup languages such as XML schemas can be represented
with graph structures.
• Other kinds of data. In addition to sequences and graphs where data poses certain struc-
tures, there are other kinds of data that do not lend themselves to a specific structure.
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The most important types of such data include spatial data, spatiotemporal data, data
streams, multimedia data and text. Spatial data, such as a map, identifies spatial infor-
mation about objects. Spatiotemporal is a particular form of spatial data related to both
space and time, such as trajectories of a moving object. A data stream is usually defined
in contrast to a persistent relation and it flows into a system often in vast volume and of
unbounded size.
Based on the data types, we provide a taxonomy of the existing data watermarking methods
in Chapter 2.
1.1.2 Challenges
A major difficulty in watermarking generic data types is that some of the inherent assumptions
related to media watermarking do not necessarily hold. For instance, the invisibility definition
of a watermarking scheme comes from the assumption of a human consumer for the water-
marked content. With respect to digital watermarking of such contents that are intended to
be rendered for a human consumer, there is well-established literature on digital watermarking
schemes. Many such watermarking schemes take advantage of the fact that rendered works
have many possible representations with almost imperceptibly different renderings from the
perspective of a human observer or listener.
In contrast, consider a watermarking system that embeds provenance information within
generated data packets in order to automate checking of data trustworthiness. This can be
achieved by embedding watermarks in timing differences between consecutive packets [Chong
et al., 2010]. While this might betray the watermarking definition as the embedding procedure
involves a change of timing information that is part of the header not within the data itself,
one can argue that this could also be considered as a watermarking scheme if one is collecting
headers and may not care about the data.
A router is a good example of our justification since it deals only with the header information
and does not care about the packet content that are of interest to the intended receiver. Another
example of this is causality determination in covert audit trails in financial fraud investigations,
where the packet headers are marked en-route.
Therefore, the visibility definition depends on whom we are hiding from and what is the
purpose of embedding. That is an obvious question in the case of multimedia, but is potentially
a complex challenge for non-media data types and applications.
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1.1.2.1 Magic Triangle of Transparency, Robustness, and Capacity for
Non-media Data
Now we look at the magic triangle of invisibility, robustness and capacity for generic data
types, in detail.
Invisibility
For media watermarking, the definition is conceptually straightforward –the watermark is either
visible (or audible) to a human, or not. The definition of visibility/audibility is a characteristic
of humans whose perceptual characteristics are now fairly well defined. For data, it is the
application that defines ‘visibility’ (which can also be described as detectability, or influencing
or biasing the interpretation of the marked data by the application).
Defining watermark invisibility for the non-media data type is a complex topic. The main
difficulty is, “Who needs to know that the watermark is embedded and who does not?” To
answer this question, identification of the target of the embedded watermark is a paramount
need. Taking the example of images, it is sufficient that the watermark be invisible to the
human eye, and for audio, it should be inaudible to the human ear. In this respect, past
research utilized limitations of the human visual and psychoacoustic systems advantageously in
the delivery and presentation of digital media (such as temporal and spatial contrast thresholds
and orientation sensitivity) to hide information. Similarly, for non-media, the characteristics
of the data consumer dictate the watermark invisibility requirement.
[Sion et al., 2006] addressed the problem of watermarking streaming data such as sensory
readings and argued that for such data any watermark-related alterations can be induced as
long as the host data still ‘seems’ good. This definition is inherently subjective, in the sense
that the degree of precision and accuracy that corresponds to the ‘good’ definition varies based
on the application. For instance, consider Electrocardiogram signals that are captured for
cardiac diagnosis of patients. In this case, watermark invisibility is a matter of preserving
cardiac diagnosis after watermark insertion. Here, the noise existence assumption which was
already discussed, still exists because the precise positioning of the probe on the chest can
result in larger differences than watermark distortion could do.
The visibility problem could become even more challenging. A human can always visualize
an Electrocardiogram signal and make broad judgement based on its shape and therefore the
human visual system may still play a role in this case. However, for many data embedding
environments, the human visual system does not play a role. As an example, consider a sensor
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network for monitoring the environment variables such as temperature or humidity. Since the
real sensor measurements are inherently noisy, it gives us the opportunity to take advantage for
embedding watermarks in the noisy parts in a way that the ‘perceived’ quality of the sensory
data is not degraded. This immediately implies the need for a proper quality metric to measure
distortion between the original data D and the watermarked data Dm.
Multimedia watermarking schemes often use statistical descriptors including first order
statistics (such as histograms) or second order statistics (such as correlations between image
pixels) to compare the two pieces of data before and after watermarking. However, it is well
known that these metrics correlate well with the way degradations are perceived by a human
observer that is not a valid assumption for non-media data. Furthermore, the limitation of
other visual models such as Just-Noticeable Difference for geospatial datasets is acknowledged
by [Lopez, 2002].
Apart from statistical descriptors and visual metrics, it is folklore from the signal processing
literature that classical metrics such as percentage residual difference, peak signal to noise ratio,
or mean maximum error be used for measuring the degradation of the host signal [Wang and
Bovik, 2009]. The main short-coming of these metrics is that all samples contribute equally
in the assessment of the signal quality and therefore are not necessarily suitable for capturing
changes in the same way that the quality of the signal changes.
In all of the above examples, the host data is still noisy. Indeed the majority of the
watermarking methods have been derived under the assumption that the host data can tolerate
damage to its values up to a certain point. But for some particular types of data, such as prices
or property coordinates, even small changes to data values may not be acceptable. In other
words, an invisible watermark should be designed in such a way that ‘distortion constraints’ of
the host data are satisfied. For example, [Kamel, 2009] proposed a distortion-free watermarking
scheme for spatial data stored in a structure called R-tree. In this work, instead of changing
data values, the information is encoded within the order of entries inside the R-tree nodes
relative to the watermark values.
Summarizing, the invisibility definition requires a good understanding of the data model
features as well as the target application. Taking one example of data provenance [Sultana
et al., 2013] where the information is embedded within time differences between consecutive
packets, the watermark is said to be invisible if it does not introduce large delays in the
network. For marking graph structures such as social network data whereby a few vertices or
edges are added to the original graph according to watermark values, the watermark is invisible
if the number of modified vertices and edges are small and therefore the main properties of
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the graph such as average path length or its diameter are preserved [Zhao et al., 2015]. In the
case of watermarking of biological sequences such as DNA, the watermark invisibility means
amino acids are identical to those of the original DNA after watermark insertion [Heider and
Barnekow, 2007].
Robustness
In the design of any watermarking scheme, the ability to withstand host data distortions
introduced through standard and legitimate data processing is defined as robustness [Cox
et al., 2007]. Standard data processing includes all host data manipulations and modifications
that the data might undergo during its distribution chain. Examples of such processing in
media domain are lossy compression, rotation, quantization, noise reduction, and delay.
Based on the degree of resistance, a watermark could be either fragile or robust. A fragile
watermark fails to be detectable even after the slightest modification to the host data and
therefore is useful for tamper proofing usages. In contrast, a robust watermark often resists
moderate to severe distortions unless an unreasonable amount of damage has been inflicted
upon the host data; this is useful for ownership assertion or traitor tracing purposes. In addition
to the robustness against common data processing, some scholars considered resistancy against
both intentional and unintentional watermark damages as robustness.
The robustness requirement can vary greatly due to different targeted applications. Con-
sider a monitoring application where enormous quantities of data are streamed through a
network. In such a setting, watermark information can be embedded within a data stream
for data authentication and then the watermarked data stream is summarized to distill useful
information [Zhang et al., 2008]. The question is, what happens to the embedded watermark?
Are we still able to detect the watermark information after a summarization process? If the
streaming data is transmitted through a lossy network protocol such as User Datagram Proto-
col (UDP) that has no guarantees of data delivery, then the watermark chain could be broken
by loss of a few packets and therefore subsequent packets cannot be authenticated [Golle and
Modadugu, 2001]. Hence, for this scenario, watermark robustness against data summarization
as well as packet loss is desired.
For watermarking of relational databases, [Sion et al., 2004] proposed a watermarking
scheme that is robust against data joint operations meaning that tuples that join before and
after watermark insertion are the same. For rights protection of trajectory dataset, [Lucchese
et al., 2010] proposed a novel watermarking scheme in a way that the nearest neighbour (NN
Digital Watermarking of Non-media Data Type 9
queries) of every object in dataset is preserved after watermark insertion that is important
for classification usage. This means that the watermark is robust against NN-search and NN-
classification operations. For the DNA watermarking, the embedded watermark is essential
to withstand DNA mutations that might occur due to either a gene’s evolution process or
environmental factors [Heider and Barnekow, 2007].
Capacity
Embedded data or message capacity refers to the amount of information one can embed into
any single piece of data. A watermark that encodes n bits, can embed 2n different messages
and is referred to as multiple bit watermarking. In contrast, a zero-bit watermark carries no
hidden message, which means only the presence/absence of a watermark can be investigated.
(See [Cox and Miller, 2002] for an example.) Also, capacity is sometimes given relative to the
size of the host data i.e. |M |size(D) . For instance, the capacity of a watermarked video can be
measured by the number of embedded bits per frame, or for DNA watermarking, it could be
expressed by the number of bits encoded per nucleotide (bpn). Some other references such as
[De Vleeschouwer et al., 2001], consider the number of correctly retrieved bits as the watermark
capacity.
The evaluation of the maximum number of information bits that can be hidden in a piece
of data plays a major role in a watermarking system. For many types of non-media data
such as relational data or trajectories, the redundancy is far less compared to the multimedia
and therefore less space is available for hiding information [Jin et al., 2005]. Apart from data
redundancy, the location of hidden information can change the data-carrying capacity of a
watermarking system. Multimedia watermarking methods often put watermarks in specific
regions that are not of interest (non-ROI) to make sure the watermarks do not interfere with
the important parts of the host data. For the non-media domain, unlike conventional digital
watermarking, hiding is not just restricted inside the content. For instance, Kamel placed
watermarks information into the relative order of entries in databases instead of the data
[Kamel, 2009] and Wang and Reeves inserted watermarks in differences between the adjacent
coordinates of vertices in a vector map [Wang et al., 2007b].
Figure 1.3 represents a few samples of the magic triangle for the non-media data types
that we review in the next chapter. In this figure, the definitions of watermarking properties
associated with corners of the magic triangles are customised based on the data characteristics
accordingly.
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Figure 1.3: Magic triangles for different types of our data taxonomy.
1.2 Thesis Overview and Contributions
The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, the necessary background
and a review of the existing watermarking methods for generic data types are demonstrated
The main contributions of this dissertation are included in Chapters 3 to 6. In Chapter 3, a
novel watermarking method for Electrocardiogram measurements is presented. In Chapters 4
and 5, watermarking methods for sensory streams that are robust against data aggregation and
de-synchronisation are studied. In Chapter 6, a conceptual framework for privacy preservation
in Internet of Things is presented and then is customised for a smart vehicle system in which
trajectory streams are perturbed by means of digital watermarking strategies.
The main contributions of this research are reviewed in the following.
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1.2.1 Digital Watermarking of Biological sequences
In Chapter 3, we propose a digital watermarking scheme for Electrocardiogram (ECG) mea-
surements. The embedded information can be used for tamper proofing of ECG data. It ad-
ditionally provides a way of authenticating the data ownership or providing assurances about
the origin of data – data provenance. When developing a watermarking scheme for a medical
context, several constraints have to be respected: 1) The watermark should not distort im-
portant data characteristics that are essential for proper medical diagnosis. 2) The watermark
encoding process should have low complexity for real-time embedding. 3) The watermark de-
coding process should be able to localize tampering, which is a particularly great concern for
big volumes of data.
To meet the aforementioned requirements, a fragile, high capacity, low complexity water-
marking scheme is proposed in Chapter 3 that gracefully detects data tampering and data
deletion. In order to preserve the medical diagnosis, a time-based sliding window over the
ECG data stream is utilized. This window essentially tracks local minimum and maximum
points of a given ECG segment to keep the modifications of these values as low as possible.
This is because the ECG diagnosis depends on these local minimum/maximum (called PQRST
wave structures or characteristics: see Figure 3.1 for an example of this) of the ECG data.
Our solution is envisioned for an e-healthcare scenario in which patient biomedical signals
are continuously captured by multiple sensors, collected by an entity such as a Smartphone,
and subsequently transmitted to a cloud infrastructure for assessing the need for further med-
ical investigations. In this setting, we advocate an end-to-end data protection; every sensor
performs the watermark insertion at the data acquisition level before forwarding data to the
Smartphone. At that point, the Smartphone could perform the watermark extraction process
in order to find tampered data and replace the fragile watermarks with a robust one for onward
transmission, or leave the watermark intact, or perform other operations such as summation or
compression and then forward the result to the cloud. The data also needs to be protected dur-
ing transmission by means of pre-existing security channels such as SSL/TLS to encrypt data
between the collector and cloud server, and possibly even to sensor nodes. As a result, there is
no point along the path from sensor to cloud that data is left unprotected. The watermarking
solution is verified on real ECG recordings which were developed by MIT and Arrhythmia
Laboratory of Boston’s Beth Israel Hospital (MIT-BIH) between 1975 and 1979 [Goldberger
et al., 2000].
In summary, the contributions of Chapter 3 are listed as follows:
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• Design of a low complexity tamper proofing watermarking scheme for ECG data that is
suitable for simple hardware implementation.
• Adapting a sliding window approach that tracks ECG data locally in order to preserve
the cardiac diagnosis.
• Providing a variable-capacity watermarking scheme for embedding secret information
inside the data. The capacity is directly related to the degree of data degradation that
can be tolerated and is locally controllable.
• Flexibility in payload contents to implement an icon, logo, patient data, or various in-
band data channel error-correction content.
Our proposed method can also be extended as a proof system for a general stream outsourc-
ing setting, whereby a data owner with limited storage capacity outsources his/her data to an
untrusted cloud service, still seeks some assurance about the integrity and correctness of the
outsourced data. Using our watermarking solution, data can be marked in a streaming fashion
before transmitting it to the cloud service. Coupling the watermarked data with a security
transmission protocol, our solution can be served as a cloud en-route security and protects
data from modifications at the cloud end. This results in the “trust-but-verify relationship”
model [Cormode et al., 2012] between data owner and the cloud service provider.
1.2.2 Digital Watermarking of Sensor Streams
In Chapters 4 and 5, we study digital watermarking of sensory data streams. First, the notion
of mergeable watermarks is introduced; a property that indicates the ability of merging multiple
watermarked data possibly encoded by different entities such as sensors, without destroying
the individual watermarks. This is reminiscent of batch verification of aggregated signatures,
where different messages are signed by different signers [Camenisch et al., 2012].
We motivate our mergeable watermarks as a lightweight data authentication approach for
in-network aggregation of sensory data streams. In-network data aggregation is essential for
wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in order to improve the bandwidth usage and energy efficiency.
However, there is always a conflict between security and data aggregation needs in such net-
works [Ozdemir and Xiao, 2009]: security methods require sensors to encrypt and authenticate
any sensed data prior to their transmission, while data aggregation protocols prefer plain data
to maximize energy. These conflicting goals have led to a large body of research on the secure
Thesis Overview and Contributions 13
data aggregation problem using a variety of techniques such as digital signatures, cryptogra-
phy algorithms, homomorphic encryption, random sampling, anomaly detection. The proposed
aggregate-commit-prove protocol [Przydatek et al., 2003] is an example of such schemas where
the aggregator not only performs the aggregation operation, but also proves the correctness of
the performed task.
Digital watermarking is a promising substitution for many of the proposed complex security
procedures to solve the described problem. In particular, our mergeable watermarking codes
can survive the aggregation operation by design. The construction of these codes is similar
to orthogonal codes in Direct Sequence Code Division Multiple Access (DS-CDMA) used for
spread-spectrum communications. The DS-CDMA has strong noise immunity and is widely
used in communication systems for transmitting information data of multiple users over a
shared channel [Proakis and Salehi, 2008]. Applying the same spreading code principles, we
achieve watermarks that are robust against data aggregation.
Thereafter, we study the problem of secure in-network data aggregation in the presence
of de-synchronization. De-synchronization attack is one of the most effective attacks against
watermarking schemes, in which an attacker does not directly remove or jam a watermarked
signal, but instead shifts and wraps the watermarked content so that it is no longer recognizable
to the decoder [Sharma and Coumou, 2006]. Unlike previously-studied multimedia watermark-
ing systems, here the watermark de-synchronisation is not only due to lack of synchronisation
between the watermark encoder and decoder. The problem we face here is more challenging
because of the possibility of joining multiple asynchronous data streams. In fact, whenever
there is a need for reasoning about a time-varying environment such as a sensor network, the
observations must be time-stamped inside the network. The in-network time-stamping im-
plies that sensors themselves must be time-synchronised; otherwise, there will be ambiguity in
reasoning about the environment.
The majority of the proposed aggregation protocols make an implicit assumption that a
node’s clock is kept synchronised all the time. This assumption comes from the fact that
applications are not concerned with the details of synchronisation and they simply expect a
‘correct’ clock to be available at any instant [Elson and Estrin, 2001]. In Chapter 5, we argue
that, this assumption is fundamentally flawed and needs to be relaxed for the secure data
aggregation problem as well.
Our proposed watermarking methods results in watermarks that are robust against data
aggregation, and also against de-synchronization. The watermarking methods proposed in
Chapters 4 and 5 are based on Spread Spectrum (SS) watermarking that involves embedding
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Pseudonoise (PN) sequences within sensory data in a subtle manner to preserve the main
statistical properties of the host data. In the case of mergeable watermarks, the emphasis is on
allowing multiple PN sequences to be merged during the in-network aggregation operation. In
the case of de-synchronisation, the PN sequences are embedded in a particular way to provide
synchronisation marks/patterns at various locations within the aggregated data stream. The
performance of the presented watermarking scheme is tested on sensory data obtained from two
databases namely SensorScope [Barrenetxea et al., 2008], and SCADA [Almalawi et al., 2014].
The former consists of humidity measurements collected every 30 seconds by 97 weather stations
at EPFL campus and the latter contains synthesized data of a water distribution network for
a small town.
The summary of contributions for Chapters 4 and 5 are listed as follows:
• Constructing mergeable watermarking codes for authenticating in-network aggregated
data.
• Introducing the problem of de-synchronisation for watermark-based secure data aggre-
gation.
• Investigating alternative state-of-the-art PN codes that are suitable for secure and scal-
able watermark embedding.
• Providing statistical analysis of our mergeable watermarking codes.
• Proposing a new synchronisation invariant aggregatable watermarking scheme that allows
simple hardware-generated watermarks to be inserted into multiple data streams in a real
time fashion where they have been captured.
1.2.3 Digital Watermarking of Spatiotemporal Data
Chapter 6 studies digital watermarking of trajectory streams. For a moving object, a d-
dimensional trajectory includes an ordered list of time-location pairs, at which they can be
recorded of primary interest, or rather a matter of convenience to study another primary
variable such as temperature, or air quality. In Chapter 6, the spatiotemporal data refers to
the former type. Clearly, in the case of arity one (d = 1), the trajectory is simply a time-series.
Watermarking of trajectories is a challenging problem and depends on the characteristics of
objects in the dataset such as variance. For instance, a busy trajectory gives the opportunity
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to store more information whereas a very smooth line limits the watermark capacity [Lucchese
et al., 2010].
The driving force behind our solution for watermarking of trajectories is data obfusca-
tion, a technique aiming to preserve data privacy, usually by removing or replacing sensitive
information from the original values [Bakken et al., 2004]. Because embedding watermarks
introduces a tunable distortion in host data, it is possible to mask the original data for the
applications where privacy is of great concern. Contrary to conventional watermarking, the
visibility constraint can be relaxed – the reversible distortion introduced by the watermark is
used to reduce data precision to below levels where privacy can be compromised. These levels
are tunable to application-dependent granularity.
To achieve this goal, we propose a two-tier watermarking scheme, one for privacy protection
of spatial data at the time of data collection, and the other for privacy preservation of temporal
data that completes data storage. The justification for our dual watermarking method is that
only perturbing the location information is not enough for privacy preservation of trajectories.
Revealing timeliness of spatial data, also opens up the possibility of time-and-location attack
[Hwang et al., 2014] and may result in breach of privacy. Similar to the proposed methods in
previous chapters, we make use of PN sequences (generated by a dynamic linear feedback shift
register) because of their hardware-friendly nature.
As our last aim, in Chapter 6 we initiate the study of digital watermarking methods as
a data security treatment for Internet of Things (IoT). More precisely, we describe a general
framework for data protection in IoT constrained environments to enforce context-driven dis-
closure control. The term context refers to any information that characterizes the situation of
sensed data such as location and time. Central to our design is the notion of flexible privacy
– the data owner should not only be able to control whom to share data with, but also should
be able to determine how much he is willing to share. This control can be done based on
contextual information of either data owner (such as location, time or emergency situations)
or data consumer (such as role, physical co-location or time of access). Apart from that, in our
suggested framework, we advocate the privacy protection at multiple phases of data lifecycle to
afford maximum data protection. (This is different from data transmission security schemes.)
Our framework enables end-to-end protection of data through the whole data lifecycle
using lightweight privacy preservation functions such as digital watermarking. Existing privacy
preserving methods based on Differential Privacy [Dwork, 2008] go a long way towards privacy
guarantee and cannot protect large amount of data in a reasonable time. We believe, our work
also opens the door to other subsequent proposals such as using watermarking as a tool for
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asserting the veracity of big-data streams in large scale, by offering audit opportunities beyond
the simple checksum. The presented framework will be tailored for a smart vehicle system using
real trajectories taken by vehicles, as recorded from in the TAPASCologne dataset [Uppoor
et al., 2016] by the Institute of Transportation Systems at the German Aerospace Center
(ITS-DLR).
In summary, our contributions for Chapter 6 include the following:
• Proposing a context-driven granular obfuscation technique for spatiotemporal data based
on visible data watermarking techniques.
• To lay down a generic framework for privacy preservation of IoT data through the whole
lifecycle emphasizing end-to-end protection. “Generic” means to provide the minimum
but sufficient details to easily extend the presented framework for building more specific
applications.
• Describing the design and implementation of a smart vehicle system that uses the pro-
posed framework and the context-driven granular obfuscation.
Lastly, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a summary of major findings of research con-
ducted in each of the chapters separately and suggests developments for the overall state-of-
the-art in future works.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
If I have seen further than others,
it is by standing on the shoulders
of giants.
Isaac Newton
This chapter introduces watermarking preliminaries, notations and elementary building
blocks for the succeeding chapters. In particular, a brief introduction to finite filed theory
for generating pseudorandom watermark patterns and a new outlook to watermarking of non-
media data, emphasising the differences with the media counterpart, is presented.
2.1 Introduction
Information, as an expression of knowledge, is presumably the most valuable asset of humanity.
The advent of the digital world, is provided us a number of easy-to-use and relatively cost-free
channels to communicate ideas and exchange information. However, the immediate effect of
digitization has been a proliferation of illegal copying and distribution of scalable digital copies
of information that entail violating intellectual property rights beyond the physical possessions.
To resolve these issues, a digital watermark can be embedded in a piece of digital content that
may include audit-trail or copy-limitation information to aid copyright enforcement. In fact,
digital watermarking can protect individual rights further the limited monopoly protection
that is offered by law.
The above scenario described the traditional driving force of digital watermarking methods
in particular for multimedia contents. Digital watermarking offers wonderful opportunities for
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not only protection of copyrighted contents, but also serves as a general theoretical frame-
work to hide information within generic data types for various usages. In order to convey the
discussion thoroughly, this chapter gives a brief introduction to overall domain of digital wa-
termarking. Further discussion follows the descriptions of the digital watermarking taxonomy
that was presented in the previous chapter.
The chapter begins with Section 2.2 by defining basic watermarking concepts and then
Section 2.3 will concentrate on particular uses of pseudonoise sequences for generating water-
mark patterns. This type of sequences are vastly exploited for watermarking solutions that will
present in this thesis. Thereafter, the differences between media and non-media watermarking
is elaborated: Section 2.4 investigates recent applications of data watermarking, following with
a review of archetypical data hiding techniques in Section 2.5 for the suggested data taxonomy
in Chapter 1. Several existing methods are then described to highlight the characteristics of
non-media watermarking for each particular data types. Section 2.6 concludes this chapter
and gives an overview of the next chapter.
2.2 Background Concepts
In this section, we briefly review basic watermarking concepts that are used in this dissertation.
All of the following definitions are taken from the reference [Cox et al., 2007] and [Wayner,
2009].
2.2.1 Traditional Applications of Digital Watermarking
First, we give an indication of what one can expect from a digital watermark. [Cox and Miller,
2002] classified the potential applications of digital watermarking techniques during the first
50 years of its birth into six main category of transaction tracking (fingerprinting), proof of
ownership, copy control, authentication, legacy system enhancement, and database linkage.
Just as human fingerprints make each person unique and constitute a way of identification,
a digital fingerprint gives the property of distinctness amongst the copies of the digital data.
In other words, a fingerprint is a watermark that is different for each instance and can uniquely
identify the legal recipient of an authorized copy. Hence, the source of illegally re-distributed
content can be also traced. Typically, a fingerprint for a wide selection of multimedia content is
derived or extracted from some inherent properties of the content, such as colour or luminosity
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for images or videos and subsequently will be stored in a database associated with information
or actions to be taken upon detection or calculation of that fingerprint.
One of the most quoted applications of digital watermarking is proof of ownership in a court
of law, in particular when multiple ownership claims are made. The ambiguity in resolving
data ownership is called “ownership deadlocks problem” [Craver et al., 1996]. Watermarking
methods that do not require original data for detection (termed as blind watermark detection)
are the most vulnerable to ownership deadlocks and one is often unable to establish who
watermarked the data first. As shall be described in Section 2.2.3, it is possible that an
adversary counterfeits a watermark by ‘subtracting off’ a second watermark and claims the
resulted data to be his/her original.
A watermark can be used in a copy control system to enable/disable copying or specifies
certain operations that could underpin the watermark reader. For instance, a recording device
may contain a watermark detector to allow or inhibit recording depending on the information
conveyed by the watermark. Of course, for such a system to work, all manufactured recorders
must include watermark detection circuitry, example of which are already in the market such
as DVD video copy protection by Philips and Macrovision. Likewise, Digimarc Corporation
has deployed an image watermarking system, wherein watermark embedder and detector are
bundled with Adobe’s popular image processing program and Photoshop. When the detec-
tor finds a watermark, it contacts a central database to identify the watermark’s owner and
retrieves the copy control flags/actions associated with that image object.
A concealed watermark can also be used as an authentication code or tamper-proofing
method of a given piece of data. As opposed to traditional data authentication schemes such
as error correction codes or digital signatures which can still be separated from the data, a
digital watermark is (ideally) integral to the data and not separable. This helps to ensure
data integrity wherever the data goes. For this application, data enriched with watermark
information are also referred to as self-identifying data, in a sense that the authenticity of data
can be asserted from the information embedded within data itself [Chong et al., 2010]. In the
succeeding chapters, we explore this application of digital watermarking for non-media data
streams.
Watermarking can additionally play a valuable role in enhancing information or functional-
ities carried by legacy systems. An example is a backward-compatible upgrading of an existing
communication system such as an analog TV with PAL/SECAM signals [Doerr and Dugelay,
2003]. In this case, a digital signal is simultaneously transmitted with existing analog signals,
without interfering with conventional reception. This digital signal serves as a watermark. It
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is also possible to use watermarks as pointers for linking to subsequent information such as a
Website or a live channel. Similarly, many applications such as Shazam or Youtube use audio
fingerprinting for performing automatic content recognition.
The literature mentions numerous other applications where digital watermarking could be
useful. For example, a digital watermark can be used for measuring data quality degradation as
a substitution to inefficient retransmission techniques that not only consume the bandwidth,
but also do not necessarily capture all data degradation occurred in the original data itself
[Holliman and Yeung, 2002]. The other promising solution that watermarks offer is proxy-
based data transmission [Davis et al., 2009]: instead of transmitting a high resolution image or
video over a low-bandwidth network, a watermarked version of that content is transmitted in
a lower quality, and upon retrieving the watermark payload, the higher quality version of that
content will be transmitted through another high-speed channel. Additionally, a watermark
can be embedded for monitoring of airplay of advertisements on commercial radio broadcast
to confirm the promises of a radio station operator. For this purpose, the number of times the
watermark occurs during a given broadcast period is counted [Keshet et al., 2007].
2.2.2 Models of Digital Watermarking
There are several approaches in classifying watermarking schemes according to host modifica-
tions. In Figure 1.1 of Chapter 1, D and f were defined as host data and embedding function
respectively. The common embedding rules for the function f are either additive or multi-
plicative. In additive schemes, watermark samples are linearly added to the samples of the
original data (D) with appropriate amplitude to control the watermark distortion, whereas in
multiplicative schemes samples of D are first multiplied by an independent signal’s samples
and then combined with the watermark samples.
The existing watermarking schemes can also be classified based on the domain in which
information is embedded – either in spatial or transform domain. This classification comes
originally from representation of media; an image can be represented in spatial domain by
their pixel values and in transform domain by their spatial frequency coefficients. Similarly,
watermarks can be embedded within an image by modifying the pixel values such as Least
Significant Bits (LSBs) of the pixels or the transform domain coefficients such as Discrete
Cosine Transform (DCT) or Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT). A possible alternative is
embedding watermark using the combined spatial and frequency domain in order to increase
the degree of protection.
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The choice of embedding watermark information in spatial domain or transform domain,
following an additive or multiplicative approach, has resulted in a wide variety of encoding
schemes, the most known ones are summarised in Table 2.1. Low bit encoding such as LSB
addition/substitution is by far one of the simplest and common approaches for embedding
information as it only attempt in altering the low bits of data sample values. Unfortunately,
the low information capacity make these schemes vulnerable to even slight manipulations. In
chapter 3, we advocate to embed information within multiple bits to increase the watermark
capacity and robustness. Spread Spectrum (SS) watermarking is another common approach
for encoding information, the idea of which is taken from the spread spectrum techniques in
radio communications. An example of a SS watermarking is presented by [Tirkel et al., 1996].
The principle of the SS encoding is spreading watermark information across multiple data
samples that make them more robust against being detected or removal attacks. In Chapter 4
and Chapter 5 we use this encoding scheme to spread watermark information within multiple
sensory data stream jointly.
Statistical watermarking aims at encoding watermark information within statistical char-
acteristics of the host data. Often a binary pattern of the same size as the original data is
embedded where the number of “ones” is equal to the number of “zeros”. A known example is
Patchwork method first proposed by [Bender et al., 1996]. In this work, the authors noted that
the difference between any pair of randomly chosen pixels is Gaussian distributed with a zero
mean. This mean was then shifted by randomly selected pairs of points and then incrementing
the intensity of one of the points (by one) while decrementing the intensity of the other (by
one).
The class of dither modulation, especially the Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) method
was first proposed by [Chen and Wornell, 2001]. Quantization is usually a form of rounding.
The quantization process can be perturbed and a message can be encoded in this perturbation.
For example a data sample di can be rounded as round(di + 0.1) to encode a 1 bit and
round(di − 0.1) to encode a 0 bit. In this case, the expectation value over many data samples
will contain a dither corresponding to the message bits.
Angle coding is another form of multiplicative watermark encoding scheme that is useful
mainly for non-scalar data. For instance,[van Schyndel et al., 1999] introduced a non-linear
watermarking system for multi-variate data, wherein the angle formed between associated
variables is deliberately perturbed. The primary requirement of these schemes is that the
watermark can be expressed as an angle.
Note that the embedding schemes described in this section is unlikely to include a complete
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Table 2.1: Common methods for watermark embedding
Watermarking
scheme
Description Example methods
Low-bit encoding The LSB planes of sample data are
modified according to watermark
information.
[van Schyndel et al.,
1994]; [Wong, 1998]
and other early
methods.
Spread Spectrum
encoding
Watermark information is spread across
multiple data samples.
[Tirkel et al., 1996];
[Cox et al., 1997];
[Soltani Panah et al.,
2015]
Statistical
encoding
The statistical properties of host data
are modified to convey watermark
information.
[Bender et al., 1996];
[Guo et al., 2006];
[Kalantari et al., 2009]
Dither modulation
(QIM and
distortion-
compensated QIM)
The quantization process is perturbed
and a message can be stored in this
perturbation.
[Chen and Wornell,
2001]; [Bhat et al.,
2011]
Phase/angle
encoding
The watermark information (typically in
complex form) are embedded within the
angled formed between associated
variables.
[van Schyndel et al.,
1999]; [Svalbe et al.,
2000]; [Fang and
Chang, 2006]
list of all watermarking models. We only mentioned the most well-known schemes that helps in
understanding the watermarking solutions proposed in this dissertation. Therefore, omissions
should not be interpreted as being inferior to those described here. In next section, we review
some of the basic concepts in regards to security of a watermarking system, in particular some
of the major watermarking attack methods are explained.
2.2.3 Watermark Security
In the last few decades, the watermarking security issue has become one of the main challenges
facing the design of watermarking techniques and there has been criticism that many pro-
posed watermarking security solutions are weak or not as strong as they claim [Furon, 2005].
Regardless of the data type, a few challenges for watermark security are identified herein.
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Notion of Watermark Security is Still Ambiguous!
Firstly, the separation between watermark security and robustness is very ill-defined. For
instance, [Cox et al., 2007] defined security as watermark resistance against any intentional
attempt to impair watermark detection, as opposed to the normal data processing that a robust
watermark should survive. This isolation assumes that the intention behind every operation is
known and deterministic. In a real scenario, an innocent-looking operation might compromise
the watermark usability, but one may not necessarily be able to say whether it is deliberate or
not.
Figure 2.1 shows the ambivalence in the separation of robustness and security. In Figure
2.1 (a), the resilience against normal data operations and attacks are depicted as two disjoint
sets of robustness and security. Although, some overlaps are revealed between the two sets
in the Figure 2.1 (b), such as a quantization operation. Broadly speaking, quantization is a
useful compression operation mostly for images and speech processing and one may except this
belongs to the robustness set. However, it is possible that an adversary quantizes watermarked
data to damage the watermark, while keeping the alterations within allowable bounds. In such
circumstances, it is too strict to conclude whether the operation is malicious or innocent. Thus,
the two sets overlaps, but they are never identical as attacks to security includes a broader
scope than attacks to robustness and therefore, we can conclude that robustness is not sufficient
for security.
Secondly, the security of a watermarking system depends largely on the application in a
sense that every application requires its own type of security. There are many applications
where weak security is sufficient and preferable to no security mainly because there is no mo-
tivation for data tampering such as device control usages [Cox and Miller, 2002]. On the other
hand, there are some applications in particular for data authentication and data trustworthi-
ness in hostile environments where the most harmful attacks beyond unauthorised watermark
detection or removal are motivated. In other words, ‘the security level’ of the desired applica-
tion plays the crucial role in defining watermarking security.
Thirdly, the watermark security is usually determined by making assumption about the
amount of information that is available to an intruder, referred to as a threat model. Many
watermarking systems are designed based on the security through obscurity approach, which
means that data is secured through obscuring how it is secured. In fact, the assumption
here is that the data hiding algorithm is not publicly revealed [Moulin and Koetter, 2005].
The contrary argument in cryptography is the Kerckhoff’s principle which states that the
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Figure 2.1: Distinction between watermark robustness and security.
opponent knows the details of all aspects of the cryptosystem except for the secret key that
is shared between the transmitter and receiver [Petitcolas, 2000]. The adoption of Kerckhoff’s
principle for a secure watermarking system is advocated here [Furon, 2005]. This implies that
the embedding function is known to the adversary and therefore, watermark messages can
be encoded by means of an encryption algorithm before being embedded in a way that is
computationally infeasible for the opponent to guess the hidden codes.
Fourthly, the security evaluation of a watermarking system is as critical as designing a
secure watermark in first place. Most of the watermarking schemes are claimed to be robust
and secure, but there is no attempt to address the fundamental question of just how secure they
are. As the multimedia watermarking is mature enough, there are several digital watermarking
benchmarking tools such as StirMark, Certimark, Checkmark, Optimark and the Watermark
Evaluation Testbed (WET) ([Petitcolas et al., 2001] and [Cvejic, 2007]). In contrast, non-media
information watermarking techniques suffer from the lack of a common benchmark to quantify
watermarking resistance against attacks. This is understandable given the wide variety of data
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uses and types, but until such a standard emerges, there may be reluctance to see the value of
watermarking.
Addressing all of the aforementioned challenges are necessary (though ambitious) to achieve
perfect security for a digital watermarking system. The main problem is that there is no con-
sensus about a secure watermarking system and little research identifies security architecture
for watermarking systems in particular for non-media data type that is concern of this thesis.
2.2.3.1 Categories of watermarking attacks
An attack is any process applied to data which reduces the watermark detectability or extrac-
tion ability. In this section, some of the significant known attacks related to the succeeding
chapters are described. According to the reference [Voloshynovskiy et al., 2001], attacks against
a watermarking system can be coarsely classified into four main classes of removal, geometric,
cryptographic, and protocol attacks.
1. Removal attacks: The goal of this attack is complete removal of the encoded information
from the watermarked data without cracking the security of the watermarking algorithm.
In practice, the complete watermark removal is not always attained by this category of
attacks, but they may nevertheless damage the watermark information significantly. An
example is a collusion attack which is applicable when many copies of a given data set–
each signed with a key or different watermark–are obtained by an attacker or a group of
attackers. In such a case, a successful removal attack can occur by averaging all copies
or taking only small parts from each different copy.
2. Geometric attacks: In contrast to a removal attack, a geometric attack does not actually
remove the embedded watermark itself, but intend to distort the watermark detector
synchronisation. Common examples of geometric attacks for multimedia watermarking
are global and local affine transformations. Additionally, this attack is often common
against Spread Spectrum watermarking method that was described in previous section.
Synchronisation of the watermarked signal is very important and simple systems often
fail to recover this synchronisation properly. In chapter 5, a treatment to this attack will
be presented thoroughly.
3. Cryptographic attacks: The goal of a cryptographic attack is cracking the security meth-
ods in watermarking schemes and thus finding a way to remove the watermark informa-
tion or to embed misleading watermarks. One attack in this category is brute-force search
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for the embedded secret information. Another example is Oracle attack, which can be
used to create a non-watermarked data when a watermark detector device is available.
Practically, application of these attacks is restricted due to their high computational
complexity.
4. Protocol attacks: This category of attacks aims at attacking the entire concept of the
watermarking application. One type of protocol attack is based on the concept of in-
vertible watermarks, wherein an adversary subtracts his/her own watermark from the
watermarked data and then claims to be the owner of the watermarked data. This can
create ambiguity with respect to the true ownership of the data. Another example is the
copy attack. In this case, instead of destroying the watermark or impair its detection,
embedded information is estimated from watermarked data and copy it to some other
data, called target data.
For the rest of this thesis, we mainly use these four classes of attacks to assess the security
of our watermarking solutions. However, an extensive review of the state-of-the-arts attacks
against watermarking systems can be found in [Song et al., 2010]. In the next section, we
outline the preliminaries of pseudorandom sequences.
2.3 Preliminaries on Pseudorandom Sequences for Digital
Watermarking
Through this dissertation, we make use of watermark patterns that are known as pseudorandom
sequences/arrays. Most of these sequences have a strong algebraic and/or number-theoretic
flavor over finite fields. Therefore, in this section, we provide a brief introduction to pseu-
dorandom sequences. Many of these sequences, also known as spreading codes, have been
extensively used for digital communications. In fact, a state-of-the-art classification presented
by [Garc´ıa et al., 2015] divided spreading codes into three main categories, the summary of
which is depicted in Figure 2.2.
Let s = (s(0), s(1), .., s(l − 1)) be an l-ary complex sequence such that s(i) is given by:
s(i) =
{
Aie
jφi
}
= {Ai[cos(φi) + j sin(φi)]} ∀i, 0 ≤ i ≤ l − 1 (2.1)
where Ai and φi are amplitude and phase angle of the complex sequence.
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Figure 2.2: General classification of the spreading sequences. In this thesis, only pseudorandom
(PN) codes are used for watermarking purposes.
1. Real sequences: A sequence is said to be real if in Equation 2.1, φi = 0 or φi = pi for
all the elements of that sequence. Additionally, if all the coefficients Ai are the same, the
sequence is called uniform, otherwise it is classified as multilevel. The applications of real
uniform sequences with Ai = 1, referred as binary sequences, are numerous. The most
known of such sequences include Barker codes, Orthogonal Variable Spreading Factor
(OVSF) sequences, Pseudorandom sequences, Chaotic sequences, and Golay complemen-
tary pairs. Most of these sequences can be generalized to multilevel ones by drawing
coefficients from an alphabet. In some cases, it is advantageous to use multilevel real
codes for instance to increase the capacity of the system.
2. Polyphase sequences: A sequence is said to be polyphase if in Equation 2.1, φi 6= 0
and φi 6= pi ∀i = 1, ..., l. This class of sequences have been traditionally used for radar
applications, where a good Doppler response is required1. In the case of a real sequence,
when all the coefficients are equal, the sequence is uniform; otherwise it is called a non-
uniform polyphase sequence. Examples of former are chirp-like phase codes such as Frank
1In radar terminology, pulse Doppler radar is used for the estimation of range and velocity of moving object.
Since, in measurement of rapid objects at far range some ambiguities may occur, the Doppler response is used
for solving these ambiguities by sending out pulse sets with varying repetition frequency. More information can
be found here [Axelsson, 2001].
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and Zadof sequences. Examples of the latter are Huffman codes and generalized chirp-like
sequences.
3. Computationally generated sequences: This class of sequences are generated by
means of computationally searches to achieve sequences with desirable properties. A well-
known example of this category is polyphase Barker codes. Although, some numerical
optimization schemes have been carried out that found polyphase Barker sequences of
length ≤ 63, a systematic method to construct these sequences for a general length is
still missing.
Although, this dissertation is only concerned with pseudorandom sequences, other spreading
codes could also be used as watermarking patterns. In the following we only demonstrate the
generation of pseudorandom sequences. A more comprehensive description of all the spreading
codes can be found here [Garc´ıa et al., 2015].
2.3.1 Truly Random Numbers versus Pseudorandom Numbers
Random number generation is a concept of fundamental importance in many areas from cryp-
tography and gambling to numerical simulation of physical and biological systems. For in-
stance, generating randomly chosen cryptographic keys are essential to ensure the security of a
cryptographic system. The intrinsic randomness can be achieved by means of several hardware
processes such as [random.org]:
• Elapsed time between estimation of particles during radioactive decay,
• Thermal noise from a semiconductor diode or resistor,
• The frequency instability of a free running oscillator,
• Air turbulence with in a sealed drive which causes random fluctuations in disk drive
sector read latency times,
• Gathering random bits from web page hits received by a server (such as Damon Hart-
Davis’ Java EntropyPool as described in http://random.hd.org/),
• A discrete-time chaotic map, formed by the iteration of the output value in a transfor-
mation function (such as Bernoulli and Tent map [Stojanovski and Kocarev, 2001]).
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Unfortunately, the necessary hardware for random number generation cannot be assumed to
be available generally. Apart from that in some applications such as simulations and software
debugging, it is beneficial if the random perturbations were repeatable, so that if an error
was found, the test can be exactly repeated after correction. This means the random number
generation process should be deterministic to reproduce the random numbers. For this purpose,
Pseudorandom or Pseudonoise (PN) sequence generators have been studied for a long time as
a substitution for expensive and time consuming hardware random generation process.
The idea of having a deterministic method to generate a non-deterministic behaviour seems
contradictory: by observing its outcome over time, we could in principle eventually detect the
determinism and simulate such a generator [Blum et al., 1986]. In fact, the characterization
of randomness is elusive. For instance, the Lehmer congruential multiplicative pseudoran-
dom number generator is one of the earliest pseudorandom generators wherein the output is
statistically indistinguishable from a sequence drawn at random [Lehmer, 1951]. For some ap-
plications, however, this might not be enough and unpredictability of the generated numbers
is required to some extent. For instance, a SS watermarking system often encodes data in the
choice of a sequence that appears like noise to an adversary but a legitimate receiver, furnished
with an appropriate key, can recognize it. In this case, we can safety say that PN sequences
should be unpredictable to adversaries with feasible resources. In reference [Blum et al., 1986],
the unpredictability is defined as follows:
“... A pseudorandom sequence generator is polynomial-time unpredictable if and
only if for every finite initial segment of sequence that has been produced by such a
generator, but with any element deleted from that segment, a probabilistic Turing
machine, can roughly speaking, do not better in guessing in polynomial time what
the missing element is than by a flipping a fair coin.”
Many important constructions of pseudorandom numbers depend upon theory of finite fields
or rings (not necessarily linear codes), especially Galois field. In the following, we demonstrate
an important class of these construction.
2.3.2 LFSR-generated Pseudorandom Numbers
Over the last decade, there has been much progress in the design and analysis of pseudorandom
generators. In particular, Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR) are widely studied for
generating pseudorandom and deterministic patterns, due to their hardware-friendly nature
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and desirable statistical properties. Broadly speaking, there are two ways of implementing an
LFSR [Proakis and Salehi, 2008], namely Galois feedback generators and Fibonacci feedback
generators. The former uses only the output bit to add (in Galois field) several stages of the
shift register and is desirable for high-speed hardware and software implementation. The later
generates several delays of sequences without any additional logic. This dissertation is only
concerned with the Galois feedback generators.
Strictly speaking, a Galois of Finite Field is a field with a finite number of elements, denoted
by GF (pn), where p is a prime number and n is any positive integer. The elements of GF (pn)
are {0, 1, 2, ..., pn − 1}, and +,−,×,÷ operations are carried out modular pn. For instance,
GF (2) = {0, 1} is the binary field. Gf(3) = {0, 1, 2} is the ternary filed. GF (8) consists
of 8 elements as GF (23) =
{
0, 1, 2, 2 + 1, 22, 22 + 1, 22 + 2, 22 + 2 + 1
}
= {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7},
where each of the field elements is a polynomial of degree at most 2 evaluated at 2. As it is
evident from this example, what makes the binary finite fields more convenient for hardware
implementations is that the elements of GF (2n) can be represented by n-bit binary codes and
therefore the addition/subtraction operation in this field is similar to the XOR operation that
are very efficient for hardware implementation. Let us have a closer look at a Galois LFSR.
Assume r1, r2, ... ∈ {0, 1} be a sequence of binary elements, called registers, satisfying the
k-th order linear recurrence relation:
rj+k = bkrj+k−1 + ...+ b1rj (2.2)
where bi ∈ {0, 1} and addition is over the field GF (2). The sequence r1, r2, ... is called a
linear recurring sequence. Once the terms r1, .., rk have been fixed, the rest of the sequence
can uniquely be determined. If the j-th state of the sequence is represented by the vector
(rj , ..., rj+k−1), from Equation 2.2 then transitions between states can be defined. More pre-
cisely, for a given state s = (r1, ..., rk), the next state s
′ = (r′1, ..., r′k) is computed by:
r′i =
ri+1, 1 ≤ i < kf(r1, ..., rk), i = k (2.3)
where the function f is given by f(r1, ..., rk) = bkrk + ... + b1r1. This sequence of states
defines a Galois LFSR. Since an LFSR has a finite set of states, the sequence of states eventually
repeats. The number of registers is called the order of the LFSR and the number of states
which appear before the first state repeats is called the period.
It is possible to associate with every LFSR whose underlying recurrence relation is given
by Equation 2.2, the characteristic polynomial g(x) = xk− bkxk−1− ...− b1. In fact, the period
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of an LFSR is related to the order of its characteristic polynomial. Given any starting state,
expect all zeros, the LFSR could at best cycle through all possible states, but sooner or later
returns to its initial state. So, the maximum possible period is equal to 2k − 1. This only
happens, if the characteristic polynomial of the LFSR is primitive. A polynomial g ∈ Z2[x] of
degree k is said primitive (or an irreducible polynomial), if the smallest integer N for which
g|(xN − 1)| is N = 2k − 1.
Figure 2.3 shows a simple LFSR of an order 4. In this figure, a new bit is generated for
each shift, based on a linear combination of the bit values of (in this case) 3 and 4 previous
shifts. In fact, the characteristic polynomial for this LFSR is g(x) = x4 + x3 + 1 that shows
the positions of the feedback taps. Certain feedback combinations produce a pseudorandom
pattern of bits equal to 2order. So in the case of Figure 2.3, a pattern of maximal period of 15
is produced.
Figure 2.3: An LFSR of order 4 with characteristic polynomial x4 + x3 + 1. The red points
show the positions of the taps.
To further understand the operation of an LFSR, the first 16 states and outputs of the
above LFSR are shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: States of the LFSR over F2 with g(x) = x
4 + x3 + 1. The LFSR initial state is
‘1101’.
state output state output state output state output
1 1101 1 5 0011 1 9 0010 0 13 1011 1
2 1110 0 6 0001 1 10 1001 1 14 0101 1
3 1111 1 7 1000 0 11 1100 0 15 1010 0
4 0111 1 8 0100 0 12 0110 0 16 1101 1
LFSR sequences having the maximum possible period are called maximal length sequences
orm-sequences. A primitive generator polynomial always yields anm-sequence. In the succeed-
ing chapters, we take advantage of m-sequences and their derivatives to generate watermarking
sequences for marking joint of multiple data streams. However, the question of how to connect
feedback taps of an LFSR in order to produce an m-sequence requires background in abstract
algebra beyond the scope of this thesis.
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2.4 Beyond the Media: Non-media Data Hiding Applications
Over the last decade, the non-media watermarking has emerged as an exciting new sub-domain
of digital watermarking research and is still not as mature as that for media. As already
mentioned, the central focus of this thesis is studying watermarking of non-media data and the
associated challenges. In Section 2.2.1, the traditional applications of digital watermarking,
mostly for multimedia content were outlined. In the following, we have categorised the new
applications of digital watermarking for non-media data.
2.4.1 Sensor Networks
2.4.1.1 Secure In-network Data Aggregation
In-network aggregation of data is essential for wireless sensor networks in order to improve the
bandwidth usage and energy efficiency. There is always a conflict between security and data
aggregation needs in such networks [Ozdemir and Xiao, 2009]: security methods require sensors
to encrypt and authenticate any sensed data prior to their transmission, while data aggregation
protocols prefer plain data to maximize energy. These conflicting goals had led to a large body
of research on the secure data aggregation problem using a variety of techniques such as digital
signatures, cryptography algorithms, homomorphic encryption, random sampling, anomaly
detection, to name a few.
Digital watermarking is a promising substitution for many of the proposed complex se-
curity procedures to solve this problem. In particular, the spread spectrum watermarking
technique has important features such resilience against various transformations and simple
embedding operations that make it suitable for aggregation supportive environments such as
sensor networks. The first attempt to construct the spread spectrum watermarks for secure
data aggregation is raised by [Zhang et al., 2008]. The presented method visualises the sensory
data gathered from the whole network at a certain time snapshot as an image, in which every
sensor node is viewed as a pixel with its sensory data representing the pixel intensity. Then,
watermark bits are spread based upon orthogonal pseudorandom modulation pulses to avoid
interfering. This application of digital watermarking for secure data aggregation is the main
focus of Chapters 4 and 5.
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2.4.1.2 Secure Query Processing
In a sensor network, typically a sink node queries the sensors for obtaining some results.
Through literature, the secure query processing has two possible meanings: 1) the entity who
is responsible for answering sink issued queries should not learn or estimate the actual value
of either data items or queries. 2) the integrity of query results should be assured. The former
is usually addressed by encryption mechanisms, while the latter task can be accomplished by
means of watermarking methods similar to the secure data aggregation solutions. However,
none of the presented watermarking schemes for secure data aggregation can be used directly
for the secure query processing. The reason is that those techniques require all data or a large
window of data for watermark verification, whereas the secure query processing requires a small
portion of data samples that are not necessary equal to the window length used for watermark
encoding.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one work recently proposed by [Yi et al., 2013]
that addresses the query integrity preservation by means of watermarking. For this purpose,
both data samples and queries are encoded using an order preserving function, and then the
integrity verification of queries is achieved by a chain watermarking scheme that embedded the
watermark of each data sample into its predecessor. The presented protocol has the limitation
of only supporting range queries in a sensor network.
2.4.1.3 Secure Data Provenance Transmission
Data provenance shows the history of data ownership and is crucial for assurance of data
trustworthiness. Again, there are many techniques such as digital signatures, message authen-
tication codes, file headers to associate provenance information with data. In [Chong et al.,
2010], the authors designed the first watermarking system for embedding provenance infor-
mation into sensory data including positive and negative integers, decimal numbers and also
low-entropy datasets. For this purpose, provenance information is embedded into the insignif-
icant bits of data samples. The authors argued that blind watermarking schemes can be used
in sensor networks for answering the question “Where did the data come from” whereas non-
blind techniques can answer the question of “Is this data mine?”. Later on, [Sultana et al.,
2013] considered the problem of secure provenance transmission in a data streaming fashion.
The presented method constructs an audit trail of data by embedding provenance information
within inter-packet delays of consecutive packets from a sensor node over the routing tree.
One may argue that placing watermarks inside the metadata (timing information) is far
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from the purpose of watermarking in the sense that the best watermarking schemes are the
ones that are not detachable from the host data. The missing point here is that meta-data
could also be considered as host data. As an example, consider the Australian government
law for retention policy of meta-data for the duration of at least two years [Data retention
bill]. For this scenario, it is required the audit log be protected from modification to permit
detection and after-the-fact investigations of security violations and therefore watermarking
could be useful to achieve this goal.
2.4.1.4 Covert Communication
A watermark can be the carrier of a covert message such as reporting misbehaving drivers
in a Vehicle Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs). The reason that we mention this application un-
der the subcategory of sensor networks is that VANETs can use wireless technology for their
communication infrastructure in order to facilitate route planning and route safety. This chal-
lenging environment requires novel solutions with respect to those of more-traditional wireless
sensor networks though. For covertly reporting misbehaving vehicles within a VANET channel
in real-time, [de Fuentes et al., 2014] explored two information hiding techniques, namely a
subliminal channel and a steganography method. For this application, information hiding is a
superior method to crypto-primitives mainly because an encrypted report sent after the illegal
action could raise suspicious by the misbehaving vehicle owner (assuming the misbehaviour
was deliberate).
The carrier for sending information is the VANET’s beacon messages that are sent every
100 ms by all vehicles and contain the state of vehicles such as position, speed, heading, etc.
Since this information is inherently noisy, there is a chance to hide information within the
noise part. The subliminal channel embeds the report in the signature process (using Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature algorithm) of beacon messages, whereas the steganography technique
replaces the LSBs of selected sensorial data fields. The hidden misbehavior report has three
fields including misbehaving action, misbehaving vehicle identifier and also a random section
that is only used for the subliminary-based approach. In both methods, the secrete message is
encrypted with a password that is a particular permutation of the misbehaving vehicle identifier
encrypted for a certification authority.
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2.4.2 Healthcare Systems
Today, medical data is often digitized and transmitted to information technology (IT) systems
that facilitate diagnosis and treatments for patients. With the advent of cloud storage as
a repository for storing, retrieving and exchanging information, hospitals and research labo-
ratories could have instant access to many private and sensitive health records. The Public-
Population-Project in Genomics (P3G) [Knoppers and Newton] and the Bimolecular Resources
Research Infrastructure [Yuille, 2011] are examples of biobank projects focusing on the cir-
culation of biological information. Despite the achieved medical enhancements, information
technology adoption in healthcare systems remains a concern: How to preserve privacy and
security of sensitive and identifying medical information? In the following section, we look at
the role of digital watermarking for improving security of healthcare systems.
2.4.2.1 Biomedical Data Watermarking
Biomedical data such as Electrocardiogram (ECG), Electroencephalogram (EEG) and Elec-
trocardiogram (ERG) contain a number of sensitive attributes that need to be preserved from
data tampering. Sutter in 1992 originated the idea of using a spread spectrum watermark for
ERG signals [Sutter, 1992]. In this seminal work, PN sequences are used for creating image
patterns such that when they are exposed to eye patients, there will be an electrical response
in the retina that can be used for diagnosis purposes.
Kong and Feng investigated the possibility of three different fragile watermarking tech-
niques namely Patchwork, LSB substitution, and QIM for integrity verification of ECGs and
showed that the Patchwork method excelled over others in terms of noise resistance [Kong and
Feng, 2001]. A similar approach was devised by [Engin et al., 2005] using a discrete wavelet
watermarking scheme for ensuring the security of the ECG signals, whereby authentication
information is embedded in the Fourier coefficients of ECG segments. Kozat et al. proposed
the idea of fusioning sensitive metadata such Electronic Health Records (EHR) within the
medical data [Kozat et al., 2009]. For this purpose, one fragile watermark is embedded on top
of a robust watermark to achieve the dual goals of privacy protection and tamper detection
of ECG signals. Digital watermarking of an ECG data stream shall be further investigated in
Chapter 3.
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2.4.2.2 Genomic Data Watermarking
Today, cutting edge research is being conducted at the intersection of the fields of digital wa-
termarking, steganography and genetics. Similar to a digital communication system, Deoxy-
ribonucleic Acid (DNA) has emerged as a new carrier medium for hiding information, not only
for the purpose of tagging and copyright protection of genomic data, but also for effective
covert communications. Yet the same privacy issues of biomedical data exists. In this regard,
channel errors are analogus to mutations of DNA bases [Balado, 2013]. DNA is conceptually
equivalent to a quaternary finite-field sequence formed by four nucleotides (also called DNA
bases): Adenine (A), Cytosine (C), Thymine (T), and Guanine (G). For example, the sequence
AAGTCGATCGATCATCGATCATACGT represents a ‘DNA strand’. A DNA, thus, is com-
posed of two oppositely oriented strands that join together by bonding between their four
nucleotides.
Since, there are certain biological constraints in the structure of DNA segments it is not
always possible to arbitrarily change a section of nucleotide sequences. One of such constraints
is that in pairing between the two DNA strands, the nucleotide A bounds with T, and the
nucleotide G bonds with C; therefore the paring A-T and C-G are the only possible bonds that
could exist between the two strands. The other constraint is related to the ability of watermark
to surve genetic changes, in which the DNA sequence is altered permanently. These alterations,
termed mutations may occur because of several factors such as sunlight, DNA heredity, errors
in the cellular machinery, etc.
Shimanovsky et al. proposed the original idea of hiding information within DNAs [Shi-
manovsky et al., 2002]. The authors claimed that their presented techniques not only can be
used for integrity verification of DNA sequences, but also could be useful for gene copyright
protection in the realms of gene therapy, transgenic crops, tissue cloning, and DNA computing.
The application of watermarking for tracking the unauthorised use of genetically modified or-
ganisms was regonzied by [Jupiter et al., 2010]. The author proposed a watermarking system
to uniquely identify different laboratories. This is helpful for certain investigations such as
whether a particular institution is the source of a viral outbreak such as the 2001 biotressorim-
related anthrax attack.
The application of watermarking in health-care systems can be extended to other types
of genomic data such as those obtained from sexually reproducing organisms. The additional
restriction here is that recombination of a watermarked X-chromosone with a watermarked
Y-chromosone can destroy watermarks from one generation to the next one. Therefore wa-
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termarking of mitochondrial chromosome DNA for those sexually reproducing organisms is
advocated by [Heider et al., 2008], since they reproduce asexually, from the female line only,
and are thus perfect copies with no recombination.
For a comprehensive review of challenges and methods for DNA watermarking, interested
readers are referred to [Heider and Barnekow, 2011].
2.4.3 Relational Databases
The application of digital watermarking for relational data is obvious. Right protection, tamper
detection, source identification, indexing and fast retrieval are typical usages of a watermarked
database. In this section, we only review a few recent works that introduced fancy applications
of digital watermarking for relational databases.
2.4.3.1 Data Obfuscation
Data obfuscation is a technique aimed at privacy-preserving mining of data usually by remov-
ing or replacing sensitive information from the original data [Bakken et al., 2004]. The popular
data obfuscation methods include but are not limited to data swapping, data randomization,
data anonymization. Recently, [Vlachos et al., 2015] proposed a watermarking technique for
trajectory datasets with the double goals of rights protection and data obfuscation. The pro-
posed method guaranties preservation of hierarchical clustering operations after watermark
insertion. This property is important for distance-based mining applications such as anomaly
detection or classification. Since the watermark objective here is data obfuscation, the wa-
termarks can be embedded with higher amplitudes as opposed to common usages in which
the watermark is ought to be ‘invisible’ (its presence being undetectable to the normal data
reader). It is interesting to note that the possibility of watermarking for code obfuscation as
a defence against reverse engineering has been already discovered in software security litera-
ture. A good survey of watermarked-based obfuscation for software protection can be found
here [Collberg and Thomborson, 2002]. Chapter 6 will demonstrate an obfuscation method for
privacy preservation of spatiotemporal data streams.
2.4.3.2 Forensic Construction
Digital watermarking is a useful primitive for forensic construction. By forensic construction,
we mean indexing information in a way that data alterations can be identified by an auditor.
The idea of a watermark-based forensic construction for memory-based data structures was
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studied by [Goodrich et al., 2005]. In this work, forensic construction for several data structures
including binary search trees, skip lists, linked lists and hash tables is suggested. The proposed
construction encodes information into the layout of the data structure rather than data itself.
In fact, the encoded information is a matrix that contains the hash values of a concatenation
of a subset of items in the given data structure. In contrast to storing hash values for data
authentication, this method requires no additional space other than a cryptographic master
key for auditors.
Protecting disk-based data structures is more challenging compared to memory-based coun-
terparts. This is because the memory-based data could be attacked only during the execution
time, whereas the disk-based data can be attacked oﬄine as well. As such, [Kamel, 2009]
advocated the importance of watermarking of not only relational tables, but also all various
relevant indexes. In particular, a forensic construction for R-tree data structures is proposed.
One might be interested to use digital signatures for a R-tree. We argue that if the digital
signature is applied to the whole R-tree, the changes to individual values cannot be localized.
In contrast, appending a separate signature to every node is not practical due to large required
storage that results in performance penalty. The presented forensic construction encodes the
information within the order of entries inside the R-tree nodes relative to a secret key that
corresponds to the watermark values. Furthermore, a factorial numbering system is used to
provide mapping between possible permutations of the entries in R-tree and all possible values
of the watermark.
2.4.4 Cloud Computing
In recent years, cloud computing has emerged as one of the most promising computing paradigms.
Cloud users obtain storage and computing resources from cloud providers on demand, the with-
out local hardware and software maintenance burden.
Despite all its benefits, there are still many ‘cloud fears’ that inhibit the adoption of cloud
services by cloud users. Privacy is the main critical issue for cloud users as they do no longer
have the physical possession of their data. Putting data in a multi-tenancy environment also
makes it vulnerable to unauthorised changes and might result in significant loss for individuals
and organisations Hence, security against unauthorised accesses and privacy preservation have
been long-term goals of the cloud security research community – many of them yet shift trust
from a cloud provider to another third-party [Chow et al., 2009]. Digital watermarking cannot
solve all of these problems alone, but it could be useful in augmenting trust and security when
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combined with other security approaches.
2.4.4.1 Secure Data Outsourcing
The ‘information-centric’ security advocates shifting data protection from the outside to within
[Chow et al., 2009]. This means that for controlling data in the cloud, data itself needs to be
self-describing, and defending regardless of its environment. Therefore, cloud users need to
have their own procedures for auditing outsourced data.
In [Bertino et al., 2005] two important issues pertaining to sharing medical data are ad-
dressed including privacy protection of individuals associated with the data and copyright
protection over the private data . Thereby, the authors proposed a framework with two main
components i.e. a binning agent and a watermark agent. Before outsourcing, medical data
undergoes two consecutive steps: firstly, the binning agent bins the data to satisfy k-anonymity
specification and secondly the watermark agent inserts watermark information in a hierarchical
manner.
A compressive sensing-based framework for secure watermark detection using a multi-party
computation protocol is described by [Wang et al., 2014b]. Compressive Sensing (CS) is an
alternative to Shannon sampling theory for the reconstruction of a sparse signal whose sampling
rate is far less than twice the maximum frequency present in the signal. Unlike the common
assumption of publicly availability of watermarked data at the time of detection, the authors
considered a scenario in which the privacy preservation of watermarked data is also essential
and therefore the watermarked data would be only available in a transformed format such
encrypted- or CS-data. In the proposed framework, the cloud not only supplies storage for
outsourcing data in CS form, but also provides watermark detection service. The proposed
framework is specifically useful for a scenario whereby a cloud provider is willing to provide
storage to only copyright protected content from one hand and the cloud user, on the other
hand, only outsource his/her data in transform domains for the sake of privacy.
2.4.4.2 Data Colouring by Cloud Watermarking
Data colouring is a digital watermarking technique based on Cloud model, in which each user
is assigned a specific color for protection of a copyrighted content. Colour is just a metaphor,
referring to watermarking of all pieces of user’s data. That is to say, not only the whole
data but also every fragment of that data is branded [Liu et al., 2011]. This is similar to
digital holographic watermarking methods, whereby part of hologram can be used to decode
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the hidden information in a short amount of time. An example is given in [Kishk and Javidi,
2003].
Mathematically speaking, cloud model is an uncertainty transformation model between
a qualitative concept and its numerical representation. This model associates the qualitative
concept with three numerical parameters namely expected value (Ex), entropy (En) and hyper
entropy (He) to represent the overall property of cloud drops. Using a forward cloud generator,
a piece of cloud is made from a large number of cloud drops that has a visible shape in a whole,
but fuzzy in detail. The forward cloud generator constructs cloud drops based on the three
mentioned numerical parameters.
The idea of using cloud model for digital watermarking was first introduced in [Zhang
et al., 2005] for copy right protection of relational databases and later on was extend by [Liu
et al., 2011] for trust management in cloud-computing environments. In a cloud watermark-
ing approach, for given certain watermark information as expected value and other suitable
parameters, a series of similar but different cloud drops are generated by the forward cloud
generator in a way that a large number of randomly generated drops guarantee the certainty
of that watermark. On the other hand, the watermark detection algorithm uses a backward
cloud generator to retrieve Ex, En, and He values from the construed cloud.
2.4.5 Network Flow Watermarking
In spite of all the good usages of watermarking techniques that have been described so far, there
exist other watermarking applications with obverse intentions such as breaking the anonymity
of a communication. An anonymous communication system like Anonymizer.com, attempts
to remove all the identifying characteristics from the network flow to provide communication
privacy beyond the content privacy. In such systems, an adversary might perform traffic anal-
ysis to disturb anonymity and finding communication relationships. Watermarking techniques
are useful tools for linking network flows mainly because they can significantly reduce the
computation and communication costs of traffic analysis with more accurate detection rates.
One of such attempts is proposed by [Wang et al., 2007a] that is able to uniquely identify
a long flow. This is achieved by injecting a unique watermark into the inter-packet timing
of a packet flow. The presented method could successfully penetrate the Total Net Shield
anonymous service with only 10 minutes active Web browsing. Later on, two other similar wa-
termarking systems were proposed, namely RAINBOW [Houmansadr et al., 2009] and SWIRL
[Houmansadr and Borisov, 2011]. Both systems actively modify the traffic patterns of a net-
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work flow (usually packet timings) to embed a special pattern. If the same pattern is later
found on another flow, the two are considered linked. In a recent research conducted by [Bates
et al., 2014] a network-flow watermarking attack is demonstrated to identify virtual machines
co-located on the same physical resource. For this purpose, a malicious user is able to embed a
watermark into the network flow of a target instance and broadcast co-residency data from that
physical machine in order to compromise co-residence isolation in virtualization middleware,
under 10 seconds traffic analysis.
Apart from attacking anonymous communications, digital watermarking can be beneficial
for detecting stepping stones [Wang and Reeves, 2011]. Such methods divert a network connec-
tion from an attacker to a victim through a number of compromised hosts and therefore hides
the attacker identity. Detecting such hosts, called stepping stones, is an important problem in
computer security in order to trace attacks back to their true sources. Recently information
hiding has been coupled with the IP spoofing to combat Internet censorship [Wang et al.,
2012b]. The proposed framework called CensorSpoofer, tunnels data over existing protocols
such that a low-capacity email channel is used for upstream messages and a high-capacity VoIP
channel is utilized for downstream. In other words, upstream channel hides the requests using
steganography within email/IM, whereas the downstream channel uses IP spoofing to conceal
the proxy’s real address.
2.4.6 Financial Systems
The application of information hiding techniques in financial systems is evolving and still
requires more attentions from academia2. The reason might be the high sensitivity level of
information in financial applications and difficulty of finding a security solution on a cost
effective basis. Nonetheless, there are few works in this area that are worth mentioning. One
of the interesting applications of digital watermarking has appeared with the advent of the first
decentralised electronic currency system called Bitcoin [Nakamoto, 2008]. This system uses a
powerful scripting mechanism to determine tokens ownership. The proposed Colored coins by
[Rosenfeld, 2012], also called watermarked tokens, allow users to watermark their Bitcoins.
Additionally, these colored coins extend the ability of biotins to represent other assets such as
car, Smartphone, stock, and so forth such that they can be tracked on the Bitcoin blockchain.
The other application of information hiding techniques in financial systems that is still in
infancy is money-laundering detection. Leigh investigated the possibility of covert channels
2Please note that the works that have been cited for this subsection are all white papers, but we believe
they are worthy to mention.
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in financial networks for money laundering [Leigh, 2016]. Consider the scenario where Bob is
part of a money laundry network and runs a legitimate business such as a retail shop. Bob’s
supplier pays him inflated prices for buying merchandise as a common customer. If we assume
the payment is done via direct credit or wire transfer, Bob could use the cent values of the bank
transfer to indicate the next person who the money should be passed; for example, amount
ending with 01 cents are transferred to Alice, 02 to Claire, and so on. This way a covert
channel for money laundry is provided.
The author developed a framework for testing data hiding in electronic funds transfer sys-
tems with direct debit transactions in use within. The conclusion was that steganography
analysis could be used for detecting the presence of hidden data in financial covert channels
(referred to anti-money laundering), whereas digital watermarking techniques are useful for
tracing suspect transactions and possibly determining the degree of separation between sus-
pects. We also envision the possibility of covert channels for new digital currencies such as
Bitcoin credit.
2.5 Digital Watermarking of Complex Data Types
In Section 1.1 of the previous chapter, we introduced a new classification for complex data
types that sets the basis for analyzing the research which has been conducted in this thesis.
This section provides a detailed look of digital watermarking techniques for the mentioned
complex data types. All the presented methods are analysed regarding to the magic triangle
of transparency, robustness and capacity. With the aid of a few examples, the watermarking
methods for each data type and the main restrictions are identified. A more generous review
of our non-media watermarking taxonomy can be found in [Soltani Panah et al., 2016].
2.5.1 Time-series
Time series data is perhaps the most frequently encountered type of data used by the data
mining community. Given a one dimensional (1D) time-series of length n, it can be repre-
sented by an ordered set of n numeric values at each timestamp t1, t2, ..., tn. This definition
is compatible with a discrete time-series that contains a finite set of values. In contrast, a
continues time-series contains an unbounded stream of data values, and therefore a window is
introduced to extract finite portions of the stream. An example of this type of data is ECG
time-series that shall be looked thoroughly in Chapter 3. Therefore, we only give a example of
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ECG watermarking method here and postpone the detailed discussion to the next chapter.
Figure 2.4: An overall overview of watermarking of ECG time-series (EHR stands for Electronic
Health Record).
Example 2.1. One of the important workarounds for watermarking of time-series, in particular
ECG data is proposed by [Kozat et al., 2009], wherein sensitive numerical meta-data (such
as patient’s social security number or date of birth) constitutes watermark information. As
depicted in Figure 2.4, the proposed scheme is a dual watermark that combines a robust and
a fragile watermark to embed information within an ECG signal. The robust watermark is
a SS modulated watermark embedded in the frequency domain for storing patient data. The
host ECG is thus partitioned into a set of overlapping subsequences, and for each of these
sub-ECGs, the same watermark is spread over many frequencies so that the energy in any
subsequence is very small and minimally detectable. The fragile watermark is added on top of
the resulting signal and contains the robust watermark for identifying possible tampering of
the host data based on the LSB alteration method of selected positions of the host data.
In order to preserve privacy of private metadata, a randomized representation of the meta-
data is generated by a cryptographically safe hash function. Then, the resulted hash value is
enclosed with an error correcting code (such as Hamming codes) for aiding data recovery in
the case of data corruption. In order to determine the watermark embedding power, a cardiol-
ogist examined a random subset of watermarked normal and arrhythmia ECGs to determine
whether the diagnostic values of the ECG data is preserved.
Magic triangle: The main challenge of watermarking ECG data is preserving cardiac diag-
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nosis. This requirement is equivalent to the invisibility constraint of multimedia watermarking.
The presented method is imperceptible to main ECG features3 and hence does not change the
cardiovascular diagnosis of a physician. The watermark capacity for an ECG segment of size
168 is a 30-bit long binary stream (equivalent to a 9 digit numerical Social Security Number)
or 56 bits including Hamming code(7,4). It is shown that, the robust watermark is resilient
against vertical shifts, decimation attack, cropping attack, and noise addition in both space
and frequency domain.
2.5.2 Biological Sequences
In contrast to the time-series, biological sequences such as DNAs do not refer to time explicitly,
but the ordering of such data provides information about the data characteristics. Typically,
there are two parts for embedding information within DNA namely coding and non-coding
segments. A noncoding DNA (nc-DNA) segment is never translated to a protein, whereas a
coding DNA (c-DNA) may be translated into a protein eventually [Balado, 2013]. Similar to
multimedia watermarking that prefers to embed watermarks within active parts of the host data
rather than headers or trailers to achieve maximum robustness, the strongest watermarking
techniques for DNAs hide information in the actual sequence coding of the genes rather than
noncoding parts [Shimanovsky et al., 2002]. The challenge is therefore how to preserve the
important protein coding of the genes. This feature is referred to as ‘amino-acid preservation’
in the DNA watermarking literature. Figure 2.5 shows an example of embedding information
within a c-DNA segment.
Example 2.2. In [Shimanovsky et al., 2002] two data hiding techniques are proposed with the
purpose of tagging and integrity verification of important genetic materials. The first technique
hides data within non-coding DNA or non-translated RNA regions, while the second method
hides data directly into active genetic segments. The basic idea of the two techniques is based
on DNA codon redundancy. A codon is a grouping of three nucleotides. There are 43 different
codon combinations with a triplet nucleotide of an RNA, whereas there are only 20 standard
amino acids. Hence, each amino acid can be encoded by more than one codon. For instance,
the codons ‘GCU’, ‘GCC’, ‘GCA’, and ‘GCG’ encode the same amino acid known as Alanine.
If the codon ‘GCU’ is intended to be marked with a secrete message 4, it is replaced by ‘GCG’
because this is the fourth codon of the set of codons whose mapping amino acid is Alanine.
3The main ECG features are called PQRST values that correspond to the set of maximal/minimal points
of ECG signal. This will be further described in Chapter 3.2.
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Figure 2.5: An example of watermark encoding within a coding DNA segment. For instance,
according to the codon table, the two codons ‘GTG’ and ‘GTT’ result in the same amino acid,
Valine. Therefore, they can be interchangeably used for watermark insertion.
The embedding process is based on arithmetic coding technique: a binary sequence cor-
responds to the watermark message is first converted into a decimal number between 0 and
1. Then, for the amino acid sequence generated by the original mRNA, a list of all possible
codons that result in the same amino acid is found. After that the number can be calculated by
continually subdividing the number of codon combinations for each amino acid in the sequence.
In order to prevent ambiguity, the subdivision process of the arithmetic encoding can be done
in an alphabetical order. Curiously, this kind of code redundancy is similar to that used for
software code watermarking [Collberg and Thomborson, 2002].
Magic triangle: Amino acid preservation is the main requirement for a DNA watermarking
algorithm. The proposed scheme does not change the transcription or translation of a protein
and therefore gives the identical amino acid sequence as that of the original DNA. The capacity
of the scheme has not been investigated for a general case, but through an example, the authors
have shown the ability of embedding 40 bits into a short mRNA sequence. The embedded
message is encrypted prior to watermarking. Also, the authors have suggested using other
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arrangement technique rather than an alphabetical arrangement for nucleotide subdivision to
prevent an attacker from repeating the same watermarking process. This implies the security-
through-obscurity assumption that was already discussed in Section 2.2.3.
Example 2.3. DNA-Crypt algorithm is a method that secretly marks a DNA sequence by
using a combination of encryption and steganography techniques [Heider and Barnekow, 2007].
Encrypted messages are integrated into nc-DNA regions with the purpose of detecting unau-
thorized usage of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO). The method takes advantage of
amino acid redundancy to replace single bases and thus creating ‘synonymous codons’ in the
genome. More specifically, the DNA-Crypt allocates four bases {A,C,G,T} to 2 bits and
embeds the last base of four synonymous codons into 2 bits of the watermark. In order to
make the watermarks robust against DNA mutation, correcting codes such as Hamming codes
are used to keep the information intact. An integrated fuzzy controller decides on a set of
heuristics, whether to use a correction code or not for optimal performance based on three
variables including length of the sequence, the individual mutation rate, and the stability over
time (i.e. number of generations). Eventually, the resulted encrypted information is placed
into the given DNA for long term storage. The proposed DNA-Crypt introduces only a few
sequence mismatches that present similarly to noise in image steganography.
Magic triangle: Similar to the previous method, the proposed DNA-Crypt does not change
the transcription or translation of a protein and therefore, the amino acid sequences are pre-
served after hiding information. The conducted in silico experiments on Ypt DNA proteins
demonstrated the possibility of embedding 16.5 bytes information within a DNA sequence.
Additionally, the presented method is resilient to mutations due to utilizing several mutation
error correcting codes for correcting hidden information.
Example 2.4. Three reversible DNA-based data hiding methods namely insertion, the com-
plementary pair, and the substitution methods are proposed by [Shiu et al., 2010]. Despite
previously discussed techniques, the objective here is neither preserving intellectual property
nor authentication of genome data, but the DNA data hiding is utilized as a fancy way of
exchanging secret information through an insecure channel such as a session key. For each
method, a public DNA sequence is used as a reference, which implies the sender and receiver
have to agree on the reference sequence. Since there are roughly 163 million publicly available
DNA sequences, it is theoretically impossible for an attacker to guess the reference sequence.
The proposed algorithms are based on two secret schemes called a binary coding rule and
a complementary coding rule that is only known to the sender and receiver. The former
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transforms letters into binary codes and vice versa such as mapping nucleotides A, C, G, T
to 00,01,10,11. The latter assigns each letter x to a complement letter C(x). For example,
the complementary rule ((AC)(CG)(GT)(TA)) results in mapping the string of ‘AATGC’ to
‘CCATG’. Apart from the high data capacity, the three methods have a few disadvantages: the
insertion method requires several keys be transmitted to the receiver; the complementary pair
method expands the sequence length significantly; and the substitution method requires that
the original DNA sequence be transmitted to the receiver for extracting the secret message.
Among the three methods, the substitution method is more compact and effective compared
to the other two methods.
Magic triangle: The transparency of the proposed methods are measured based on the
reference DNA sequence’s length after watermark insertion. The reason is that a long DNA
sequence can easily attract the attention of intruders. The three methods suffer from the
expansion problem; in particular, the expansion of the DNA sequence using the complementary
pair method is larger than the expansions for the other two methods. The capacity of the three
methods are investigated based on bits per nucleotide (bpn). The substitution method has the
best capacity while the complementary pairs has the worst capacity. In terms of robustness,
the insertion method has the most resistance against modifications while the complementary
offers the least robustness.
2.5.3 Graph-Structured Data
Today much sensitive data are captured as large graphs like those obtained from social media
Websites such as Facebook or Tweeter. The social data can be modeled as a graph G = (V,E),
where people are analogues to the graph vertices V and their social ties corresponds to the
graph edges E connecting those vertices. In spirit, the idea of many graph watermarking
schemes is convolving a random looking graph with an original large enough dense graph.
Figure 2.6 represents this procedure at a glance. In Figure 2.6 (a) the marked part of the
original graph (coloured as red) shows the extracted sub-graph whose edges are going to be
added or deleted according to the watermark graph (Figure 2.6 (b)).
Apart from social network graphs, watermarking of semi-structured data such as XMLs
and software watermarking have similar graph structure model to that of social data and
therefore we will provide an example of such watermarks in the following. In many software
watermarking schemes, it is customary to add a set of additional constraints to a given problem,
the intellectual property of which is desired in order to limit the choice of solutions.
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Figure 2.6: Graph watermarking at a glance. (a) Original graph (b) Watermark (c) Water-
marked graph.
Example 2.5. In [Qu and Potkonjak, 1999] a constraint-based watermarking method for in-
tellectual protection of a graph coloring solution is proposed, whereby watermarks are encoded
as extra constrains within the register allocation of an application. A graph colouring problem
aims at labelling the vertices of a graph with minimum number of colors such that no two
connected vertices have the same colour In this work, the graph colouring problem is modeled
as a random graph of n vertices with edge probability p denoted as Gn,p(V,E), and then three
watermarking methods are described for embedding the message M into a k-color solution.
The first technique adds extra edges between a set of pairs of vertices according to the binary
encryption of M and forces those vertices to have different colours The second technique selects
one or more subsets S ⊂ V according to the message M and assigns each subset with one colour
and then color the rest of the graph. The selected subset(s), called maximal independent set
(MIS), are selected in a way that none of the vertices in S are connected to each other, while
all other vertices not in S are connected to at least one of the vertices of S. The third method
adds new vertices and associates edges based on the watermark M to the original graph G.
All the presented methods enjoy high credibility, meaning that the watermark signatures are
easily detectable with low probability of coincidence for the proof of ownership. Among the
three methods, the MIS technique has the least watermark information capacity.
Magic triangle: The watermark invisibility is evaluated based on the quality of colouring
solution after watermark insertion. For this purpose, the number of colours after hiding wa-
termark signatures is compared to that of original solution (k). It is shown the three methods
provide high credibility with at most one colour overhead even for large graphs. Addition-
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ally, the maximum watermark capacity for the three methods are n, log2 n logb n, and 2n bits
correspondingly, where b = 11−p . There is no discussion on the robustness of the scheme.
Example 2.6. The problem of watermarking weighted graphs that are generated from map
data is studied by [Khanna and Zane, 2000]. The presented scheme is useful for tracing pirate
map copies on the basis of queries alone, referred to as query-preserving watermarking. In fact,
the hypothesis is that data is only partially accessible through a set of queries. For example,
a suspected database provided by an unknown server can only be examined based on queries’
results.
The proposed scheme encodes information in the weights of the graph representing the
map, such that the length of any shortest path is not modified beyond an acceptable and
provable distortion d. Additionally, a general probabilistic method is proposed to mark graphs
in an adversarial setting, where the malicious data provider tries to erase the watermark by
introducing distortions to query results. For this purpose, the original graph G is associated
with a vector X that includes the correct answers to the queries. The marked copy of the
vector X denoted as Y is then constructed from a random vector B such that Y (i) = X(i) +
amid + adiffB(i) represents the correct answers in the marked graph, where amid =
a1+a2
2 and
adiff =
a2−a1
2 for a pair of distinct values a1, a2 ∈ {0,+1,−1}. Thereby, if the owner constructs
the vector Z based on queries’ results of the suspected data, the provider is responsible for the
suspected copy, if ∀i, |Z(i)−X(i)| > d.
Magic triangle: The watermark invisibility of the presented scheme is equivalent to pre-
serving the shortest path lengths for each pair of nodes in the marked graph. The watermark
capacity is investigated for three different queries including edge, distance, and route queries
in both non-adversarial and adversarial settings. For a graph G with n nodes and m edges,
it is possible to encode O(m1/2−d/2) bits of information for the edge model and O(n1/2−1/d)
for distance model with an additive distortion of 1/d (0 < d < 1/2). The adversarial setting
can be considered as the robustness against deliberate attacks as the provider distorts queries
by a bounded value in order to evade the fingerprint. Also the presented scheme is based
on the assumption that the (suspected) data provider has limited knowledge about the graph,
which may limit the suitability of the method in some severe circumstances where the malicious
provider has gained access to the true distances.
Example 2.7. In [Zhao et al., 2015] a method of in-band watermark insertion is proposed
for privacy preservation of shared graphs among multiple parties. A watermark Wi is a small
tailor-made graph generated from a graph G of n nodes, a graph key only known to data owner
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and a key known to a user (party) whom the marked graph is shared with. The watermark Wi is
a random graph (generated based on the Erdos-Renyi model in which the degrees distribution
follows a Poisson distribution) with node count k such that each of the
(
k
2
)
edges is added
to the Wi independently with the probability p. Then a sub-graph S ⊂ G is extracted from
the original graph and the Wi graph is overlaid with S. The underlying requirement for
the proposed solution is that the original graph degree and also sub-graph density should be
comparable or even higher than the generated watermark sub-graph.
To reinforce watermark uniqueness, a hash-based labeling scheme is proposed such that
for each node, a hash value is constructed from the array of its neighbor degrees called node
structure description (NSD). For example, for a node v with three neighbours of degrees 2, 4,
and 6, its NSD is “2-4-6”. This way, k hash values are randomly generated as node indexes of
the sub-graph S. Finally, S is modified to match the watermark Wi using an XOR operation
on its edge values. This results in a unique watermark graph GWi constructed for user i using
seed value Ωi (associated with the user key and the graph key). The challenging part of the
watermark extraction is related to identifying the existence of a sub-graph in an arbitrary large
test graph. This problem is called ‘subgraph matching’ in graph literature and known to be
NP-complete. The authors avoid this pitfall by pruning the search space into a small number
of selected nodes.
Magic triangle: For a graph dataset, watermark insertion should not change overall struc-
ture of the graph. Therefore, three methods are proposed to measure graph distortions: 1)
counting number of modified nodes and edges, 2) calculating Euclidean distance between the
dK-2 deviations (joint degree distributions) of original and marked graph, and 3) measuring
standard graph metrics including degree distribution, assortativity, clustering coefficient, av-
erage path length and diameter. The information capacity is not investigated thoroughly, but
it has been noted that, the watermark graph requires average node degree of (k + 1)/2 and
average graph density of
(k2)+k−1
2 to ensure watermark uniqueness and minimum distortion.
Robustness is evaluated based on both a single and collusion attack model and a hierarchical
watermark embedding process is suggested to countermeasures collusion attack as well.
Example 2.8. The study by [Gross-Amblard, 2011] investigated the capacity of watermarking
protocols that preserve a set of predefined queries. The author showed that for a scalable
watermarking protocol, marks should be hidden into weights of active tuples of the dataset,
that is those tuples that are part of query answers. In particular, a watermarking protocol
for preserving Monadic Second-Order (MSO) queries on treelike structures such as XMLs and
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classes of structures with bounded clique-width or tree-width is suggested. MSO is a node
selection query language for XML documents with a more expressive form than XPath. For
every MSO query, there exists an automaton which defines the equivalent query. Hence, it is
possible to compile a MSQ formula into the correspondence tree automation augmented with m
selecting states in order to evaluate the MSO query. For watermark insertion, the constructed
automation tree is fully traversed in a bottom-up order to form |W |/4m subsets of size at least
2m and at most 4m, where |W | is the size of active tuples. Then, for each set a pair of nodes
that force the automation to end is searched and marked to control the overall distortion.
Magic triangle: The watermarking scheme does not change the first-order and MSO queries’
results up to an acceptable distortion, and therefore is transparent to those queries performed
on treelike structures. Following the non-adversarial model, it is possible to embed |W |/4m
information such that MSO query results are preserved. For the adversarial model, one can
embed O(L) bits with a detector’s error probability at most max {2p,O(1)}, given L = d|W |/2e
and p ≥ e−O(L). Also, the presented scheme is robust against random distortion of query
answers (adversarial setting).
2.5.4 Spatial Data
Spatial data usually presents d non-spatial attributes for one or more spatial locations. The
location attributes could be defined based on spatial coordinates such as latitude or longitude
or in terms of logical locations in a map such as the city or state. The most striking types
of spatial data include point, polyline, polygon, and grid. The first three follow a vector data
model while the last one is a raster model representing continues surfaces.
The key part of the majority of the presented schemes for watermarking maps is feature
selection, in which the most resilient features of a given map are extracted in order to survive
map transformations and other attacks that attempt in impairing the embedded watermark.
For example, [Yan et al., 2011] used a Voronoi diagram for extracting the key points of a map
from multiple layers. The key points are defined as those points in the map that have more
important geometric and/or attribute aspects than the other points. Removing or editing the
key points (such as joint points of a polygon) by an adversary is less probable as it makes the
map useless. Figure 2.7 shows some of the feature selection algorithms that we review in this
subsection.
Example 2.9. A good representation of spatial data watermarking can be found in [Doncel
et al., 2007], where a zero-bit multiplicative watermark is described for copyright protection
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Figure 2.7: An overview of feature selection methods for finding resilient watermark places in
a map.
of 2D vector graphics data such as polygons. Additionally, an optimal blind detector whose
performance is superior to a traditional correlator is proposed. Since Fourier descriptors of
a polygonal line are invariant to a number of geometrical transformations, they are selected
to carry watermark information. Traditional watermarking schemes often use a correlator to
estimate the watermark. As a matter of fact, the embedding rule for polygon lines is rarely
additive and the Gaussian approximation is not valid anymore for their Fourier coefficients
magnitude. Instead, the authors observed that, the Fourier descriptors were modeled by a
Rayleigh distribution under the assumption that those descriptors are independent random
variables, the detector performance will be improved. Finally, the watermarking scheme is ex-
tended for marking multiple polygonal lines by means of distributing the watermark uniformly
through the vector graphic file. In particular, when two lines share a number of points (such as
shared boarders of neighboring countries), they must be kept coincident at the corresponding
locations (for retaining common boarders) after watermark insertion.
Magic triangle: The proposed method for marking vector graphic data should not cause
any visual distortion after watermark insertion. The most delicate issue is watermarking of
overlapping and adjacent lines as the distortion could convey false information such as changing
the boarder divisions among countries on a map and therefore makes common boarders separate
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or vice verca. The proposed method can survive geometric distortions including translation,
rotation, isotropic scaling and change of traversal starting point. Also the presented watermark
is sufficiently robust to noise addition and anisotropic scaling attacks but is vulnerable to vertex
removal attacks. As already mentioned, the method is a zero-bit scheme meaning that only
the presence or absence of a watermark can be investigated.
Example 2.10. In [Yan et al., 2011] a watermarking scheme for copyright protection of vector
geo-spatial data is presented. To enhance the robustness against attacks, watermark informa-
tion is embedded into three different feature layers of the geo-spatial data. The more impor-
tant a layer is, the more likely the layer ought to be chosen. After selecting feature layers,
the proposed method modifies the coordinates of some key points for each layer. The authors
demonstrated several procedures for selecting key points from each type of layer (point, linear
and areal) taking into account the specific attributes of those feature layers. For example, a
Voronoi diagram is utilized for selecting key points in a specific point set. The watermark
encoding process, converts a watermark string into an ASCII code and after shuﬄing and ex-
erting a NOT bit operation, embeds the watermarks into the LSBs of the x or y coordinates
of the selected key points.
Magic triangle: The watermarking method does not change the topological relations among
spatial objects and therefore is invisible. It is possible to adjust the number of LSBs used for
watermark embedding according to the required data precision for practical applications and
make the watermark transparent to those applications. The watermarking scheme is robust
against data format change, random noise, similarity data transformation, and data editing.
The capacity of the watermark is not investigated, but it is mentioned that the number of
points in each selected feature layer should be greater than the number of watermark bits to
ensure the feasibility of watermark insertion.
Example 2.11. In [Lee and Kwon, 2013] a blind watermarking scheme for a GIS vector is
proposed by selecting layers with the highest density of polylines and polygons as target layers
in order to improve the robustness against layer attacks.The method clusters all polylines and
polygons in the target layer of the map using a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) and embeds
a watermark on the basis of the distribution of polyline length and polygon area in each group
by moving all vertices in polylines and polygons within a specified tolerance. In other words,
an watermark W constitute a polygon watermark WPG embedded in all polygon groups and a
polyline watermark WPL embedded in all polyline groups.
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Magic triangle: The method is invisible as it does not cause any perceptual difference
between the original layer and the watermarked layer of the map. However, based on the
experiments, this difference is slightly visible when the map is magnified three times. The
watermark capacity depends on the map layers and number of polylines and polygons in
the target layers. One requirement is that, the watermark length exceeds the
∑NPL
i=1 NPLi +∑NPG
i=1 NPGi , where NPLi and NPGi show the number of polylines and polygons in a layer,
respectively. For example, in a 1:25,000 scaled map with 116 layers with 11,175 polylines and
7,765 polygons, the proposed method inserted 1719 watermarks successfully (1014 polyline and
705 polygon watermarks). The presented scheme is robust against rotation, scaling, translation,
region and vertex cropping, data adding, random noise addition, polyline and polygon breaking,
object filleting and simplification, layer rearranging, layer cutting. Additionally, the average
number of objects in a group, and the watermark length influence the watermark robustness
and capacity and are inversely proportional.
Example 2.12. A high capacity reversible data hiding method for 2D vector maps is presented
in [Wang et al., 2014a]. For this purpose, the distance between the minimum and maximum
coordinates of each axis are divided into equal segments and then two virtual coordinates are
calculated for each coordinate according to the segment, which the coordinate is within. The
new-formed intervals created by two virtual coordinates are modified to carry secret bits. In
order to resist feature rearrangement and vertex traversing attacks, different vertex traversing
orders are defined for different types of features. For example, within each polylines, vertices
are sorted and traversed from the vertex with the biggest coordinate value (start vertex) to the
vertex with the smallest vertex value (end vertex). Similarly, polylines are scanned from the
polyline with the largest start vertex to the polyline with the smallest start vertex. Because
vertex traversing order is essential for resisting feature rearrangement attacks, the start and
end vertices are not used for watermark embedding.
Magic triangle: The presented watermark does not cause any significant visual distortion
that is achieved by appropriately selecting the length of each interval created by two virtual
coordinates. Apart from that, the presented method preserves the watermarked vertices within
the original vertex range. If every coordinate carries c bits, the data capacity is about 2c times
the number of vertices in the vector map. The robustness of the proposed method is low and
is only immune to feature rearrangement and vertex reversing operations for polylines and
polygons.
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2.5.5 Spatiotemporal Data
A trajectory of a moving object is an example of a spatiotemporal sequence. Formally, a d-
dimensional trajectory includes an ordered list of time-location pairs, i.e. < (t1, v1), ..., (tn, vn) >
where the pair (ti, vi) denotes location information vi (of arity d) at time instance ti. In the
case of arity 1, the trajectory is simply a time-series. Watermarking of trajectories is a chal-
lenging problem and depends on the characteristics of objects in the dataset such as variance.
For instance, a busy trajectory gives the opportunity to store more information whereas a very
smooth line limits the watermark capacity [Lucchese et al., 2010]. The watermarking methods
that we review in this section have particular interest in retaining the usability of dataset for
mining algorithms. As such, these watermarking procedures are concerned with marking of a
collection of objects while preserving the relationship among those objects, in contrast with
the majority of the traditional watermarking schemes that consider only a single object.
Example 2.13. The first watermarking scheme to preserve Nearest-Neighbors (NNs) of ob-
jects in a trajectory dataset is proposed by [Lucchese et al., 2010]. This means, following their
scheme, the k nearest neighbors of each object will remain the same after watermark insertion
and therefore the usability of dataset can be preserved under NN-search and NN-classification.
The heuristic of their approach is modeling the watermarking problem with the NN constraint
as an optimization problem and finding the largest watermarking strength for every pair of
trajectories x and y in the dataset. The problem can, then be solved by counting the number of
trajectories that lose their neighbors for any given watermarking strength through an exhaus-
tive search (EH); however the high computational complexity of EH makes it inappropriate
for large dataset. Therefore, a fast search algorithm is proposed for finding desirable embed-
ding power that preserves NN of objects: first the squared distance between two watermarked
trajectories is modeled with a piecewise quadratic function. Then, those ranges of embedding
powers that results in distances lower than its original nearest neighbors are pruned from the
search space. It has been proved that the proposed fast search algorithm results in the same
embedding power as an exhaustive search algorithm.
The authors described two watermarking schemes including additive and multiplicative
techniques based on frequency domain spread spectrum methodology. Both methods slightly
modify coordinates of locations in trajectories from the second and up to the (l+ 1)-th Fourier
descriptor where l is number of non-zero elements of watermark. Having a collection of water-
marked trajectories, watermark detection is measured by calculating the average correlation
across all sequences of the watermarked dataset. Finally, the authors have advocated the
Digital Watermarking of Complex Data Types 56
additive watermarking scheme with improved search detection for large trajectory dataset.
Magic triangle: The embedded watermarks do not introduce any apparent visual distortion
on the trajectory shapes, but also preserve the NN of objects in the dataset under the Euclidean
metric. Through the experiments, the data embedding capacity is evaluated by changing the
watermark length from 1 to the trajectory length minus one, since the first Fourier coefficient
is not altered to avoid creating artifacts. Based on the results, it is possible to embed at least
one bit in each frequency coefficient and keep the distortion small at the same time. Also the
scheme is robust against attacks including geometric transformations (translation, rotations,
scaling), noise addition, down sampling, and up sampling.
Example 2.14. Later on, a multiplicative watermarking scheme for spatiotemporal datasets is
presented by [Vlachos et al., 2015], with dual goals of rights protection and data obfuscation.
The proposed method is resilient against hierarchical clustering (HC) procedures, meaning
that the resulting tree of partitioned objects, called dendrogram, after watermark insertion
is isomorphic to that of the original data (Figure 2.8). For achieving this goal, the water-
marking problem with HC constraint is casted as unobtrusively modifying the complete graph
(constructed from the dataset) whose important parts after watermark insertion should be
preserved. In this graph, nodes correspond to objects in the dataset and each edge between
object x and y represents the Euclidean distance D(x, y) between them. After embedding wa-
termark with power p into the Fourier descriptors of objects, D(x, y) will change to Dˆp(x, y).
The authors observed that there is a quadratic relation between the embedding power p and
Dˆp i.e. Dˆ
2
p(x, y) =
∑n
j=1 ||(1+pWj)(Xj−Yj)||2 , where Xj and Yj are j−th Fourier descriptors
and Wj is the j-th watermark bit. Therefore, the HC preservation problem resorts to finding
lower or upper envelops of this parabolas. The process to prune the search space follows the
same steps as [Lucchese et al., 2010]’s scheme.
It is interesting to note that the watermark can be embedded with higher intensity, if the
ultimate goal is data obfuscation. This may change the relationship between lower parts of the
leaves in the clustering graph, but the higher parts that correspond to aggregated clusters are
more likely to remain the same. We also present a data obfuscation scheme based on digital
watermarking in Chapter 6.
Magic triangle: The proposed watermarking scheme does not introduce any visual distor-
tion to trajectories. Also the encoding process does not affect any of the prevalent hierarchical
clustering variants namely single-, complete-, and average-linkage. The presented method is ro-
bust against the following attacks: noise addition in space and frequency domain, up-sampling,
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down sampling, geometric transformation including rotation, translation, and scaling.
Figure 2.8: Demonstration of clustering preservation in terms of isomorphic dendrograms before
and after watermark insertion [Vlachos et al., 2015].
2.5.6 Data Streams
A data stream is an infinitive sequence of data items that is generated by continues mea-
surement over time. A window is often defined for bounding the amount of data items for
processing. This type of data does not lend itself to signal processing-style watermarking
methods and because it is unstructured, relational database watermarking techniques are not
directly applicable [Chong et al., 2010]. This section is mainly dedicated to marking streaming
data generated by sensor networks. The reason is that digital watermarking techniques have
become a promising solution for such environments because of limited computational power
and energy resources of sensors.
Example 2.15. A family of real-time watermarking techniques for sensor networks is de-
veloped by [Koushanfar and Potkonjak, 2006] that embeds an authorship signature into a
non-linear optimization problem before solving it. Location discovery is an example of such
optimization problems. One possible algorithm for location discovery is acoustic atomic tri-
lateration, where the unknown location of a node is obtained by measuring its distance to a
few already located nodes. This process results in a system of equations for which the differ-
ences between measured distances and expected distances are minimized to bound the maximal
errors.
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Three methods are suggested to encode the watermark: addition of new constraints, aug-
mentation to the objective function, and addition of new variables. The first method uses the
linear combination of variables defined in the optimization objective function. Then, it parti-
tions the watermark stream into groups of size equal to the number of the existing variables
and utilizes a Kolmogrov complexity rule for converting the watermark streams into watermark
constrains. For example, if a bit one is assigned to a variable within a group, that variable
is included in the linear combination of the variables from that group. The second method
encodes the signature by adding terms corresponding to the codeword using the enumera-
tion of variables obtained from the Kolmogrov rule. Instead of constraining the problem, the
third method adds auxiliary variables to the optimization problem that increases watermarking
bandwidth. The proposed methods can effectively insert a watermark during the design of a
sensor network, its deployment, data acquisition or data processing phases.
Magic triangle: The proposed watermarking method is fully transparent to sensor network
middleware and does not change the stand design or operation procedures used for multi-modal
sensor data fusion. Additionally, the presented methods are resilient against ghost signatures,
addition/removal of a new signature, and de-synchronisation attacks. From a security perspec-
tive, the watermark is encoded using a standard cryptographic technique so that the constraints
do not have any statistical regularity. In fact, the PGP package (including MD5 and RSA)
along with stream cipher RC4 is used to generate a cryptographically strong pseudorandom
bitstream.
Example 2.16. The first watermarking solution for solving the secure in-network data aggre-
gation problem (see Section 2.4.1.1) first proposed by [Zhang et al., 2008]. In this seminal work,
the aggregation function is defined as JPEG compression. The proposed technique visualizes
the sensory data gathered from the whole network at a certain time snapshot as an image, in
which every sensor is viewed as a pixel with its sensory data representing the pixel intensity.
For watermark encoding, the whole network is divided into L non-overlapping sets in a way
that one watermark bit is spread within one subset without interfering with others. Within
a subset, all nodes are assigned the same watermark bit with different watermark amplitudes
drawn from a Gaussian or Uniform distribution to hide watermark bits into frequency coeffi-
cients of the sensory data. After data compression by aggregators, data is routed to the sink.
This way, each sensor appends a part of a whole watermark and sink node verifies the exis-
tence of superposed modulated watermark bits upon receiving the aggregated data and thus
authenticates the data without any en-route checking by intermediate nodes. In addition, the
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authors combined the SS watermark with a temporal one such that for every individual node,
each watermark bit is further spread along its different sampling round. The added temporal
watermark provides flexibility between detection time and detection granularity.
Magic triangle: The watermarking scheme is invisible as the sensory data are modified by
imperceptible values. This makes the watermarked data stream be disguised as “regular data”
so that an adversary (ideally) is not able to conjecture from its own readings. The upper bound
for the number of watermark bits follows the Shannon’s channel capacity L/C = 1.433×SNR
where C is the total available bandwidth and SNR is Signal-to-Noise Ratio approximated by
the watermark amplitude and variance parameters. For this purpose, an initial discovery phase
to estimate these values may be required. The robustness of the proposed spread spectrum
technique supports in-network data aggregation that is considered a compression operation
here. Also the scheme is robust against node failures with a reasonable degree and can survive
a number of attacks including false distribution imposition, forgery of coefficient values, and
non-zero coefficients position switch attacks.
Example 2.17. A provenance encoding technique for unstructured numeric data is proposed
by [Chong et al., 2010], that is reminiscent of watermarking methods intended to support fair-
use policies in the scientific community. The method is a self-identifying technique as data is
marked with its own meta-data. For this purpose, provenance information is embedded within
the LSBs of data. More precisely, an annotated data point is constructed from a data point
with at least three insignificant bits that are replaced with a parameter check bit, a mark
check bit, and a provenance piece (chosen from Npp distinct provenance pieces). With the aim
of the two check bits one can investigate whether watermark m is embedded within the data
(one-bit checking), whereas the provenance part is useful to determine which provenance mark
is embedded within the data (blind checking).
The parameter check is computed from the hash value of significant bits and the number of
distinct provenance pieces (Npp). The mark check bit is the hash value of significant bits and
the provenance mark m. There is a redundancy of provenance bits that have the advantage of
not requiring all distinct provenance pieces to be available during the decoding process, but also
makes the scheme robust to truncation and rounding. The proposed method is also applicable
for marking negative integers, floating point numbers and low-entropy datasets. Additionally,
the authors proposed a directed search algorithm to decrease search complexity of possible
provenance marks during the retrieval process.
Magic triangle: The self-identifying scheme is imperceptible in a sense that it does not
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inhibit standard usage of the dataset because the watermark alterations are within the sensor
data error. Also, various statistical measures of dataset (mean and variance) is preserved. The
watermark capacity for one-bit checking is zero while the blind checking scheme is able to
embed
(Lmd−2)×Npp
2 bits of information if each bit of the provenance mark appears in exactly
two provenance pieces (Lmd is the number of insignificant bits). In terms of robustness, the
proposed scheme can survive reordering, sampling, quantization (rounding), truncation, and
bit-flipping up to a certain point.
Example 2.18. Unlike [Zhang et al., 2008]’s scheme that all watermarked samples of a data
stream were required for watermark verification, the watermarking solution proposed by [Yi
et al., 2013] only needs a small portion of watermarked samples for successful detection. In fact,
this method is advantageous for validations of query results. The proposed security protocol,
called QuerySec, can achieve this goal for range queries in a two-tiered sensor network with the
dual goal of privacy preservation and integrity verification. In such a network, storage nodes
are the central point of many attacks, since they not only provide storage for nearby sensors
but also process queries that are issued from a sink node. For privacy preservation, QuerySec is
designed with an order preserving function-based scheme that allows storage nodes to process
encoded queries over encoded data. For integrity verification, a link watermarking method is
proposed that embeds hidden marks of every data item into its predecessor. But before that,
each sensor sorts its data items in ascending order.
The method assumes that all collected data are in the range (d0, dn+1) and the lower and
upper bounds are known to sink and sensors. After that, a t bits cyclic redundancy code
(CRC) is generated as watermark for each data item and is concatenates to its predecessor.
For example, assume three data items {2, 4, 5} are collected by sensor Si. Assume d0 = 1
and d3+1 = 10, then a two bits CRC for every data item can be generated as CRC(2) = 01,
CRC(4) = 10, CRC(5) = 11, CRC(10) = 00, after concatenation CRCs, the watermarked
data (including lower and upper bounds) is {5, 10, 19, 20, 40}. Upon receiving a query result,
sink decrypts the result and extracts the watermarks to check whether the data items in the
query result can form a link. Additionally, a data structure called multi-dimensional neighbour
tree is designed to validate the integrity of multidimensional data. The proposed QuerySec is
efficient for sensor networks in terms of power consumption and required space.
Magic triangle: The watermark capacity is bounded by the data redundancy space and the
cipher block size. For example, using DES of block size 42 bits, if we assume each dimension
value of multi-dimensional data items is 16-bit, then 32 bits is left for each block to carry
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watermark information. QuerySec is a secure protocol as both data and queries are encoded.
For this purpose, each sensor has a secrete key shared with the sink. Additionally, the proposed
linked watermarking scheme can survive two types of attacks: insertion of some forged data
into the query results; and deleting some data items from query results.
2.5.7 Additional Data Types
The heterogeneity and variety of today’s data inhibits providing a comprehensive data type
taxonomy. For example, there are still other data types that require special considerations for
a successful watermarking application. Data cubes and compressive sensing measurements are
two examples of such data that we review in the following section.
Example 2.19. A data cube is a multidimensional data model designed for providing aggregate
information. The first study on rights protection of numerical data cubes by means of digital
watermarking is presented by [Guo et al., 2006]. The authors identified two difficulties in
marking such data. First, a data cube does not have primary key attribute and therefore,
existing watermarking techniques for relational databases are not applicable for such data.
Second, those methods do not necessarily survive common cube operations such as roll-up and
drill-down. The former is the process of viewing data in progressively less detail, whereas the
latter is the process of viewing data at more detailed levels.
One simple approach to marking data cubes is slightly modifying individual cell values.
However, this opens up the possibility of significant errors as the result of the accumulated
changes made by the marking method. To resolve this problem, the proposed scheme can follow
a mini-cube construction procedure. Suppose for a 3D cube, the data value d(Xi, Yj , Zk) of cell
i at the position (Xi, Yi, Zi) is decremented by 1. Then, three other cell values d(Xxc, Yj , Zk),
d(Xi, Yyc, Zk), and d(Xi, Yj , Zzc) are incremented by 1 in order to balance deviation in any
1d aggregation that involves cell (Xi, Yi, Zi). Similarly, the values of three other cells namely
d(Xxc, Yj , Zzc), d(Xi, Yyc, Zzc), and d(Xxc, Yyc, Zk) are decremented by 1, and the last cell
value d(Xxc, Yyc, Zzc) is incremented by 1. These seven cells (balance cells) together with
the watermark cell (Xi, Yi, Zi) form a mini-cube. This way any aggregation that involves at
least two cells in the constructed mini-cube remains unchanged after watermark insertion.
For inserting the watermark, the data cube owner seeds a HMAC function with his private
key in concatenation with the cell’s feature attributes (X,Y, Z). A cell is selected to carry a
watermark bit if the resulting hash modγ = 0, where γ controls the percentage of watermark-
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carrying cells. Finally, for each selected cell, a bit position among  LSBs is selected to embed
the watermark bit.
Magic triangle: The proposed scheme is imperceptible in the sense that the sum queries
on data cubes at any aggregation level are not changed after encoding watermarks. Also the
method has reasonable robustness against cell value modification, value selection, additive
attacks, and invertibility attacks (using counterfeit watermarks).
Example 2.20. In contrast to recent data hiding techniques that adopt compressive sensing
(CS) for improving the security of their solutions, [Yamac¸ et al., 2016] proposed a data hiding
method for CS measurements in which the host signal (x) is represented by far fewer mea-
surements (y) than conventional methods. The key premise in the CS is to reconstruct the
N -dimensional vector x, from the m-sparse vector y, i.e. y = Ax, where A is the measurement
matrix and m << N . The presented method spreads watermark information directly over the
CS measurements via an encoding matrix B, i.e. yw = Ax + Bw where w ∈ {+a,−a}M is
a binary sequence of length M . The interesting aspect of the scheme is that the embedded
information co-exists with the host signal only in the compressed form which means recovery
of the signal removes the hidden data. The main difficulty of CS data watermarking is reliable
watermark detection that depends on the number of CS measurements and is empirically found
to be at least m ≥ 4k, where k is the sparsity level. The striking property of the presented
scheme is that it can operate with either random modulation of matrices A or B, or transformed
matrices (such as noiselets and wavelets), which enables a fast implementation for large size
datasets.
Magic triangle: The authors proposed a general framework for marking CS data, and
therefore the invisibility definition varies based on the target application. For instance, if the
presented framework is used for a wireless body sensor network that captures patient’s ECGs,
the hiding watermark should be preserve cardiovascular diagnostic values. The watermark
capacity depends on the properties of the two modulation matrices (in particular the restricted
isometry constants of the measurement matrix A and the left annihilator matrix of the encoding
matrix B) and the signal to noise ratio.
A summary of the existing watermarking techniques for the presented data taxonomy are
summarised in Table 2.3.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, an overview of digital watermarking preliminaries was given. Additionally, we
looked at a range of applications of both media and non-media watermarking and provided a
summary of unique challenges for watermarking each non-media data type accordingly. This
chapter also discussed the generation of pseudorandom sequences and their properties, since
they will be widely used in subsequence chapters to embed watermark information within host
data in a subtle manner.
2.6.1 Looking Forward
From the next chapter, we study digital watermarking of non-media data. In particular, Chap-
ter 3 is concerned with watermarking of ECG data for integrity verification in an e-Healthcare
scenario. For this purpose, one of the most common algorithms for image watermarking is
explained and then will be adjusted on the basis of the specific characteristics of ECG data
such that the cardiac diagnosis of watermarked data is preserved. The new algorithm has low
complexity and high information capacity which makes it suitable for embedding watermarks
on devices with constrained resources.
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Table 2.3: Summary of watermarking schemes our data taxonomy (wm stands for watermark).
Watermarking properties
Complex
data
type
Application Main Difficulties Examples Invisibility Robustness
Time-
series
tamper proofing/ au-
thentication of ECG
data
preserving PQRST feature
points of ECGs; lack of
a standard metric for
measuring diagnostic dis-
tortions of watermarked
ECGs;
[Kong and Feng,
2001]; [Kozat
et al., 2009];
[Ibaida et al.,
2011]
no effect on cardio-
vascular diagnosis
compression,
quantization
Biological
se-
quences
tagging/ right protec-
tion/ authentication of
genomic data, DNA-
based secret sharing
respecting biological con-
straints such as nucleotides
pairing; amino-acid preser-
vation for c-DNA wm ap-
proaches; codon optimiza-
tion limits watermark ca-
pacity;
[Shimanovsky
et al., 2002];
[Heider et al.,
2008]; [Heider
and Barnekow,
2011]; [Shiu
et al., 2010]
amino-acid preser-
vation, no effect on
the gene length for
covert communica-
tions
spontaneous
mutations,
recombination
Graph-
structures
right protection/ pri-
vacy preservation of
social network data,
XMLs, graph color-
ing/partitioning solu-
tions
limited bandwidth in
order to preserve graph
structure; complexity
of wm detection due to
NP-complete subgraph
matching problem in par-
ticular for large graph
datasets
[Qu and Potkon-
jak, 1999];
[Khanna and
Zane, 2000];
[Gross-Amblard,
2011] ; [Sion
et al., 2003];
[Zhao et al.,
2015]
preserving key
properties of
graphs such as
shortest path,
transparency to
graph partitioning
tools, preserving
high level seman-
tics such as number
of added colors to
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Chapter 3
Digital Watermarking of
Electrocardiogram Data
Things are never simple when it
comes to the human heart.
Gillian Jacobs
This chapter presents a tamper proof watermark for protection of Electrocardiogram data
with respect to real-time embedding constraint without compromising cardiac diagnosis. The
presented scheme is built upon a media watermarking algorithm and incorporates the specific
requirements of marking Electrocardiogram data to achieve a higher information capacity. The
watermarking solution is tailored for end-to-end data protection in environments with tight
computational complexity.
3.1 Introduction
After a review of digital watermarking, from this chapter we begin on the task of watermarking
streaming data and propose digital watermarking algorithms based on specific characteristics
of the host streaming data. In particular, this chapter, mainly focuses on digital watermarking
of Electrocardiogram (ECG) data for healthcare applications.
The landscape of healthcare delivery and medical data management has significantly changed
in recent years, due to advances in information and communication technologies. These changes
have emerged as electronic healthcare (e-healthcare), offering convenience to both patients and
healthcare providers, ultimately resulting in an enhanced quality of life [Sun et al., 2010]. One
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of the main components of an e-healthcare system is Wireless Body Sensor Networks (WBSNs)
that allows a patient in residence to interact with his physician simply by wearing a few sen-
sors. This enables medical professionals to monitor their patients’ physiological data remotely,
causing minimal interruption to the patient’s daily activities.
Unfortunately, the healthcare industry is notoriously conservative when it comes to the
uptake of wireless technology. This is because the wireless medium is inherently less secure than
wired media and the data transmissions can be intercepted, altered, or replayed by an adversary.
These changes to physiological data can be fatal in a life-threatening situation such as a heart
attack. Therefore, it is imperative to devise mechanisms that ascertain the authenticity of
sensory readings for e-healthcare deployment. The biggest impediment to achieving this goal
is having the resources of body sensors with tight computational complexity. This means
the conventional asymmetric encryption methods are not applicable due to the complexity of
public-key-based operations [Sun et al., 2010]. Further, while both symmetric and asymmetric
encryption protect the data during its transmission, they provide no other protection or disclose
evidence of tampering after data is decrypted [Wayner, 2009]. Here, our aim is solve this
problem by means of digital watermarking methods.
The main contribution of this chapter is in proposing a practical real-time watermarking
scheme for ECG data. The ECG is an important diagnostic tool for detecting various cardiac
diseases, due to its ability to correlate the different ECG wave signatures with the actual
operation of the heart and its ease of recording in a non-invasive manner. The embedded
proprietary information can be used to ascertain the authenticity of data, but also can protect
the intellectual property rights of individuals. This is particularly important when the sensitive
data are streamed to an untrusted storage and enables the data owner to resolve the ownership
of its outsourced data by investigating the presence of watermark information.
The other possibility for data protection is appending message authentication codes (MACs)
as an endorsement to data samples. These codes are constructed from Hash functions that are
“infinitely” sensitive, in a sense that even slight changes invalidate hash values [Fridrich and
Goljan, 2000]. Even though this is a good requirement to ensure data authenticity, under noisy
conditions such as wireless transmissions, the MAC solution becomes impractical. What would
be useful to have is a data authentication method that gracefully degrades in the presence of
modifications/distortions. Hence, if successful, digital watermarking allows tamper localization
with graceful degradation of the extracted watermark information. Additionally, watermarks
are, by construction, inseparable from the original data and therefore are more secure compared
to appended metadata such as MACs. Over the next few sections, more details about our
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watermarking method are provided.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the major challenges in water-
marking of ECG data. In Section 3.3, our vision for marking data at the point of origin is
explained. Although the focus here is protection of ECG data in wireless e-healthcare moni-
toring, the proposed architecture and the associated watermarking algorithm can be used for
many other outsourcing applications, as a way of authenticating the data ownership or provid-
ing assurances about the origin of data. The review of related works is given in Section 3.4.
Thereafter, in Section 3.5, we advocate a comprehensive security architecture that provides an
end-to-end protection of ECG data, while Section 3.6 thoroughly presents our watermarking
algorithm. The experimental setup and results on real ECG data are reported in Section 3.7.
Further discussion on the properties of the proposed watermarking solution and its viability
for resource constraint environments are given in Section 3.8. Finally, Section 3.9 concludes
this chapter.
3.2 Challenges
Digital watermarking in the medical context is a complex problem. The most serious objec-
tions to the idea of embedding information within sensitive biomedical data such as ECG lie
in its effect on medical diagnosis that could potentially have life-threatening consequences.
Even if watermarking is allowed, there are difficulties in reasoning about the quality of water-
marked data in terms of diagnosis preservation is in question and proper metrics are needed
to determine whether or not the watermark changes are acceptable.
3.2.1 Preserving Cardiac Diagnosis
ECG is a signal of special interest in cardiological treatment. The first step in the interpretation
of an ECG signal is detection of its characteristic features, named as waveforms. For this
purpose, physicians use letters to label components of the ECG waveforms that correspond to
anatomical parts of the heartbeat. The most widely accepted labelling method originates from
the Descartes scheme [Henson, 1971], in which an ECG segment is composed of three parts
including a wave sequence, P, QRS complex and a T wave [Hurst, 1998]. The P wave shows the
atrium activity (its first half is produced by the right atrium and the second half is produced
by the left atrium). The QRS complex is caused by depolarization of the interventricular
septum, endocardium, and both right and left ventricles. Finally, the T wave is produced by
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repolarization of the ventricles.
Due to sensitivity of the PQRST structure in cardiac diagnosis, caution must be taken in
the design of an ECG watermarking scheme to not distort this structure evidently; otherwise,
there is no value in asserting data if the data usability is violated in the first place. Figure
3.1 demonstrates the PQRST structure of an ECG segment. As shown in this figure, the
PQRST values correspond to the set of maximal/minimal points: the R wave represents the
peak maxima, P and T are the local maximum peaks, and Q and S are the local minima peaks.
Figure 3.1: The PQRST wave structure of an ECG segment.
Cardiac Disease Signatures
Analysing the predominant PQRST structure, distinct heartbeat patterns can be detected
that allow a diagnosis of cardiac disease. Any disorder of heart rate or rhythm, or alteration in
the morphological ECG pattern, is an indication of an arrhythmia [Ince et al., 2009]. Various
arrhythmias require different treatments and lack of accurate detection can be fatal for patients.
Thus, a great deal of work has focused on automatic detection and classification of cardiac
arrhythmias using techniques such as wavelet transform [Inan et al., 2006], support vector
machine [Osowski et al., 2004], principal component analysis and neural networks [Ince et al.,
2009]. Although the details of these techniques are out of the scope of this thesis, we need to
know the arrhythmia classification in order to have a fair comparison of watermarking changes
for various disease signatures.
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The most clinically-accepted ECG classification has been established by the Association for
the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI) [ECAR, 1987]. Among other tasks, this
association is responsible for recommending practices related to reporting performance results
of automated arrhythmia detection algorithms. Following the AAMI standard, there are five
designated heartbeat classes as follows:
• N: Normal beats originating in the sinus mode,
• S: Supraventricular ectopic beats (SVEBs),
• V: Ventricular ectopic beats (VEBs),
• F: Fusion beats, and
• Q: Unclassifiable beats.
In contrast to the AAMI classification, the benchmark MIT-BIH arrhythmia database
[Goldberger et al., 2000] classifies heartbeats into 15 distinct classes: the normal beat, left
bundle branch block, right bundle branch block, atrial escape beat, nodal (junctional) escape
beat, atrial premature contraction beat, aberrated atrial premature beat, Nodal (junctional)
premature beat, supraventricular premature beat, premature ventricular contraction beat, ven-
tricular escape beat, fusion of ventricular and normal beat, Paced beat, Fusion of paced and
normal beat, and Unclassified beat1. Later in this chapter, we use this database to study the
suitability of our watermarking method. So as to comply with the AAMI practice, Table 3.1
shows the mapping between the labels provided by the MIT-BIH database and AAMI standard.
In this chapter, we shall study the effect of our watermarking solution only for four heartbeat
classes including normal, left bundle branch block (LBBB), atrial premature contraction beat
(APC), and premature ventricular contraction beat (PVC).
3.2.2 Quality Metrics
The other challenge that we face here, is assessing the quality of watermarked data in terms of
cardiac diagnosis preservations. If we assume that the ultimate user of ECG data is a human
observer (a physician), it is possible to visualize the ECG signal and make broad judgement on
the basis of PQRST structure. For instance, in ref [Kozat et al., 2009], a cardiologist examined
a set of watermarked normal and arrhythmia ECG beats to identify the diagnostic values. It
1This database will be explained in Section 3.7 in more detail.
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Table 3.1: Heartbeat classes given by the MIT-BIH database along with the regrouping defined
by the AAMI standard.
MIT-BIH class Number of
samples
AAMI
groups
Number of
samples
Normal beat 75052
N 9063
Left bundle branch block 7259
Right bundle branch block 8075
Atrial escape beat 16
Nodal (junctional) escape beat 229
Atrial premature contraction beat 2546
S 2781Aberrated atrial premature beat 150
Nodal (junctional) premature beat 83
Supraventricularpremature beat 2
Premature ventricular contraction 7130
V 7236
Ventricular escape beat 106
Fusion of ventricular and normal beat 803 F 803
Paced beat 7028
Q 8043Fusion of paced and normal beat 982
Unclassified beat 33
was claimed that for signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of less than 30 dB (SNR < 30 dB), the cardiac
diagnostic might change because of various distortions near the P-wave region. However, this
claim is largely subjective and no attempt was made to prove it.
Apart from that, relying on standard error estimators, such as SNR, Percentage Root mean
square Difference (PRD) or Mean Square Error (MSE), is not enough for measuring data
distortions. The main reason is that, all data samples contribute equally to these estimators
and therefore do not necessarily reflect changes in the diagnostic behaviour [Wang and Bovik,
2009]. As already discussed, the PQRST structure contributes mainly to cardiac diagnosis and
therefore, the quality estimator should relate the amount of distortion to the PQRST structure
in an effective way.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only a few studies that attempted to find alternative
quality measures considering PQRST structure for ECG signals. The most important ones
include Wavelet PRD (WPRD) [Manikandan and Dandapat, 2007], Wavelet Weighted PRD
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(WWPRD) [Al-Fahoum, 2006], and Wavelet Energy-based Diagnostic Distortion (WEDD)
[Manikandan and Dandapat, 2007]. As the names imply, all these distortion measures are
Wavelet-based approach and measure the amount of distortion in different Wavelet subbands.
In Chapter 2, we explained the possibility of information embedding in wavelet domain. To
recap briefly, wavelet transformation is an iterative process whereby a signal is decomposed into
finer resolution signals (also called subbands or coefficients) in time and frequency. As depicted
in Figure 3.2, the decomposition begins with two filters from a ‘mother’ wavelet. These filters
will provide an orthogonal basis dividing the signal frequency spectrum and generating high
and low frequency signals in each iterative step. For the ECG signal, most of the important
features are related to the low frequency subbands [Manikandan and Dandapat, 2007].
Figure 3.2: A Wavelet decomposition tree. The ‘A’ and ‘D’ represent the low and high fre-
quency components obtained by the low pass filter (LPF) and high pass filter (HPF), respec-
tively.
To see how the above wavelet metrics work mathematically, we first look at the PRD
and SNR definitions. Let x(n) be an original (ECG) signal, and x˜(n) be the distorted (or
watermarked) signal. The PRD and SNR are calculated as follows:
PRD =
√∑N
n=1(x(n)− x˜(n))2∑N
n=1 x(n)
2
× 100 (3.1)
and
SNR = 10× log
∑N
n=1 x
2(n)∑N
n=1(x˜(n)− x(n))2
(3.2)
The relationship between the SNR and PRD can be obtained by:
SNR = 40− 20 log(0.01PRD) or PRD = 10−SNR20 ×100
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WPRD value for the subband j is equal to the PRD of subband j, and is defined as:
WPRDj =
√√√√∑Njk=1(cj,k − c˜j,k)2∑Nj
k=1 c
2
j,k
(3.3)
where cj,k is an original coefficient, c˜j,k is the distorted coefficient, and Nj is the number
of coefficients within sub-band j.
The two other metrics, i.e, WWPRD and WEDD are based on a common design philosophy,
that is, decomposition of the segment of interest into Wavelet sub-bands and designating
weights according to the actual diagnostic significance of the sub-bands. The weighted WPRD
can be calculated as follows:
WWPRD =
M∑
j=0
wjWPRDj (3.4)
where wj is the weight for the sub-band j, and M is the number of sub-bands or levels.
The weight, wj based on normalized area is estimated as:
wj =
∑Nj
k=1 |c(j,k)|∑M+1
j=1
∑Nj
k=1 |cj,k|
. (3.5)
Likewise, the WEDD is defined as:
WEDD =
M+1∑
j=1
w′jWPRDj (3.6)
where w′j is the weight calculated based on energy as:
w′j =
∑Nj
k=1 c
2
j,k∑M+1
j=1
∑Nj
k=1 c
2
j,k
(3.7)
Although the WWPRD and WEDD quality estimators eliminate the problem of unequal
distribution of ECG diagnostic samples, they both have the common drawback that the original
signal is required for measuring the distortions. In our approach, the original data does not
exist in any un-watermarked version anywhere and therefore we need to be able to determine
the quality of data in the absence of a ‘ground truth’ or prior knowledge about un-watermarked
data. To the best of our knowledge, such a metric for ECG quality measurement does not exist.
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3.3 Vision
Before describing our watermarking scheme, we first look at two key elements of our vision,
which are also applied for proposed watermarking methods in subsequent chapters.
3.3.1 On Sensor Watermark
One of the critical questions for watermark encoding is, at what point in the data lifecycle
should watermarks be embedded? The data lifecycle typically spans from its capture, storage,
update, transmission, access, archive, up to the restore, deletion and purge [Kim et al., 2003].
In our system model, the watermark is embedded within the ECG data at the data collection
phase, i.e. sensor level. We refer to this as On Sensor Watermark (OSW). This idea of inserting
watermarks at the point of origin was first introduced by Tirkel et al. to resolve ownership
conflicts pertaining to image or video piracy [Tirkel and Hall, 2001]. The authors argued
that watermarks should be embedded at the very early stage of capturing data, before the
distribution phase. Therefore, they inserted watermarks in the spatial domain where the
captured data first appeared at a charge-coupled device sensor’s output. In contrast, Chong et
al. argued that it is preferable to mark transformed data (in a standard unit that is actually
disseminated such as a straight voltage reading or as a ratio to a benchmark voltage) than
to mark raw data; otherwise the embedding scheme would need to be robust to arbitrary
transformations, and this is difficult to achieve in a real scenario [Chong et al., 2010].
In fact, both points of view are valid and for this reason a dual watermark is desirable –
a spatial one to safeguard the data at its origin or for other purposes such as constructing
synchronization patterns (watermark registration), and a second one in transform domain to
resist domain-specific data manipulations (see [Kozat et al., 2009] for an example of dual wa-
termarks). Here, we advocate OSW to protect data from any tampering at the data collection.
However, it is possible that the watermark information will be extracted at the next level of
data lifecycle and be replaced by another, if required.
3.3.2 Trust-but-Verify Data Outsourcing
As we explained in Chapter 1, our solution can be generalised as a proof system for stream
outsourcing scenario, whereby a data owner outsources his/her data to an untrusted cloud
service. Following the trust-but-verify relationship business model [Cormode et al., 2012], the
data owner does not blindly entrust the data to the cloud provider and is willing to verify
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the integrity and correctness of the outsourced data. This is also the topic of provable data
possession in secure storage outsourcing literature [Ateniese et al., 2011]. Although there have
been some good studies for this purpose using different techniques including erasure correcting
codes, homomorphic tokens and so on, the provided solutions are limited. They still shift trust
to other third parties (e.g. [Wang et al., 2012a]), or are only applicable in the case of static
data (e.g. [Shacham and Waters, 2013]), or local copy of data has to be maintained for the
verification (e.g. [Bellare et al., 1994]), or are too complex for a user with limited computational
capacity to perform the verification process (e.g. [Ateniese et al., 2007]).
In our solution, unlike most prior works for ensuring remote data integrity, we couple
on-the-fly OSW with a secure transmission protocol to achieve a secure cloud en-route path
before residing the data at the untrusted storage end. This way, the data owner is provided
with not only strong correctness/possession assurances about the outsourced data, but also
can maintain data confidentiality. Note that in this setup the data owner has full control over
and ownership of the outsourced data without needing to trust anyone else.
In the next section, we present the prior work relating to watermarking of ECG data.
3.4 Related Works
The majority of previous studies dealing with watermarking of biomedical signals used robust
watermark techniques. For instance, Engin et al. proposed a discrete wavelet based watermark-
ing scheme for ensuring the security of the ECG signals [Engin et al., 2005]. In their scheme,
authentication information was embedded in the coefficient sequences of ECG segments in
frequency domain. However, the data-carrying capacity of their method was limited and was
also highly susceptible to watermark estimation attacks (See Chapter 2 for a description of
the attack). Similarly, Zheng and Qian investigated a high capacity wavelet-based algorithm
[Zheng and Qian, 2008] by embedding watermark information in selected coefficients related
to high frequency of “Haar wavelet” transforms based on a lifting scheme which corresponded
to non-QRS complex waves of the original signal to guarantee the restoration of almost undis-
torted ECG signals. The selection of coefficients is tailored to maintain the QRS complex
waves of ECG signals. A major shortcoming of both proposed schemes is high computational
complexity of the wavelet calculations that still fail to perform reasonably on low-power sensor
devices in WBSNs.
In order to balance the energy consumption and security objective in wireless sensor net-
works, Zhang et al. suggested a distributed robust watermarking scheme in which each sensor
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appends a part of a whole watermark–like a jigsaw puzzle–into the sensory data at a particular
time and the sink node is responsible for watermark verification task. Therefore, a missing
watermark part will allow the sink to locate the corresponding sensor nodes for possible attacks
[Zhang et al., 2008]. Although the simple operation of the watermark embedding could balance
the energy consumption in the network, as sated by the authors, watermark detection calcula-
tions are relatively complex. Apart from that, the need for such multi-pieces of watermarks to
be synchronized to each other can make their scheme difficult to apply in a practical setting.
The authors did not discuss this de-synchronisation issue.
To date, there have been only a few works that studied fragile watermarking of biomedical
signals (e.g. [Kong and Feng, 2001] and [Ibaida et al., 2011]). In [Kong and Feng, 2001], the
authors compared three different fragile watermarking techniques namely Patchwork, least-
significant bit (LSB), and quantization index modulation (QIM) 2 for integrity verification of
ECG signals. Their study revealed that the Patchwork method excelled over the two others
in terms of noise resistance. Likewise, we embed watermark information directly in signal
domain but not necessarily in LSB bit-plane; it can be embedded in multiple contiguous bit-
planes which make watermarks more resilient to estimation attacks and increases data-carrying
capacity as well. Moreover, our algorithm is superior to theirs in terms of finding the exact
location of tampered data.
Our work is closely related to the work presented by [Ibaida et al., 2011], whereby a low
complexity fragile watermark was deployed based on quantization and LSB schemes. The
watermark information constitutes patient medical information that is embedded within ECG
signals. The security of the presented algorithm is based on linear transform values that are
used for scaling watermark amplitudes i.e scalar multiplicand and offset which are selected
based on the ECG acquisition device such as the resolution of the analog-to-digital converter,
as the authors claimed. In comparison, we use a hash value of a key (in addition to scaling
parameters) that makes our scheme more difficult to break from a cryptography point of view.
Instead of embedding either a fragile or robust watermark, Kozat et al. used a dual water-
mark consisting of a robust watermark for storing patient information, and a fragile watermark
for identifying possible data-tampering [Kozat et al., 2009]. The robust watermark is embed-
ded in the frequency domain using spread spectrum methodology that ‘divides’ a sequence
into overlapping subsequences, and ‘spreads’ the same watermark over many frequencies of
these subsequences so that the energy in any one subsequence is very small and minimally
detectable. The fragile watermark is added on top of the resulting signal containing the robust
2See Chapter 2 for descriptions of these watermarking methods.
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watermark by applying LSB alternations on specially-selected positions of the signal in order
to make it resilient to estimation attack. The authors also used an Error Correction Scheme,
namely Hamming codes, in order to make watermark recoverable during transmission over a
noisy channel.
A deficiency of the above scheme is that it is not suitable for applications with multiple
sensors. We will look at this problem in Chapter 4 in detail. But loosely speaking, having
multiple data streams generated by various sensors and encoding data in a similar fashion for
all of them, will expose watermarks to an estimation attack. For example, an adversary could
take an average derived from multiple nodes to estimate the original signal, subtract it from the
watermarked signal for each sensor, then repeat the process until it converges. The adversary
might not get or understand the watermark sufficiently well, but has enough information to
generate an interfering signal and so prevent a decoder entity from trusting the watermark.
Taking all the above considerations into account, in our scheme, we adopt a variation of
Wongs algorithm [Wong, 1998] for integrity verification of ECG signals. The chief benefit is
that it is fragile, reversible and simple to implement. Moreover, it is spatial, not frequency-
based and thus damage can in principle be localized to an individual sample (as opposed to a
single window), and is amenable to the fallback procedure described in Section 3.8.
3.5 System Overview
Figure 3.3 demonstrates our architecture to endow the data owner with correctness assurance
of the outsourced data in an e-healthcare deployement.
Starting from the bottom of our architecture, sensors measure the biological data period-
ically and then forward the readings to a nearby collector device, such as a Smartphone, a
wrist watch, a PDA, or a laptop based on the application needs. Subsequently, the Smart-
phone performs aggregation on sensory data and transmits the aggregated result to a cloud
infrastructure where further medical operations may be taken. In alignment with our vision
described in the previous section, we want to secure the whole path from the point of origin
where the data has been captured to the final destination point.
To achieve this goal, every sensor will perform the following watermark insertion at data
acquisition level (i.e. OSW) before forwarding to the collector entity. At that point, the col-
lector or equivalently aggregator could perform the following watermark extraction algorithm
in order to detect tampering and replace fragile watermarks with a robust one for onward
transmission, or leave the watermark intact, or perform other operations such as summation
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Figure 3.3: System model for a secure e-healthcare monitoring deployment.
or compression and then forward the result to the cloud. We can assume that the transmission
will be done over a secure encrypted channel such as TLS between the aggregator and cloud
server, and possibly even to sensor nodes with the capability.
Next we describe our proposed watermarking scheme. A fundamental capability here is
that the data can embed multiple watermarks of the same type. While, there are many
watermarking schemes in the literature, they do not have this property and fail to perform
multiple watermark insertions.
3.6 Proposed Watermarking Method
We propose a variation of the Wong algorithm [Wong, 1998] that is suitable for the OSW
implementation. Let us first review this algorithm.
Wong Watermarking Method: Single Bit Encoding
Ping Wah Wong proposed an authentication watermarking algorithm for images [Wong, 1998].
The proposed method was a block-based watermarking scheme, in the sense that a block of
watermark is embedded into each image block of size I by J pixels. If the watermark size does
not match that of image, tiling of the watermark is necessary.
Let, there be M ×N pixels for a gray-scale image X. The first step of the Wong scheme is
partitioning the image X into blocks of I × J size. Then, the watermark insertion procedure
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for the rth image block, denoted as Xr has the following steps.
1. Form the block X˜r by setting the least significant bit of Xr to zero.
2. Calculate the hash value of the X˜r, i.e. H(X˜r) = (p
r
1, p
r
2, ..., p
r
s), where H(.) is a crypto-
graphic hash function such as MD5 or SHA, and s is the hash size.
3. Combine the hash bit stream on the interval [(r − 1) × IJ + 1, r × IJ ], denoted as Pr,
with a corresponding watermark block Br using an element-wise exclusive or function
(XOR) i.e. Wr = Pr ⊕Br.
4. Encrypt the Wr using a public key cryptographic function E(.) with a private key K
′ to
give Cr = EK′(Wr).
5. Insert Cr into the least significant bit of X˜r to form a block Yr of the watermark image.
The aforementioned steps are applied independently to all blocks of the host image X. The
watermark extraction procedure, is exactly the reverse of the watermark insertion as depicted
in Figure 3.4. As it is shown, first a block of watermarked image, Zr is split into two piece:
Gr contains the least significant bits, and Z˜r contains values except that the least significant
bits have been zeroed out. Again, the hash value of the masked pixels (Z˜r) is calculated and
then decrypted with the public key K that corresponds to the private key K. Finally, the
decrypted value is combined with the corresponding hash value (using XOR) to retrieve the
original block. A more detailed description of this algorithm can be found here [Wong, 1998].
The security of the Wong method lies in side information (K,K ′) that is assumed to be only
available to the watermark encoder and decoder. Unfortunately, this scheme, like many other
block-based watermarking proposals, is vulnerable to a “vector quantization” (VQ) attack
[Holliman and Memon, 2000]. In a VQ attack, an adversary constructs a vector quantization
codebook using blocks from a set of watermarked images. The image to be counterfeited is then
approximated using this codebook. Since each block is authenticated by itself, the counterfeit
image appears authentic to the watermarking method. This attack can be avoided by adding
the image id or block index r, to the input of the hash function block [Wong and Memon, 2001]
or using overlapping blocks [Coppersmith et al., 1999] .
Next, we demonstrate our proposed method for watermark insertion and detection in more
detail.
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Figure 3.4: The watermark extraction procedure of the Wong method.
3.6.1 Watermark Insertion: Multiple Bits Encoding
Our variation of the Wong algorithm reflects the different media used. In our case, we intend
to watermark streaming data instead of static monochrome images. Let d denote an infinite
ECG stream with the sequence of floating point values d(1), d(2),..., d(i),..., and index i is the
ith data sample. Any stream processing is necessarily both time- and space- bound [Sion et al.,
2006]. The time bound derive from the fact that it has to keep up with incoming data. To
model the space bound, we use a continuous window of size n samples, or equivalently nr = l
seconds for data stream d of sampling rate r Hz . The default behavior of the window model
is to “push” older items out and “shift” the entire window to the right(a non-overlapping
window) to free up space for new entries.
Our watermarking method for ECG data proceeds in four main steps as follows:
1. Data normalization:
a) Range calculation,
b) Data scaling, and
c) Data quantization,
2. Bit-plane selection,
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3. Watermark insertion,
4. Scale inversion.
Prior to watermark insertion, the normalization step scales and quantizes floating point
values over a certain range. This range is calculated in such a way that the amount of changes
to extreme values (either local minima or maxima) is kept to a minimum in order to guarantee
the preservation of PQRST characteristics.
We make use of an order-statistical filter to find the running maxima and minima of the
streaming data. Using a length m sliding window that we call “range window”, the data
elements are ranked in an ascending order and the first and last elements are output as the
local minimum dminj and local maximum dmaxj , for the j
th range window and j ∈ [i, i+m) and
1 6 i 6 n. Thus, the range for the jth window is simply calculated as rngj = dmaxj−dminj . As
the range window proceeds, the minimum and maximum values are updated. Figure 3.5 shows
a range window of 16 values (see enlarged part). This explains the quantization (‘jumpiness’)
of the red and blue bounds.
Figure 3.5: A sliding window tracks data stream incrementally to find local minimum values
(green line below signal) and maximum values (red line above signal) for each window.
Note the range window is different from the window for bounding ECG samples. The
former is in fact a sliding window to make the range of an ECG signal (The y-axis or Voltage
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values in Figure 3.5) discrete, while the latter is a non-overlapping window merely used for
bounding the number of samples at the time of watermark insertion.
After calculating the range values, the data sample d(i) is scaled as:
dsc(i) =
d(i)− dminj
rngj
× b
where, rngj denotes the range window and b is the sample resolution. The scaled values
are then quantized. For this purpose, the ECG values are rounded off to the nearest integers.
As one would expect, this is a lossy step.
After data normalization, multiple adjacent bits are selected for watermark insertion. In
contrast to Wong’s method that inserted watermarks at a single bit in each image block, our
approach has the flexibility in selecting multiple contiguous bit-planes for watermark inser-
tion, and hence increases the watermark capacity. Once the to-be-watermarked bit planes are
selected, the next step is substituting those bits by the watermark bitsteam.
In our approach, the watermark bit-stream is constructed from the combination of the
un-selected bit plains, a binary logo (in the simplest implementation), and the hash bit stream
of a secret key K using an exclusive OR operation. For experiments, we used MD5 hash
function, but any other cryptographic one-way hash function can be used. As a result, the
embedded watermark is dependent on the data which makes it more resistant to copy attack
[Voloshynovskiy et al., 2001].
As we explained in Chapter 2, in a watermarked-copy attack, a watermark is copied from
one content to another. The rationale behind this is based on the fact that even a copied
watermark should be combined with another irrelevant carrier, so the inserted watermark will
look like noise with respect to the carrier.
The last step is to undo the scaling by means of the scaling parameters (dminj ,dmaxj , rngj).
It should be noted that the data is modified in such a way that any watermarked value that
was not a local minimum or maximum, will not become so after the watermark has been added.
This preserves the dynamic scaling and makes it more difficult for an attacker to manipulate
the watermark. We only have to defend against fraud, not against removal or rendering the
watermark unreadable, since they by definition constitute tampering.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the proposed watermarking algorithm. In this figure, the bit-plane
is set to ‘00011000’ which means that 3 most significant bits of the data are preserved after
watermark insertion, and 2 bits are used as the watermark while the lower 3 bits are unchanged
but subject to round-off error. The result for 8-bit quantization is shown in the figure, but the
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bit depth is limited only by the natural resolution of the source data (typically 12- or 24-bit
ADC). Similar to the Wong scheme, we might need to tile the hash value as well as binary logo
to match the size of the original data.
Figure 3.6: Watermark insertion for bit-plane = ‘00011000’.
3.6.2 Watermark Detection
In the detection process, the watermark is gradually reconstructed as more and more of the
stream data is processed and involves almost exactly the same process as watermark embedding.
Detection starts first by a data normalization process including range calculation, data scaling
and data quantization. This mean the scaling boundaries (dwminj , d
w
maxj , rng
w
j ) needs to be
re-calculated. After this, the scaled data dwsc will be masked with the selected bit-plains. The
result is subsequently XORed with enough tiled hash value of the secret K to estimate the
watermark, namely wmest. To obtain the original data, dest, the scaling should be reversed.
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The watermark detection process is described in the Algorithm 3.1.
Algorithm 3.1 Watermark Detection
1: procedure wm decode(dw[], selected bitplanes, K)
2: while true do . recalculate the original scaling boundaries
3: dwminj ← find local minimum in curr win[j]
4: dwmaxj ← find local maximum in curr win[j]
5: rngwj ← dwmaxj − dwminj
6: dwsc[]← roundoff (
dw[]−dwminj
rngwj
× b) . quantize data
7: h[]← Hash(K)
8: if len(h) < n then
9: tiled h[]← Tile the hash value h[] to match the data size
10: end if
11: wmest[]← tiled h[]⊕ (bitand(dwsc[], selected bitplanes)) . Estimate the watermark
12: dest[]← d
w
sc[]×rngwj
b + d
w
minj
. Estimate the original data
13: advance curr win[j]
14: end while
15: end procedure
3.7 Experiments
In order to evaluate our watermarking method, we leveraged the standard MIT-BIH arrhythmia
database [Goldberger et al., 2000]. This database consists of 48 fully annotated, 30 min, two-
lead ECG recordings from 47 different patients. The leads usually involve the modified limb
lead II (MLLII) and one of the modified leads V1, V2, V4, or V5. Since the second lead usually
varies for each recording (patient), all the results in this chapter are based on the MLLII. The
data are sampled at 360 Hz and 200 adu/mV gain, and the ± 5 mV range is quantized to 11
bits.
As we discussed in Section 3.2.1, we examine the performance of our system on four dif-
ferent heartbeat classes. For this purpose, we used the patient records 117, 111, 232 and 233
as assigned in MIT-BIH database to study Normal, LBBB, APC and PVC heartbeats, respec-
tively. For instance, Record 111 belongs to a female patient aged 47 years and contains 2123
LBBB beats. The description of other records can be found here [Moody and Mark].
Table 3.2 shows the average PRD and SNR obtained for different heartbeat classes. These
values are calculated according to Equations 3.1 and 3.2. According to the results, we were able
to insert watermarks successfully, up to 5 bits per sample. We also used a corresponding tiled
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version of RMIT logo with 20 × 20 bits = 50 bytes as watermark information. As previously
discussed, this does not necessarily means the watermark changes are acceptable. But because
there is no quality estimator with the desired features for ECG data (see Section 3.2.2), we
used PRD and SNR to provide a fair comparison with other existing works.
To better understand the watermark changes, Figure 3.7 and 3.8 visualize how PRD and
SNR values vary for inserting watermarking in more significant bit-planes. One observation
is that the watermarking changes are the least for the PVC beats and the most for the APC
beats. Additionally, if a watermark is bound to the most significant bits of the signal, the PRD
is higher and SNR is lower and this eventually results in higher diagnostic deficiency.
Table 3.2: PRD and SNR values for various cases of watermarked ECG signals.
WM
Capacity
Normal LBBB APC PVC
PRD SNR(dB) PRD SNR(dB) PRD SNR(dB) PRD SNR(dB)
1 0.1355 57.3612 0.1746 55.1591 0.2322 52.6828 0.0797 61.9708
2 0.2867 50.8514 0.3095 50.1868 0.4213 47.5082 0.1917 54.3476
3 0.6101 44.2921 0.5661 44.9423 0.7715 42.2533 0.3497 49.1261
4 1.2676 37.9403 1.4772 36.6112 2.0364 33.8227 0.7532 42.4262
5 2.5072 32.0162 3.2719 29.7040 4.2695 27.3926 1.5353 36.2761
Figure 3.7: PRD variation for shifting bit-plane to more significant bit-planes of ECG signals
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Figure 3.8: SNR variation for shifting bit-plane to more significant bit-planes of ECG signals
Also, to leave the reader with a flavour of what the watermarked data look like, we have
depicted the original beats versus the watermarked beats and the estimated beats, for the first
2500 samples of the ECG data in Figure 3.9.In Section 3.6.1 we explained that our method has
two possible artifacts: one is data quantization prior to watermark insertion that is lossy, and
the other is watermark embedding that is reversible and therefore lossless. This means that
the estimated signal after removing a watermark is not exactly the same as the original one,
but the difference is bounded by quantization error which in turn depends on the maximum
and minimum values (dmax, dmin) for data scaling and baseline b.
3.8 Verification of Algorithm Properties
In this section, we assert the watermarking properties claimed above.
3.8.1 Computational Complexity
The first step of our encoding/decoding process is data normalization. This mainly includes
scaling operations and binary to decimal (decimal to binary) conversions. As discussed earlier,
the scaling process is done by locally calculating the maxima and minima over a range window.
Since it is a standard sliding window, the complexity of a windowing process is linear i.e. O(m),
where m is the window size because it requires two comparisons for each m value in order to
find the local maximum and minimum over that window. We can further improve the accuracy
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Figure 3.9: ECG beats for normal, LBBB, APC, and PVC before watermark insertion (left col-
umn), after watermark insertion (middle), and reconstructed signal after removing watermark
(right column) for bitplane=‘00011000’ for about the first 7 seconds (2500 samples).
of the windowing process by using an overlapping sliding window. As such, samples are likely
to be considered multiple times, so the boundaries move in a smoother manner. A larger
overlap will result in faster execution but coarser boundaries. However, the selected window
size here is less than 120
th
second – an icon appears roughly every second (roughly equal to one
heart-beat duration) which does not significantly affect the complexity.
We used a standard MD5 hash function which processes the input in 512-bit blocks by
executing 64 steps. Each step consists of 4 additions, 3 logical operations, 2 table lookups and
1 rotation. The input message may be arbitrarily large, but since here we just need to calculate
the hash value of a secret key once, it does not affect the complexity. Logical operations are
also cheap computationally and do not increase complexity. The rest of encoding/decoding
operations have 3 logical operations (1 AND operation for masking bit-planes and 2 XOR
operations).
In Figure 3.10 the average complexity of encoding and decoding process is shown. The cost
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of hash calculation and decimal to binary conversions can be considered negligible. The most
complex part involves the binary to decimal conversion and other operations including tiling
and other necessary array operations.
Figure 3.10: Average encoding/decoding complexity.
The total execution time of the encoding and decoding process for an ECG signal including
2500 samples with different watermark capacity is investigated in Table 3.3. All the experiments
were performed on a desktop computer that was equipped with an Intel Core i3 550 CPU (3.20
GHz) and 4GB of RAM. The operating system was a 64-bit version of Microsoft Windows
7. For our system with the described configuration, the execution time of both encoding and
decoding calculations was roughly 0.3 sec which is quite reasonable in respect to the real-time
constraint for environments with tight computational capacity.
3.8.2 Capacity Estimation
The estimated capacity is the upper bound of the number of bits that can be embedded in
the host ECG signal without causing diagnostic artifacts. We show this threshold value by ∆
which its lower bound is proportional to quantization level introduced by the normalization
process. Therefore, the data hiding capacity C(f) for a sampling frequency f is equal to:
C(f) =
t× f
∆
(3.8)
where ∆ = b ADC resolutionwatermark capacityc, both in bits, and t is the total signal time in seconds. Based
upon results achieved in Table 3.2, ∆ = b115 c = 2 and as a consequence the total capacity
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for an ECG signal with ADC resolution of 11 bits and sampling rate of 360 Hz is roughly 1.8
Kbits/sec. With such high capacity, one can easily embed important information inside the
ECG signal itself without degrading the signal quality, which is measured in terms of PRD and
SNR.
Table 3.3: Execution time.
WM
capacity
Execution time (s)
Encoding Decoding
1 0.296 0.259
2 0.292 0.255
3 0.285 0.271
4 0.306 0.283
5 0.307 0.288
3.8.3 Graceful Degradation of the Watermark
We also studied how the proposed scheme supports graceful degradation or equally how the
watermark behaves in the presence of distortion. Figure 3.11 shows the RMIT Logo used as
watermark information, and segments of the original ECG signal with the logo as input, and
the watermarked signal as well as the extracted logo images as output. The density of the logo
‘frames’ within the signal window depends on how many bits per pixel are stored and on the
size of the logo. Figure 3.12 shows the effect on the logos of changing individual samples (150
in this case, resulting in 150 × 2 bits / sample = 300 entries in error, or 30020 = 15 columns), and
of deleting those samples. Figures 3.12 (c) and (d) demonstrate how the watermark behaves
in the presence of distortion. Deletions and additions will cause synchronisation loss for the
remainder of the segment, but it is later re-established via the protocol.
In Chapter 5, we look at how synchronisation can be improved from within the watermark
itself.
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Figure 3.11: (a,b) Original and watermarked signal, (c) Original 20x20 Logo, (d) Extracted
logos
Figure 3.12: (a) Signal with parts set to zero (circled), (b) Signal with deletions, (c) Extracted
logos showing how synchronisation was not affected, (d) Showing how synchronisation is lost
by data point deletions (or insertions).
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3.8.4 Embedding Data Instead of Logo
As mentioned above, we have used an RMIT logo for the embedded data for demonstration
purposes. The frame size used in Figures 3.10, 3.11, 3.12 for the logo, is an attribute of
the embedded data, not the watermark embedding method. We are not restricted to using
logos only, although they are good demonstrators in a court of law. We could instead insert
patient data (as long as it contains an error-check of some kind) or other identity, such as the
measurement settings and circumstances. A more interesting use is data-chaining, where a
low-resolution version of a data frame is stored as watermark within the next frame. If we use
a CDMA-encoded binary message with ECC, then synchronisation is trivially added, with no
extra effort required on the collector. Importantly, if a block-chaining method is used, we can
vary the message content from frame to frame. The system has the capacity and flexibility for
many other such uses.
3.9 Summary and Future Works
In this chapter, we proposed a fragile watermarking algorithm for protection of ECG data at
the sensory nodes. Most earlier studies are related to the watermark robustness and end-to-end
transmission of biomedical data that leave data vulnerable between sensors and the aggregator
where such a watermark is inserted. The main contribution of our work is that it tries to
insert a watermark one step after data collection. If the data is watermarked, it goes wherever
the data goes, and only an active attempt at manipulation would remove trace of it. Our
method can be used not only for assuring data possession guarantees, but also to determine
what part of data was tampered with, and perhaps, ultimately, who did the tampering, via
forensic analysis. The advantage of this scheme is its simplicity and ease of implementation in
simple devices with limited computational complexity as required within sensors.
Evaluation results confirmed that the proposed algorithm is feasible for high accuracy and
low complexity for ECG protection. We showed that, our method has the ability to rapidly
discover loss of synchronisation and to search for re-synchronisation through applying small
windows. If the embedded data uses data link chaining, then loss can also be localized. We
embedded an icon for the evaluation, but any other binary data can be used interchangeably.
At the aggregation level it might be desirable to remove fragile watermarks and embed a robust
one or embed multiple watermarks. As Mintzer suggested “Embedding a fragile watermark
followed by embedding a robust watermark is bound to damage the fragile watermark” [Mintzer
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and Braudaway, 1999]. Therefore, the most robust watermark should be embedded first, and
the most fragile watermark should be embedded last.
3.9.1 Possible Future Directions
Measuring distortions for ECG data is one of the remaining challenges that future research
might be able to find the answer. When distortions are quantified appropriately, this enables
the design of a pragmatic digital watermarking approach. Unlike multimedia watermarking,
one may not wish to rely on human subjective judgement of quality for cardiac diagnosis
preservation. Instead, an automatic quality assessment model is required, preferably without
having access to the pristine reference ECG data. However, a full discussion and design of such
quality estimators is beyond the scope of this thesis and requires further investigations.
In this chapter, we used full-reference PRD and SNR as general measure of damage. Our
justification for preserving cardiac diagnosis is that, in our scheme any significant local extreme
(either minimum or maximum) will remain after embedding (beyond window size) and the
position of such extreme is unchanged by design. Hence, the PQRST structure is maintained
in terms of timing. By adapting the window size to be close to detector resolution, the peak
heights will neither change significantly. Therefore, the ECG characteristic points themselves
are completely recoverable within sensor resolution and as a result the diagnostic significant is
relatively unaffected and is limited by PRD.
An other possible future work that has not been addressed in this chapter, is integrating
biomedical data interchange standards with the watermarking methods of such data. An exam-
ple is Digital Imaging and Communication in Medicine (DICOM) standard established by the
National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) for the communication and manage-
ment of medical imaging information and related data [Association]. The image compression
literature is full of research studies supporting the DICOM standard. Recently, there have
been some attempts in digital watermarking of images that are stored according to the DI-
COM standard (e.g. [Fontani et al., 2010]). For the ECG measurements, the widely accepted
standard is ‘SCP-ECG’, stands for Standard Communications Protocol for computer assisted
ECG. Adoption of such commercial standards for development of watermarking methods can
make them more appealing to vendors and ultimately hasten their application in medicine. To
the best of our knowledge, no ECG data watermarking method with support of biomedical
standards (such as SCP-ECG) is proposed.
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3.9.2 Looking forward
In this chapter, a fragile watermarking scheme for protecting ECG data is presented. Data
authenticity is then determined by examining the watermark extracted from the host data. In
some applications, the requirement for data authenticity is somehow different. For instance, in
sensor networks, data is subject to several sources of errors such as inaccuracies and imprecision,
or various environmental effects. Therefore, the captured data is inherently noisy and if the
noise characteristics is below a threshold, the data is still acceptable. This necessitates the
presence of a robust watermark that could tolerate these changes to data. Apart from that, for
most of sensory applications, the captured data in raw format is often of little interest (to the
end users), as knowledge extracted from the entire network is needed for subsequent decisions.
For this purpose, data goes through different stages of processing and data mining operations
in order to extract insights from raw data. This means the watermarks embedded at the data
acquisition stage should tolerate these changes to data.
The method that we presented in this chapter is a virtue in one sense, since for integrity
assurance we might need to detect even slight changes to the data. In contrast, a semi-fragile
or robust watermark that is often a host-dependent signature message, must survive legitimate
distortions, but be destroyed by illegitimate modifications applied to the data. This demand
techniques that can distinguish acceptable manipulations such as data compression or data
aggregation, from malicious ones. In the next chapter, we propose a robust watermarking
scheme that can survive linear aggregation of multiple data streams.
Chapter 4
Digital Watermarking of Sensory
Data Streams (part I): Mergeable
Watermarks
While the individual man is an
insoluble puzzle, in the aggregate
he becomes a mathematical cer-
tainty. You can, for example,
never foretell what any one man
will do, but you can say with pre-
cision what an average number
will be up to.
Conan Doyle
This chapter is dedicated to designing watermarks that are robust against additive aggre-
gation operations. The importance of such watermarks for end-to-end aggregate data authen-
tication in wireless sensor networks is discussed. We show that pseudorandom sequences can
be used to efficiently generate watermarks with robustness against aggregation.
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the notion of mergeable hiding codes is introduced. In particular, the ap-
plication of such codes for secure data aggregation in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) is
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investigated. Regardless of the application, the notion of mergeable watermarks gives us a
new angle on constructing watermarks: it suggests the payload needs to be allocated amongst
multiple data streams in such a way that it can survive some aggregation operations. In other
words, the watermark should be robust against data aggregation. Examples of such operations
include summation or average on multiple data streams. Also, the linear aggregation can be
used to compute basic statistics such as the mean or variance or other moments.
The above issue that we explore here is analogous to the batch stenography problem first
posed in [Ker, 2006], in which the payload is securely spread across a batch of covers and a
steganalyst attempts in combining evidence from those covers to say whether they collectively
contain payload or not. In a recent review of steganography [Ker et al., 2013], marking across
multiple objects is stated as one of the open problem:
“... Open Problem 7: Theoretical approaches and practical implementations for
embedding in multiple objects in the presence of real time constraints.”
Motivated by design of such codes, in this chapter, we provide a solution for watermarking
of multiple data streams that is applicable for aggregate data authentication in WSN. The
strictly limited sensing, computation, and communication capabilities of sensors makes data
authentication a challenging problem. Traditional solutions to this problem are cryptography
and digital signatures that unfortunately lead to prohibitive costs because of decoding and re-
encoding on a hop-by-hop basis. Apart from that, those methods apply only limited protection
for data while it resides on the sensor devices. In align with the On-Sensor-Watermark vision
(see Chapter 3), Section 3.3), our solution based on digital watermarking can serve as an
on device data protection that allows efficient (linear) aggregation of multiple data streams,
without expanding data size. Additionally, we prove that our scheme does not change the main
statistics of sensory data, but also can effectively prove the correctness of those statistics.
How to adapt watermarking methods exist for embedding information
within one single data stream to many?
In Chapter 3, we proposed a digital watermarking scheme for an ECG data stream. This
was a fragile watermark. Watermarks with fragility are effective for data integrity purpose,
however, are extremely sensitive to alterations such as noise that is quite often present in
a WSN. Under such circumstances, a robust watermark would be more suitable to tolerate
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natural noise artefacts or inherent measurement uncertainty to some extent1. Apart from the
robustness issue, our proposed method for ECG watermarking was only suitable for marking
a single data stream. Hence, in this chapter we propose a robust watermarking method for
jointly marking of multiple data streams.
As stated in [Sion et al., 2006], the difficulty of watermarking of a single data stream is
threefold:
1. The inability to store a complete stream that restricts the encoder to mark data having
a finite window by only one pass over the data.
2. The difficulty of assessing the quality of marked data stream to measure the watermarked-
related alterations that is application specific and often need to consider overall stream
characteristics.
3. Different semantic operations than audio/video stream (such as data summarization or
aggregation) that prohibits the direct application of multimedia watermarking methods.
We have already discussed all of these issues in the previous chapters.
The difficulty of data watermarking can be aggravated when there are multiple data streams
(MDS) that need to be marked jointly. Many of today’s applications benefit from the batching
of MDS in order to reason about the status of the current deployed system and take further
actions based on the aggregated results. Examples include but are not limited to environmental
monitoring such as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), military applications,
tracking stock changes. Although digital watermarking of a single sensory data stream has
been extensively studied, little research has been done on marking of MDS. In this chapter,
we assume data streams are synchronised at the time of watermark insertion/detection and
propose a construction that can survive data aggregation. This construction shall be improved
in Chapter 5 by relaxing the synchrony assumption.
The chapter begins with Section 4.2 to describe the in-network data aggregation in WSNs
and the difficulty of applying conventional security methods to ensure the integrity of aggre-
gated data. Next, the security objective of our watermarking solution is described precisely.
Section 4.4 looks at the related works and their distinctions to the presented solution in this
chapter. Thereafter, Section 4.5 investigates generation of watermarking codes using pseudo-
random sequences. Our novel watermarking solution is described in Section 4.6 including wa-
1A robust watermark should tolerate changes up to the point that measurement data are acceptable in the
presence of noise.
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termark generation, encoding and decoding. Then, Section 4.7 elaborates the possible methods
to increase the scalability of the watermarking solution and Section 4.8 studies the statistical
validity of the watermarked data streams to devise optimal watermark amplitudes. Section
4.9 gives the performance evaluation of the presented scheme on real dataset and finally Sec-
tion 4.10 concludes the chapter with a discussion of remaining limitations and opportunity for
future works.
4.2 In-network Data Aggregation in WSNs
A WSN is a multi-hop network composed of a multitude of tiny sensor devices with limited
computation, communication, and battery facilities. Such a network offers potentially low-cost
solutions to an array of problems in many applications, including battlefield surveillance, target
tracking, environmental and health-care monitoring, traffic regulation and wildfire detection.
The multi-hop nature of a WSN implies that sensors are also utilized as part of the network
infrastructure; not just sending their own data, but also forwarding data for other sensors
[Castelluccia et al., 2009]. This results in a delivery tree that is often built from the sink to all
sensors, such that data sent by a sensor are forwarded to the sink by the intermediate sensors
along this tree. The sink is a more powerful device compared to the other sensors, and is
usually interested in collective information of sensors.
The task of gathering information from a WSN, with the aid of such limited resource
constraints of sensors, becomes challenging. A popular example of such a sensor is the Berkeley
mote that spends approximately the same amount of energy to compute 800 instructions as it
does in sending a single bit of data [Voloshynovskiy et al., 2001]. Thus, it becomes essential to
use an approach that reduces the number of bits forwarded by intermediate nodes. One of such
approach is “in-network data aggregation”, that is the process of combining and summarizing
sensory data in order to reduce the amount of data transmission in the network, and thus
extend the entire network’s lifetime.
Figure 4.1 illustrates an example of in-network data aggregation in a WSN. The entire net-
work is divided into multiple clusters such that the sensors transmit their local measurements
into the cluster head – aka aggregator – within a cluster. Subsequently, the aggregator forwards
combinations of data gleaned from multiple sensors to the sink node over a multi-hop path.
The use of such local aggregation processing and hierarchical collaboration results in energy
efficiency of the network. The benefit of in-network data aggregation has also been confirmed
theoretically[Krishnamachari et al., 2002] and experimentally [Madden et al., 2002].
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Figure 4.1: In-network data aggregation in a wireless sensor network.
The data aggregation process eliminates the problem of limited bandwidth and energy in a
WSN, but it opens up the possibility of a more careful design for ensuring the data authenticity.
The main reason is that the in-network aggregation process necessitates the existence of trusted
aggregators; otherwise, the trustworthiness of the collected information will be in doubt. The
aggregate-commit-prove method proposed by [Przydatek et al., 2003] is an example of such
remedies, wherein the aggregator not only performs the aggregation operation, but also proves
the correctness of the performed task.
One might argue that the data can be protected using traditional security methods such as
encryption or by appending meta data such as MACs on a hop-by-hop basis. The problem with
these methods is that the data needs to be verified at every intermediate nodes and re-encoded
prior to its transmission. This would negate any benefit that could potentially achieved by
the in-network aggregation process, due to the exhaustive calculations that is needed to be
done by tight resource constraints on sensors. Therefore, it is imperative to design a security
scheme that is not a hindrance to the in-network data aggregation process. To this end, much
research has been conducted to resolve the issue. An extensive review of these techniques could
be found in [Ozdemir and Xiao, 2009].
Our solution to the above problem is based on digital watermarking. The key idea is that
each sensor embeds a unique watermark as its signature and the receiver (for example data sink)
can verify the existence of those signatures and thus authenticate the data. The challenging
part of this solution is signature design to accomplish optimal watermark separation from the
aggregated data at the sink end, given prior knowledge of the association of watermarks with
source nodes. Our method for securing in-network data aggregation is computationally sound
and can accommodate with real time constraints.
Next, we define our security objective concretely.
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4.3 Security Objective
The primary security objective of our proposal is “aggregate data authentication” or equiv-
alently “aggregate data integrity” verification for sensor networks. This means an adversary
should not be able to affect the result of aggregation operation without being detected. This
should remain true even in the presence of a few compromised data sources. Unfortunately for
sensor networks, perfect integrity is rarely attainable considering the fact that real measure-
ments are inherently noisy [Wagner, 2004]. Therefore, we relax our security goal slightly and
instead seek for approximate aggregate data authentication (or approximate integrity verifica-
tion) – the adversary might have only a limited influence (preferably some small values that is
negligible compared to a random noise) on the resulting aggregate values.
To validate the approximate integrity of the aggregated results, a verifier needs some knowl-
edge of its contributors/data-sources. This is because, if contributors use distinct keys, the
verifier certainly needs to know who those contributors are before using those keys in the veri-
fication stage; otherwise, utilizing a global key for all contributors, an adversary may construct
malicious data by aggregating a single data stream from one contributor many times, say n
times, which is indistinguishable with an aggregated data from n legitimate contributors [Li
and Gong, 2010].
Therefore, data origin authentication, or data provenance is an inherent requirement for
data aggregation integrity, that we set as the other security objective. Instead of appending
a list of contributors to the aggregated data, following our watermarking approach, each data
source along the path can insert its own unique watermark as an implicit way of indicat-
ing the data origin and therefore the chain of aggregated watermarks can represent the data
provenance.
Does the process of embedding watermarks affect the result of aggregation? For conventional
multimedia watermarking, the assessment of data quality takes human vision or hearing into
account, and so the watermark needs to be imperceptible to humans. For sensory data, we
similarly need to ensure that watermark-related alterations do not significantly ‘damage’ either
the individual data stream values or the aggregated stream [Sion et al., 2006]. This damage
implies that the streaming data needs to be able to tolerate small alterations to its values
without significant degradation of its overall worth. As we will see, our embedding procedure
minimizes these changes for each data value. In addition to that, we select zero mean binary
signature codes so that the aggregation result will be preserved for finite windows of length
equal to the length of signature codes. Astute selection of such codes allows us to achieve
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near-zero impact on the aggregation result beyond a finite minimum window.
Specifically, we adopt spread spectrum watermarking in which signature codes are spread
over many data values. Therefore, each sensor hides a unique spreading code in its sensory data
periodically, and these can be aggregated to a single stream. The aggregator can in turn embed
its own unique code within the aggregated data stream. Recovery is based on correlation with
a template array for validating aggregated in-band signals. We observe that such codes can be
aggregated without loss of information other than by quantisation. Furthermore, we extend
the scalability of our mergeable hiding codes by using a new class of binary codes with certain
properties that are more secure against watermark estimation2. By scalability, we mean that
a large number of unique signatures (watermarks) can be provided.
4.4 Related Works by Means of Crypto Primitives
In Chapter 2, related works for the aggregate data authentication by means of digital water-
marking techniques were reviewed. This section, thus only looks at the comparative solutions
that are based on cryptographic primitives.
Traditionally, security issues such as data authentication are addressed with the help of
encryption schemes. As we already discussed, for sensor networks with highly constrained
devices, standard cryptography is not a pragmatic approach to achieve our described secu-
rity objectives. Besides these standard methods, there are homomorphic primitives as other
attractive alternatives that we study in the following.
4.4.1 How Useful is the Homomorphic Scheme By Itself?
We briefly explain the homomorphic encryption from the reference [Gentry, 2009].
A fully homomorphic encryption system allows one to compute arbitrary functions over en-
crypted data without the decryption key. More concretely, given encrypted values E(m1), ...E(mk)
of messages m1, ...,mk, one can compute a compact ciphertext that encrypts f(m1, ...,mk) for
any efficiently computable function f . For instance, for k = 2, functions Add and Mult take
ciphertexts E(m1) and E(m2) and compute E(m1 + m2) and E(m1 ×m2) respectively. Add
simply adds two ciphertext, and Mult multiplies them without any prior decryption. This
problem was originally posed by Rivest et al. as a privacy homomorphism in the late 1970
2The security against estimation attack is assessed by linear complexity of embedding codes that is later
explained in Section 4.5.1.
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[Rivest et al., 1978], shortly after the invention of RSA3. No information about m1, ...,mk or
f(m1, ...,mk), or any intermediate plaintext values, should leak. For security reasons, such
encryption schemes are necessarily probabilistic. This means that for a given encryption key,
each plain text can be encrypted in several different ciphertexts.
Since this seminal work, the design of efficient and secure homomorphic encryption schemes
has been one of the holy grails of the cryptographic community. Many of the proposed homo-
morphic encryptions such as the Paillier’s scheme (and its derivatives), are only able to process
encrypted data but with only one kind of operator (often additions or multiplications) at a
time [Fontaine and Galand, 2009].
In 2009, Gentry proposed the first plausible construction of a fully homomorphic cryp-
tosystem consists of several steps [Gentry, 2009]: First, a “somewhat homomorphic” scheme
to evaluate low degree polynomials on the encrypted data is constructed, next the decryption
procedure is squashed so that it can be expressed as a low-degree polynomial which is sup-
ported by the scheme, and finally a bootstrapping transformation is applied to obtain a fully
homomorphic scheme. The crucial part of this construction is to obtain a scheme that can eval-
uate polynomials of high-enough degree, and at the same time has decryption procedure that
can be expressed as a polynomial of low-enough degree. Once the degree of polynomials that
can be evaluated by the scheme exceeds the degree of the decryption polynomial (times two),
the scheme is called “bootstrappable” and it can then be converted into a fully homomorphic
scheme.
With the above scheme, any polynomial function over encrypted data can be computed.
Even though, Gentry’s scheme was really a breakthrough after 30 years of huge efforts for real
applications, it had some deficiencies such as huge algorithmic complexity, large key size, and
ciphertext expansion. After that, the security research community has focused on improving
Gentry’s scheme and finding less complex fully homomorphic ones. Despite these huge efforts,
the overhead of those approaches remains still too high to make them directly usable in practice
for today’s applications [Aguilar-Melchor et al., 2013].
4.4.2 Homomorphic Signatures
The other alternative for integrity verification resilient against data aggregation is appending
signatures with a homomorphism property. Otherwise, validating the signature and replacing
with a new one is necessary on a hop-by-hop basis. An example of such schemes, is proposed
3 Basic RSA is a multiplicatively homomorphic encryption scheme.
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by Li and Gong, wherein three homomorphic signatures with different trade-offs between com-
putation cost, communication payload, and security assumptions for sensor networks are sug-
gested [Li and Gong, 2010]. The first proposal is a concrete homomorphic MAC scheme, and
the two other are combining homomorphic hashing with aggregate MAC and identity-based
aggregate signature, respectively. As the authors stated, an instinctive shortcoming of all
homomorphic-hashing-based approaches is that a verifier should retrieve the raw hash values
of the contributors, which constitutes considerate communication payload.
Another problem with signature schemes in general (that we already discussed in Chap-
ter 3) is their infinitive sensitivity to even slight changes that invalidates the hash values and
make them unfavorable candidates for noisy environments [Fridrich, 2009]. Additionally, ap-
plying those kinds of homomorphic primitives to data aggregation either involves cumbersome
key management problems, or incurs considerable communication costs. Consequently, their
applicabilities are highly limited [Castelluccia et al., 2009].
4.4.3 Short Aggregate Signatures: Similarity and Dissimilarities with Our
Encoding/Decoding Approach
Short aggregate signatures should be distinguished from aggregate authentication.
An aggregate signature scheme allows a collection of signatures to be compressed into one
short signature and is able to provide same security as other classical signature schemes, but
with significantly shorter length [Boneh et al., 2003]. This is a useful approach for applications
where the security overhead in terms of memory space and computations needs to be kept to
a minimum. The first aggregate signature was presented by Boneh et al. based on bilinear
pairings over certain elliptic (and hyper-elliptic) curves and requires a special probabilistic hash
function namely an admissible encoding called MapToPoint. Even though the MapToPoint
function is proven to be inefficient, this initiative work has leaded to many other variants
and improvements for constructing aggregate signatures. A more detailed description of such
schemes may be found in [Menezes, 2005].
Our encoding solution is closely related to the short aggregate signatures, but with one im-
portant distinction. For our purpose, i.e. aggregate authentication, the messages themselves
are aggregated and hence, the original individual messages are not necessary available for veri-
fication. Whereas, in aggregate signatures, the signatures on different messages are aggregated
and all individual signed messages should be available to the verifier in order to validate the
aggregate signature. Consequently, as one would expect, this can not achieve the secure end-
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to-end aggregate authentication for having existential unforgeability against chosen-message
attacks [Castelluccia et al., 2009]. Hence, other external techniques are needed to verify the
plausibility of the resulting aggregate and to increase the aggregation resiliency.
On the other hand, our decoding solution has a similar structure to that of batch verification
of signatures from (possibly) different signers, first proposed by Camenisch et al [Camenisch
et al., 2012]: When a large number of digital signatures need to be verified, it is sometimes
possible to save time by verifying many signatures together. This batch verification process
is advantageous mainly for applications, in which performing a small amount of additional
computation is more worthwhile than sending shorter messages. A given evidence of such
applications is Mica2 sensors, wherein transmitting data consumes significantly more battery
than keeping the CPU active.
The Camenisch et al’s batch verification scheme provides security equivalent to 1024-bit
RSA at a cost of 160 bits and allows the total number of dominant (pairing) operations be
independent of the number of signatures to verify. Apart from good features of the scheme, if
the batch verification fails, then it is often necessary to identify the invalid (“bad”) signature(s)
that caused the batch to fail. This process can be time consuming and might eliminate all of
the efficiency gains of batch verification. Our decoding scheme enjoys the batch verification as
well, but it is not as scalable as Camenisch et al’s. Instead ours is more promising in detecting
of invalid hiding codes as shall be described in Section 4.6.6.
Next, we provide a brief primer on Spread Spectrum watermarking, pseudonoise sequences,
and their fundamental properties.
4.5 Pseudonoise Sequences for Spread Spectrum
Watermarking
Spread Spectrum (SS) watermarking is one the most common approach for watermarking of
sensory data, in which an information bit stream is spread over sequences with certain features.
The overall structure of a SS watermark system (encoding/decoding) is depicted in Figure 4.2.
A secret key is used by a sequence generator to produce a “chip sequence”. The resulting
sequence is then, added or subtracted from the bitstream x according to the variable b, where
b assumes the values of +1 or -1 according to the bits to be transmitted by the watermark data.
The watermarked bit-stream y goes through a distortion channel such as noise addition or de-
synchronisation attack and therefore, a distorted signal yˆ is received at the decoder end. The
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watermark decoder performs a “correlation operation” to de-spread the embedded watermark.
We now describe all these notions more thoroughly.
Figure 4.2: Main components of a Spread Spectrum digital Watermarking system.
The effectiveness of SS watermarking is highly dependent to the choice of spreading codes.
The main requirement for such codes is randomness. In fact, randomness provides robustness
and security to a SS process. As such, it is ideal to use truly random spreading codes so that
no one rather than the watermark encoder could generate and predict the spreading codes.
Generating truly random numbers is an expensive task due the complexity of required hard-
ware (such as thermal noise of zener diodes or radioactive decay). Besides, if the decoder has
to generate the same code to retrieve the encoded information, being truly random, the same
code cannot be obtained at the decoder side. Instead, pseudonoise sequences (PN), also known
as pseudorandom sequences, are used to resemble the random like behaviour. More precisely,
PN codes are periodic codes that are generated deterministically with properties similar to
the additive white Gaussian noise. In this regard, Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs)
are favourite primitives to generate PN codes due to their desirable statistical properties and
hardware-friendly nature [Golomb and Gong, 2005]. More information in regards to the LFSRs
and PN sequences generation can be found in Chapter 2.
4.5.1 Definitions related to spreading codes
An important aspect of spreading codes is their correlation characteristics that we define in
this section. Let s = (s(0), s(1), .., s(l − 1)) be an l-ary PN sequence.
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Definition 4.1. Alphabet (z). The number of possible unique values in the sequence s is
called the sequence alphabet. For example a binary sequence, has z = 2, being 0/1, or -1/+1.
For a ternary sequence (z = 3), three possible values are {−1, 0, 1}. From the watermarking
point of view, embedding a ternary sequence is equivalent to increasing a data sample by either
+1 or -1, or leave it intact.
Definition 4.2. Period (Ts). The sequence s is periodic, if there exists an integer Ts > 0 so
that s(i) = s(i+ T ) for all i = 0, 1, 2, ..., l. Such Ts is called a period of the sequence s.
The sequences that we use in this chapter are periodic, so Ts = l.
Definition 4.3. Cross-Correlations Function (CCF). The (periodic) cross-correlation
function of the sequences s and r (of the same length) is defined as:
Cs,r(τ) =
l−1∑
i=0
s(i)r(i+ τ) (4.1)
where subscripts i + τ is taken modulo l. In fact, for binary sequences, the cross-correlation
shows the number of agreements minus the number of disagreements in a single period of s
and r(τ) which should have identical periods.
When the cross-correlation of two sequences, Cs,r(τ) is zero for all τ , the two are called
orthogonal.
Definition 4.4. Auto-correlation Function (ACF). The (periodic) auto-correlation func-
tion is defined as follows:
As(τ) = Cs,s(τ) =
l−1∑
i=0
s(i)s(i+ τ) (4.2)
The auto-correlation can also be seen as a set of vector products between si and every shift of
itself (s(i+ τ)).
When the auto-correlation of a sequence, As(τ) is zero for all τ , except τ = 0, then the
sequence is called ideal, or perfect (for spread spectrum use).
One important note to be made here is that the correlation characteristics of spreading
sequences can be described by “aperiodic” correlations as well. For instance, an aperiodic
ACF only considers the correlation given over one period of a spreading sequence, whereas the
periodic ACF provides the auto-correlation where the sequence repeats itself. The periodic and
aperiodic correlation characteristics are closely related and both are important. In fact, good
aperiodic correlation characteristics can be translated to good periodic correlation character-
istics. However, in a practical multi-user communication channel wherein several spreading
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codes will be transmitted, the periodic correlation characteristics are more important [Proakis
and Salehi, 2008].
Definition 4.5. Linear Complexity or Span (LC). The Linear Complexity is the mini-
mum number of elements needed to be deciphered by an attacker in order to be able to gen-
erate/predict the rest of remaining sequence. Ideally, the LC should be equal to the sequence
period so that the entire sequence will be required to predict future bit values4.
Definition 4.6. Shift Distinct Sequences. Let r and s be two sequences of the same period.
Sequence s is a shift of r if there exists τ ≥ 0 so that s(i) = r(i+ τ) for all i ≥ 0 and we denote
r = sτ . If no such shift τ exists, s and r are said to be shift distinct.
Definition 4.7. Sequence Ensemble or Sequence Family (S). A PN sequence is gener-
ated based on an algorithm with possibly a set of input parameters. The union of all different
sequences made by varying all these parameters is collectively called a family or an ensemble
and is denoted by S = {sj |1 ≤ j ≤ k} with k sequences, and indice j denotes the jth member
of the ensemble S.
4.5.1.1 Common properties of PN sequences: Golomb’s randomness postulates
The three following definitions are related to the Golomb’s three randomness postulates in-
cluding balance, run, ideal two-level autocorrelation properties.
Definition 4.8. Balance. This property states that, for each period of a PN sequence, all
alphabet values occur with (near) equal probability. In other words, each symbol in a PN
sequence occurs either
⌊
Ts
z
⌋
or
⌈
Ts
z
⌉
times within a single period Ts.
Definition 4.9. Run. This property states that, in every period of a PN sequence, the distri-
bution of runs of the same symbol in a PN sequence is binomial for every symbol. Alternately,
one can say that zero, occurs zn−1 − 1 times and each non-zero symbol, zn−1 times.
Definition 4.10. Two level auto-correlation. The sequence s of period Ts has ideal two
level auto-correlation, if the following equation holds:
As(τ) =
Ts, if τ = 0−1, otherwise (4.3)
4A well known method to calculate the LC of a sequence is Berlekamp-Massey algorithm. See [Massey and
Schaub, 1986] for detail.
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Clearly, the above autocorrelation has a non-zero peak and -1 sidelobes. This means the
number of disagreements and agreements are of s are equal.
Hereafter, we only consider binary sequences, i.e. z = 2. The only binary sequences that
satisfy Golomb’s three randomness postulates are maximal length sequences (m-sequences) that
we already described in Chapter 2. In fact, the above properties justify the name pseudorandom
sequences, for these are the properties that one would expect from a sequence obtained by
tossing a fair coin 2m − 1 times. More information about the correlation properties of these
sequences shall be provided in Section 4.6.4.
4.5.2 Information embedding in spreading sequences
In [Van Schyndel et al., 1999], the possibility of encoding information within PN sequences is
summarised as combining:
• Phase: The phase or shift of a sequence (or horizontal and vertical shifts for two dimen-
sional sequences) relative to some template,
• Choice: The selected sequence from a PN ensemble (i.e. sj for 1 ≤ j ≤ |S|, si ∈ S ),
• Polarity: The sign of a sequence (i.e. +sj or −sj) that can convey one extra bit of
information,
• Direction: The order of embedding sequence (for instance, some sequences need to include
reversed pairs of family members).
Clearly, the combination of all above parameters can achieve the maximum information ca-
pacity. But this might negate other watermarking requirements. Recall the magic triangle that
we described in Chapter 1. Achieving high capacity (right corner of the magic triangle), should
not violate the invisibility constraint which in our case is defined as ‘statistical invisibility’.
This shall be discussed in Section 4.8.
In our solution, the phase or cyclic shift of sequences are mainly employed to encode in-
formation. This method, however, has the limitation of only encoding integer values, because
shifts cannot take any other format. Apart from this limitation, the shift encoding is a simple
and effective method for performing watermark operations in sensors with limited computa-
tional capacity.
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4.5.3 Approaches to detect PN codes
In SS watermarking, de-spreading of PN codes is often by means of a correlation or match filter.
A conventional detector correlates the received watermarked data (yˆ) with the synchronized
replica of the same spreading sequence that is used by the encoder. Then, it makes a decision
based on the single correlation output. For instance, if the phase and polarity of the signature
code s constitutes the watermark information, the position and sign of the correlation peak
reveals these information at the decoder side. However, if the choice of the sequence from an
ensemble S is not known to the decoder, it is then required to perform the correlation operation
against a bank of |S| codes to first recognize the embedded sequence (s) and subsequently use
other information to decode the watermark message. Therefore, increasing the watermark
capacity comes with the cost of increases in complexity of watermark detection.
The other deficiency with the above conventional detector becomes evident in the presence
of other codes that are spread over the same data such as our scenario, whereby multiple
watermarked are superimposed on one aggregated data stream. In such circumstances, the
conventional detector neglects the presence of other codes or it assumes that the aggregate
noise plus interference is white and Gaussian [Moshavi, 1996]. This assumption is only valid if
the multiple codes are orthogonal and as such, the interference from the other spreading codes
vanishes. However, if one or more codes are not orthogonal, the interference increases and this
assumption is no longer acceptable.
In practice, maintaining orthogonality in the presence of asynchronism is not an easy task.
Even, if the synchrony is achieved, the number of orthogonal codes are limited and this restricts
the scalability of our scheme in terms of number of possible data streams that can be aggregated.
Hencefore, a better strategy is incorporating information about other spreading codes to detect
each individual watermark. In communication terminology, this is called ‘mult-user detection’
or ‘joint detection’. Two of the main classes of such approach are linear multi-user detectors
and subtractive interference cancellation as described here [Moshavi, 1996].
The intuition of our watermark detection (also referred as batch detection) is similar to
that of multi-user detection, but with different implementation. As we will see in the next
Section, our unique watermark construction based on shifting an ensemble of PN codes helps
in the joint detection of multiple watermarks with reasonable decoding complexity.
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4.6 Proposed Mergeable Watermarking Solution
4.6.1 System Model
We consider a sensor network consisting of a set of nodes with a two-tier hierarchy structure
includingN leaf nodes andM cluster heads (aggregators) such that sensory data from leaves are
periodically transmitted to the aggregators. The aggregation tree has N +M fan-in. Sensory
data resides at the leaves and the aggregated data over clusters resides at the aggregators.
Similar to the ECG watermarking method, with respect to finite space constraint, we
consider a window of length T and for 1 ≤ t ≤ T , define d(t) = [d1(t) d2(t) ... dN (t)]Tr ∈
RN as the column-vector of data-stream values at time t over all the sensors. di(t) denotes
the sample of data stream at time t belonging to node Ni. In this chapter, we adhere to the
common convention of using column vectors for data-streams and herein write them out in
transposed form, denoted by Tr symbol.
The collection of all data-streams in the network can be viewed as a continuously growing
T ×N matrix such that D(T ) = [d(1) d(2) ... d(T )]Tr ∈ RT×N . Without loss of generality,
we define summation as the linear aggregation function. So the aggregated data at time t,
denoted by dagg(t), is the summation over the column vector, di(t). i.e. dagg(t) =
∑N
i=1 di(t).
Similarly, the watermarked data-stream at time t and the watermarked data-stream over the
nodes can be expressed as:
dw(t) = [dw1 (t) d
w
2 (t) ... d
w
N (t)]
Tr ∈ RN ,
Dw(T ) = [dw(1) dw(2) ... dw(T )]Tr ∈ RT×N
respectively, therefore dwagg(t) =
∑N
i=1 d
w
i (t).
4.6.2 Assumptions
One assumption underlying our solution is that the data stream is inherently noisy and therefore
can tolerate small amounts of alterations without significant degradation of overall data utility.
Therefore, we expect approximate integrity to form ‘adequate’ security for our envisioned
applications (adequate being necessarily application-dependent). Another assumption is that
at the beginning of each aggregation round, all cluster nodes are synchronised. This assumption
is necessary because of our detection process in which the relative phase between sequences is
significant, as we explain in Section 4.6.6. We call this synchronous watermarking, and this
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chapter is restricted to such watermarks. This restriction is not onerous as sensor data is
usually collected in a time-synchronous manner [Sultana et al., 2013].
Additionally, we assume the mergeable hiding codes are constructed from an ensemble of
binary PN sequences (z = 2). Thus, for the rest of this chapter, PN sequences refer only to
binary PN codes, unless otherwise specified.
4.6.3 Definitions Related to Our Watermarking Solution
Definition 4.11. We say that ensemble S is a (l, k, δ, %) set, if each sequence in S has period
l, there are k shift distinct sequences of such in S (also called family size or set size) and the
maximum magnitude of ACF and CCF values are bounded by δ and %, respectively.
Definition 4.12. Shift Invariant Sequences. We say the set S(l, k, δ, %) has the shift
invariance property, if the ACF and CCF bounds (δ, %) are not changed by cyclically shifting
the sequences in S.
This is a commonly used design criterion for sequence families used in asynchronous Code
Division Multiple Access (CDMA) communications [Proakis and Salehi, 2008].
Definition 4.13. Multiple Watermark Interference (MWI). We define the Multiple Wa-
termark Interference as the mutual interference between individual watermarks that contribute
to an aggregated watermarked data stream. The MWI not only limits the performance of our
mergeable hiding codes, but also the number of possible watermarked data streams that can
be added together. This is semantically coherent with multiple-access interference in CDMA,
where the interference of orthogonal codes spread over a shared channel becomes substantial
by increasing the number of users.
Definition 4.14. Super-correlation. Assume, there is a collection of k′ sequences, say
S ′ ⊂ S(l, k′, δ, %), i.e {sj |1 ≤ j ≤ k′ ≤ k}. We form two composite sequences a, b from this set
and define the super-correlation (CC) as the CCF of the two composite sequences:
CCa,b(τ) =
l−1∑
i=0
a(i)b(i+ τ) (4.4)
where a =
∑k′
j=1
∑
λj
shift(sj , λj), b =
∑k′
j=1 sj and shift() represents a spatial shift of sj by λj
with cyclic wrap.
For the case k′ = 1, the super-correlation is simply the correlation of one sequence against
summation of multiple shifted version of itself. In fact, the composite sequence b, is the
variation of a with zero shift.
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This super-correlation aims to achieve a joint detection of multiple PN codes that con-
tributed in the aggregated data stream (batch detection). As we already discussed, the MWI
inhibits the summation of many sequences, in particular when shift distinct sequences are used
(k′ > 1).
Definition 4.15. Statistical invisibility. Given a set of watermarked data streams, if
the first and second moment of either time-sequential or cross-stream aggregation of those
data streams are acceptably equal to the original (un-watermarked) data streams, we say the
statistical invisibility is achieved. To become clear what we exactly mean by time-sequential
and cross-stream aggregation, both operations are depicted in the Figure 4.3. For data stream
di, this can be written as:
E(dwi (t)) = E(di(t)),and σ
2(dwi (t)) = σ
2(di(t)) (4.5)
where E(x) and σ2(x) represent mean and variance of variable x. Likewise, for time-
sequential aggregation, the following should hold:
E(dwagg(t)) = E(dagg(t)), and σ
2(dwagg(t)) = σ
2(dagg(t)) (4.6)
for all windows of length T 5.
Apart from the above definition, a stronger requirement for statistical invisibility is that
the correlation coefficients between any two data-streams di and dj is equal to that between
the two corresponding watermarked data-streams i.e:
ρ(di, dj) = ρ(d
w
i , d
w
j ) (4.7)
where, ρ(x, y) is the correlation coefficient between x and y. In Section 4.8, we prove that
our watermarking scheme satisfies the statistical invisibility as stated in Equations 4.5, 4.6 and
4.7.
5In our scheme, the window length T , should be equal to the code set size l, or a multiple of l; otherwise,
the statistical invisibility beyond the l cannot be guaranteed.
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Figure 4.3: Visualization of sequential and across stream aggregations
4.6.4 Ensemble Constructions of Mergeable Hiding Codes
Following the SS watermarking approach, each data source spreads its watermark across the
host data. The watermarks are selected from some appropriate random ensembles. The reason
for using a set of spreading codes, is that randomness is an ensemble property and cannot be
achieved with a single sequence [Leukhin and Tirkel, 2015]. Additionally, if watermarks are
attempted to be encoded on a single aggregated data stream, the MWI should be minimized to
avoid performance degradation. These requirements are translated into high auto-correlation
(A(τ)) of a PN code and the low off-peak cross-correlation (C(τ)) between any two PN codes in
the same code set. The spreading codes the we use in this thesis, are statistically uncorrelated,
and the sum of a large number of them results in a MWI that is approximated by Gaussian
noise [Moreno and Tirkel, 2012].
Now we look at possible approaches for constructing an ensemble of periodic PN sequences
with low off-peak auto-correlation and cross-correlation. In the literature, many of sequences
with these properties are constructed by means of additive or multiplicative characters of the
Finite Field or Galois Rings. A concise descriptions of such constructions can be found here
[Sarwate and Pursley, 1980].
4.6.4.1 Cyclic Shifting of a Single PN Sequence
One straightforward approach for generating an ensemble of PN codes is shifting a primitive
sequence of length l with low off-peak auto-correlation. As we outlined in Section 4.5.2, the
information can be encoded within the shift values. This way, l different watermarks can be
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generated that enable us to encode log2 l bits of information. Next, we look at some one
dimensional (1D) PN sequences.
Example of 1D PN Sequences with Favourable Correlations
According to the format of l, the known ideal binary sequences can be divided into the four
classes as follows:
1. l = 2n − 1, n positive integer: Two known examples are maximal length sequences
(m-sequences) and Gordon-Mills-Welch (GMW) sequences.
2. l = p, p is a prime: The most well-know construction of such codes is the Legendre
sequence.
3. l = p(p + 2), both p and p + 2 are primes: Twin prime sequences that are constructed
from the modified modulo 2 sum of two Legendre sequences.
4. l = 4k2 + 27, l is a prime: Hall residue sequences.
All of the above sequences have the ideal correlation properties that we are interested in.
In the following, we only look at m- and Legendre sequences. The detailed construction of the
rest including GMW, Twin prime and Hall residue sequences can be found here [Gong, 2002].
Maximal Length Sequences
Maximal length sequences or m-sequences in short, were first introduced by [Zierler, 1959]
and their usage greatly expanded by the solid theoretical foundations made by [Golomb et al.,
1982]. These sequences are the bedrock on which many communication systems are built such
as GSM and Bluetooth.
Just to recall briefly, an m-sequence is generated by an n-stage LFSR with period 2n −
1. Only certain feedback taps of the LFSR yield an m-sequence. As we already described
in Chapter 2, the structure of a LFSR can be expressed using a characteristic polynomial
associated with each register position. For the special case of m-sequences, this polynomial
should be a primitive or irreducible polynomial6 (over the finite field GF (2)) to have maximum
cycle length. The number of such primitive polynomials determines the number of shift distinct
6A polynomial is said to be irreducible over a finite field, if it is not the product of two polynomials of lower
degree. Loosely speaking, an irreducible polynomial is like a prime number in a sense that it has no non-trivial
factors. See Chapter 2, Section 2.3 for more information.
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m-sequences for a certain length. This number is known to be φ(2n − 1)/n, where φ(x) is the
Euler’s totient function defined as the number of positive integers less than x that are relatively
prime to x.
m-sequences pose the ideal two level auto-correlation (see Definition 4.10) with peak value
of 2n − 1 and off-peak values equal to −1. In contrast, the cross-correlation between shift
distinct m-sequences is generally poor and results in many spurious peaks with heights up to
l/3.
Example 4.1. To generate m-sequences of length 31, the number of required shift registers
is 5 elements (since 31 = 25 − 1). The possible feedback taps are [5,3], [5,4,3,2], [5,4,2,1] 7
resulting in φ(31)/5 = 6 distinct m-sequences i.e S(31, 6, 31, 11).
Two of such m-sequences, s1, s2 ∈ S are:
s1 = (+−−−−+−−+−+ +−−+ + + + +−−−+ +−+ + +−+−),
s2 = (+−−−−+−+−+ + +−+ +−−−+ + + + +−−+ +−+−−).
Figure 4.4 (a) and (b) illustrate the ACF and CCF of the s1 and s2. As is evident, the
cross-correlation of s1 and s2 is poor. This means, shift-distinct m-sequences are not useful for
designing mergeable watermarks as they results in high MWI. In contrast, Figure 4.4 (c) and
(d) show the correlation characteristics of sequence s1 with a shifted version of itself (by offset
4). This moves the position of the CCF peak by 4. Also, observe that m-sequences satisfies
the shift-invariance property (Definition 4.12).
The major problem with m-sequences and other PN sequences generated by linear shift
registers in general, is that are cryptographically insecure because of their poor linear structure.
In fact, the key of secrecy of such sequences (i.e initial state of registers and feedback taps)
of an n-stage LFSR can be determined from just 2n successive bits of the output sequence
[Golomb and Gong, 2005].
Legendre Sequence
Legendre sequences (also referred to as quadratic residue sequences) have been mostly applied
in coded aperture imaging because of their optimal auto-correlation properties [van Schyndel
et al., 1999]. Also, Legendre sequences have other interesting features such as invariance to
7We have chosen the Matlab notation for representing the generator polynomial as a numeric vector that
lists the coefficients of the polynomial in descending order. For instance, [5,3] is associated with the polynomial
g(x) = x5 + x3.
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Figure 4.4: (a) Auto-correlation of m-sequences of length 31 (b) Cross-correlation of two shift
distinct m-sequences (c) Auto-correlation of a shifted m-sequence (by 4) (d) Cross-correlation
of a m-sequence with a shifted m-sequence(by 4).
the Fourier Transform operation that make them suitable for key-less watermark detection as
described here [Van Schyndel et al., 1999].
For a prime p, a Legendre sequence, ls, is defined by:
ls(i) =

1, if i ∈ Rp
−1, if i ∈ Np
0, if i = 0
where 0 < i < p, Rp is the set of quadratic residues modulo p and Np is the set of quadratic
non-residues modulo p.
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Like m-sequences, the bipolar form of Legendre has ideal two-valued auto-correlations when
it is of prime length 4k + 3 (with peak value of p− 1, and off-peak values of −1), and a three-
valued auto-correlation, when it is of prime length 4k + 1. Unlike m-sequences, however, the
non-binary Legendre sequences pose an almost constant amplitude cross-correlation that is
bounded to p− 1.
Despite good features, for the case of binary, there is only one possible Legendre sequence
and therefore there is no ensemble consisting of distinct shift Legendre sequences. For our
purpose, digital watermarking, this extremely limits the watermark capacity. However, Leg-
endre sequences have high linear complexity and therefore are mostly used in higher alphabets
if embedding non-binary sequences are allowed for a particular application or its binary form
can be useful as a ‘seed’ sequence for higher dimensional ensemble constructions [Moreno and
Tirkel, 2012].
Example 4.2. For a Legendre sequence of length 31, only one code is available:
s = (+ + +−+ +−+ + + +−−−+−+−+ + +−−−−+−−+−−).
Figure 4.5 (a) and (b) show the ACF of sequence s, and CCF of s with its shifted version
with offset 4.
Figure 4.5: Auto- and cross-correlation of Legendre sequence of length 31.
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4.6.4.2 Cyclic Shifting of Multiple PN Sequences
As shall be described in Section 4.6.6, watermark construction by means of shifting a primitive
PN sequence can reduce the number of operations required for decoding as only one super-
correlation can reveal multiple sequences jointly. We are, however, not often in such a luxurious
position, because the ideal PN sequences such as m- and Legendre sequences do not enjoy a
large set size. From a security perspective, this increases chances of a successful brute-force
attack to predict the primitive sequence.
A simple yet effective remedy to the above problem is selecting a large enough PN set to
prohibit the possibility of brute-force attack. Additionally, using a “flock” of k primitive PN
patterns instead of only one, an adversary need to count all possible different patterns resulted
from k primitive PN sequences up to cyclic shifts. This is clearly a significant improvement
in watermark security, but also increases in the watermark capacity by a factor k. In the
following, we describe a few possible solutions of such constructions.
4.6.4.2.1 Known Ensemble derived from m-sequences
Having two specific m-sequences, know as “preferred pairs”, one can form compound PN
codes with improved cross-correlation properties. Two of the known ensemble constructions
of this type are Gold and Kasami sequences. Moreover, the new sets have larger linear span
compared with their m-sequence parents which boosts their security against un-authorized
detection. This is because, with a larger linear span, and attacker needs a larger sample in
order to estimate its future value. Lets have a look of these two sets.
Gold set
Gold codes are a family of 2n + 1 sequences of length 2n − 1, (n 6= 4), with linear complexity
of 2n. The first two Gold codes are the modulo-2 sum of the two m-sequences and the rest
are calculated by the modulo-2 sum of the first m-sequence and a cyclic shift of the second
m-sequence. The ACF and CCF values of Gold codes are three valued. For n odd, these values
are optimal and bounded by 2
(n+1)
2 + 1.
Example 4.3. Gold codes of length 31 can be obtained from two preferred polynomials with
coefficients [5 2 0] and [5 4 3 2 0]. There are 31 + 2 = 33 Gold codes of length 31. Therefore,
there exists an ensemble of such codes as S(31, 33, 31, 9). Two of such codes (non-preferred
Proposed Mergeable Watermarking Solution 117
pairs), s1, and s2 are shown in bellow:
s1 = (−−−−−−+−+ + + + + +−−−+−+ +−+ + + +−+ +−−)
s2 = (+−−−+−−−−−+−+ +−−+−−+−−+−−−+−+ + +)
Figures 4.6 (a) to (c) depict the correlation characteristics of s1 and s2. Observe that the
cross-correlation values of the Gold codes (4.6 (c)) are much lower compared to the codes from
the m-sequence ensemble (see Figure 4.4 (b)), whereas the auto-correlation values (Figures 4.6
(a) and (b)) are not ideal as that of m-sequences (see Figure 4.4 (a)). Again, we show the CCF
of s1 with its shifted sequence by 4 in Figures 4.6 (d).
Figure 4.6: (a,b) Auto-correlation characteristics of several Gold sequences of length 31 (c)
CCF of two shift distinct gold codes (d) CCF related to a primitive gold code and its shifted
sequence by 4.
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Kasami set
Kasami set is generated in a similar way to Gold set. A Kasami sequence is constructed by
the modulo-2 sum of an m-sequence and cyclic shifts of a sequence derived from the original
m-sequence. Kasami sequences of length 2n − 1 only exist for even values of n, and there
exist two sets of such codes namely Small set and Large set (if n mod 4 = 2). The Small set
has better correlation properties compared to the Gold and Large set, but has less number
of sequences. The Small set has 2n/2 codes and correlations are three-valued from the set{−(2n/2 + 1), 2n/2 − 1,−1}. The Large set has 23n/2 +2n/2 codes whose cross-correlation takes
on values within the set {−t(n),−s(n), s(n)− 2, t(n)− 2}, where t(n) = 1 + 2(n+2)/2, s(n) =
t(n)+1
2 . The linear spans of Small and Large sets are 1.5n and 2n, respectively.
Example 4.4. The first Small Kasami set exists for n = 4. Using the polynomial coefficients
[4 1 0], the corresponding ensemble is S(15, 4, 15,−5). Two of such codes, s1, s2 ∈ S are:
s1 = (−−−−−−+−+ + + + + +−−−+−+ +−+ + + +−+ +−−)
s2 = (+−−−+−−−−−+−+ +−−+−−+−−+−−−+−+ + +)
Similar to the previous example, Figure 4.7 (a) and (b) demonstrate the ACF magnitudes
of small Kasami sequences, whereas (c) and (d) show the CCF magnitudes between s1, s2, and
between s1, shift(s1, 4), correspondingly.
Example 4.5. For the Large set, we consider n = 6 (6 mod 4 = 2). With the aid of the
polynomial corresponds to the vector [6 1 0], and ensemble of 520 Kasami codes of length 63
can be generated i.e. S(63, 520, 63,−17). Two examples of these codes are:
s1 = (+ + +−+−+−−+−+ + +−+−−−+ +−−−+ + + + + + + + + + + +−+
−+ +−+ + + +−+−+ +−+−−−+ + +−+−+),
s2 = (−−+−−−+ +−−−−+ + +−−+−+ +−+−+ +−+−−+−−−−−+ +
+ +−+−+ + + +−−+−+−−+ + + + +−+ +−).
The correlation characteristics, similar to the small set, are shown in Figure 4.8.
4.6.4.3 Unfolding 2D Arrays Using Chinese Remainder Theorem
So far this chapter has been concerned with one dimensional PN sequences. However, there are
higher dimensional PN sequences with the good correlation characteristics. One can convert
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Figure 4.7: (a,b) Auto-correlation characteristics of two Kasami sequences of length 15 (c)
CCF of two shift distinct Kasami codes (d) CCF related to a primitive Kasami code and its
shifted sequence by 4.
two or higher dimensional PN codes of commensurate length into 1D sequences, using the
Chinese Remainder Theorem [Moreno and Tirkel, 2012]. If the higher dimensional sequences,
called PN arrays, have certain properties, this unfolding process increases the sequence length
and therefore results in higher watermark capacity. There are a variety of methods for making
PN arrays such as Raster, Tiling, Distinct Sum Arrays, Residue Shuﬄing, Product Arrays. For
a summary of these 2D arrays, see [Van Schyndel et al., 1999]. Next, we explain the Chinese
Remainder Theorem.
Proposed Mergeable Watermarking Solution 120
Figure 4.8: (a,b) Auto-correlation characteristics of two Large Kasami sequences of length 63
(c) CCF of two shift distinct Kasami codes (d) CCF related to a primitive Kasami code and
its shifted sequence by 4.
Chinese Remainder Theorem
The Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) and its extensions have been used for a long time
in several engineering applications, such as construction of quasi-cyclic codes, residue number
systems, oblivious data transfer mechanism, secret sharing of stego-images.
In short, CRT postulates for a given list of positive integers n1, n2, ..., nk such that any
two ni, nj , (i 6= j) are pair-wise relatively prime, and then for any list of non-negative integers
r1, r2, ..., rk such that ri < ni, (i = 1..k), there exists a unique integer x such that x mod ni = ri
and x < n1n2..nk . Conversely, each such x can determine a unique such list of rj . In other
words, CRT specifies a one-to-one correspondence between the residue number system of k-
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tuples and the residues modulo x, where x is the product of the moduli of the basis.
For instance, in the RSA public-key cryptosystem wherein a message m is signed with a
secret exponent d as c = md mod n, the value of c can be computed more efficiently by means
of CRT. Since n = pq and gcd(p, q) = 1, the CRT can uniquely determines c from calculating
c1 = m
d mod p, and c2 = m
d mod q.
For our purpose, array unfolding, the array dimensions must be co-prime. In geometrical
terms, the 2D array has a single pass diagonal, and if the array dimensions are co-prime,
then CRT permits unfolding a periodic sequence with the same properties along this diagonal
[Moreno and Tirkel, 2012]. It should be made clear that the unfolding process should preserve
the correlation properties of 2D arrays. otherwise, there is no benefit for converting 2D arrays
with ideal correlation characteristics into 1D sequences that do not correlate well.
Moreno-Tirkel Constructions
In 2012, Moreno and Tirkel studied the 2D construction of PN codes and then unfolding them
into 1D sets in order to give rise to ensemble of sequences with constrained correlation [Moreno
and Tirkel, 2012]. An important result of their study is three new sets of PN sequences with
similar correlation properties to the Small Kasami set, but are available in many more lengths
with much higher linear complexity. The essential ingredients of their construction is a column
sequence with good autocorrelation, and a shift sequence which is applied as a cyclic shift to the
column sequences to form a PN array. The resulting set size is flexible and grows exponentially
with the correlation bound. Additionally, in many cases, the sequences are all balanced, unlike
Gold or Kasami.
Family A of Moreno-Tirkel’s construction named “exponential quadratic”, is obtained by
exponential quadratic shifts of a PN column sequence of prime length, where the columns are
cyclic shifts of a PN sequence. The possible columns commensurate with this construction are
m-sequences and Legendre sequences. Since the array dimensions are co-prime, the CRT can
be applied to convert the array into 1D sequences. Depending on the p type, the ACF values
are either
{−p+ 1,+1, (p− 1)2} or {−p+ 1,+2, p+ 3, p(p− 1)} for p = 4k − 1. Similarly the
CCF takes values from either {−p+ 1,+1, p+ 1} or {−p+ 1,+2, p+ 3} for p = 4k − 1.
Example 4.6. An example of Moreno-Tirkel’s construction is shown in Figure 4.9, where a
PN column sequence of length 7 (−1,−1,−1, 1,−1, 1, 1) is shifted according to a vertical shift
sequence, (5, 6, 0, 6, 2, 2), with each of these shifted columns concatenated to the right. So the
first column (highlighted) is this sequence shifted by 5 elements to (−1, 1,−1, 1, 1,−1,−1),
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the second column by 6, etc. As such, the sequence length after CRT folding is extended to
7×6 = 42. After unfolding operation, the ensemble of S(42, 6, 42, 10) is achieved. The unfolded
sequence corresponds to the Figure 4.9 is:
s1 = (−−−−−+−−−+−−−−−−−−+++−+−+++−++−−−+−++++++−)
Figure 4.9: An illustration of the new Moreno-Tirkel Construction. Black and white denote
+1 and -1 respectively.
4.6.5 Watermark Generation and Insertion
Our mergeable hiding codes are obtained based on the cyclic shifting of multiple PN patterns
obtained from an ensemble of PN codes with certain properties that we explained in the
previous Section.
In short, the requirements of PN sequences for forming mergeable hiding codes with statis-
tical invisibility include: (i) low off-peak auto-correlation (ii) low cross-correlation (iii) large set
size (iv) balance (v) large linear complexity. The first three are key parameters for detection in
a noisy communication channel. With the aid of balance property, the statical invisibility can
be maintained. Recall that a balance binary code has equal number of +1’s and -1’s (Definition
4.8). This property is desirable so that the spectrum is flat and the residual carrier power is
low for efficiency. Additionally, our hiding codes should be cryptographically secure, therefore,
a large linear complexity for PN sequences is essential.
Assume, there exist an ensemble of PN sequences with the above characteristics S =
{si|1 ≤ i ≤ k} of k ≥ N sequences, where si = (si(0), si(1)..., si(l − 1)) denotes a sequence
of length l. We assign a unique pair (si, λi) to every individual node Ni including a unique
family member, si and a unique shift value, λi ∈ [0 ... T − 1]. As we said in Section 4.6.1, the
sampling window size is T , and is equal to T = c × l with c being an integer chip-rate, so we
have a sampling window with length equal to an integer number of codes.
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The watermark insertion is accomplished by adding a scaled version of the shifted PN
sequence. So, the watermarked data sample at time t, can be calculated as follows:
dwi (t) = di(t) + αi × sλi (t) (4.8)
where αi corresponds to a local scaling factor set to render the watermark imperceptible from
the noise floor of the original sensor data (watermark amplitude). For achieving better security,
this could be generated as a random variable whose power spectrum matches that of the data,
rendering it statistically indistinguishable from it.
Following the above equation, the actual watermark for node Ni at time t constitutes
wi(t) = αis
λ
i (t) that is hidden within its sensory datum di(t). By decoupling the sample
window size T from the sequence length l, we enable sampling over an unbounded stream
which slides continuously over the length of the window. So, where finite (aperiodic) data is
involved, the watermark is replicated to resemble periodic boundary conditions affording the
use of periodic correlation.
The aggregator(s) in turn combines the watermarked data streams received from its chil-
dren into a single data-stream, possibly embeds its own unique watermark and forwards the
aggregated data stream to the next node in the path. We re-write the summation of Equation
4.8 as a linear aggregation as follows:
dwagg(t) = wagg(t) +
∑
i ∈ Nagg
dwi (t), Nagg ⊂ N (4.9)
where wagg(t) = αagg × sλagg(t) represents the watermark embedded by the aggregator,
|Nagg| is the fan-in of that aggregator. The final aggregator might forward the data stream to
an analyzer for the watermark detection process. A good feature of our watermarking scheme
is the simplicity of implementation at the sensor end.
The robustness against the linear aggregation operations (for instance summation in Equa-
tion 4.9) is achieved by selecting an ensemble of near-orthogonal codes (low off-peak auto-
and cross-correlations) to minimizing mutual interference among multiple watermarks. Also,
encoding information within the sequence shift can improve detection granularity down to a
window size T . While independent PN codes (that are not chosen from the same ensemble)
can also be used for minimizing the MWI, they do so asymptotically, with potentially quite
large window sizes. Using a family of PN codes allows us to restrict analysis to window size T
and, with known shifts, the contribution of each node can be investigated only by looking for
those shifts in the composite watermark. We expand on this in the following.
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4.6.6 Batch Watermark Detection by Means of Super-correlation
As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, we assume at the beginning of an aggregation round,
all sensor clocks are synchronised, otherwise the watermark detection process needs to search
over a large space to find the whole pattern which increases the detection complexity.
The watermark detection process involves verifying the existence of individual watermarks
embedded by every node in the aggregated watermark. We refer to this capability as watermark
localization. For the decoding process, we use a full periodic cross-correlation which requires
the examination of at least one full sequence length l of data. A periodic correlation is used
to retrieve significant peaks at the corresponding shifts (parameter λi). The detection is not
completely error free due to MWI and also partial cross-correlation of the aggregated host
data with the encoded sequences. Hence, before performing the correlation, a few steps are
necessary in order to boost detection performance. The batch detection process involves the
following steps:
1. Remove the mean value of the received signal (aggregated watermarked data series),
r(t) = d(t) − µ(t), where µ(t) can be found by a rolling average, for example. The
averaging window size can be decoupled from the PN code window size.
2. Compute the correlation between the zero-mean received signal r(t) and a template array
template(t) which is the summation of all assigned un-shifted signature codes. This is in
fact the super-correlation function that was given in Definition 4.14 and can be written
as CC(τ) = ∑t ∈T template(t)r(τ + t).
3. Apply a matched filter that passes the correlation peaks but suppresses non-impulsive
noise.
4. Apply peak detection for finding correlation peaks.
Step one is necessary for minimizing the interference due to multiple data streams because
PN sequences have almost zero mean and so should the data. Additionally, in Step 3, we apply
a matched filter after correlation in order to reduce the interference with other sequences
and residual data. If chip-rate (c) is one, a simple differential filter should be sufficient as a
matched filter since the auto-correlation peaks of our sequences are impulsive and can survive
the filtering. After these steps, an impulsive peak detection algorithm can be used for finding
significant correlation peaks and their positions.
Proposed Mergeable Watermarking Solution 125
If detection is successful and the data has not been tampered with, the number of retrieved
correlation peaks over the window size (T ) is equal to the number of nodes (N), and the
watermark embedded by nodeNi can be localized with a large peak at position that corresponds
to its unique shift value (λi + 1). An example of our solution is illustrated in Figure 4.10. In
this example, there are 9 nodes in the network including leaf nodes (white) and aggregators
(black). Each node embeds a unique shifted Kasami code of length 255 as its unique signature
into its sensory data. The existence of correlation peaks and the correct location of those peaks
indicate the high integrity and trustworthiness of the aggregated data.
Figure 4.10: The batch detection obtained from the super-correlation function (Definition 4.14
for a small network of size 9 using a family of Kasami codes of length 255 (corresponding shifts
are shown on each node). For example, the contribution of node 7 can be investigated by
existence of correlation peak at point 36(= λ7 + 1).
The challenging part of detection is to identify the correlation peaks with known locations
that result from correlation of the periodic patterns. Since the strength of in-band watermark
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could be very low compared to the original data, we take multiple repetitions of the watermark,
such that multiple windows of the watermarks can be synchronously overlaid and summed.
Therefore, the expected value of the received signal, i.e. E[r(t)] = 0 by design (step 1 of
watermark detection), whereas E[wj ] = c×wi, i = j modulo l, since they are synchronized and
the magnitude of correlation coefficients will be increased.
4.7 Watermark Scalability
In this section we look the watermark scalability of our scheme. We first begin with an example
two show the watermark capacity of our approach having two data streams.
Example 4.7. Let’s suppose there exist two data streams generated by nodes N1 and N2.
Also, S(l, k, δ, %) is an ensemble of ideal PN codes.
Following our watermark construction based on cyclic shifting of multiple PN codes, for
both N1 and N2, we can choose 1 out of k sequences as the watermark pattern si. If we fix this
pattern, then it should be shifted by a value λi. In order to achieve batch detection, distinct
shifts are required for encoding information within the sequence si. Then, it is possible to
embed the watermark with a given sign i.e. either +sλi or −sλi . Therefore, for N1 we have k
possible primitive codes and l shifts, whereas for the N2, k− 1 primitive codes and l− 1 shifts
are left. This corresponds to
(
(log2 k + 1)× log2 l
)
+
(
(log2(k − 1) + 1)× log2(l − 1)
)
bits.
Now, if we assume l = 31, the capacity of encoding information using an ensemble of m-
sequences of S(31, 6, 31, 11) (see example 4.1) would be (log2 6 + 1) × log2 31 + (log2 5 + 1) ×
log2 30 = 26 bits. Using Gold set, there are 33 distinct gold sequences of length 31, therefore,
the watermark capacity will expand to 54 bits.
Recall from Section 4.5.3 that if a conventional correlator was used, the watermark capacity
would be higher compared to the our batch detector (for this example, (log2 k+ 1)
2× (log2 l)2
bits). On the other hand, the batch detector can speed up the tamper detection and conse-
quently prevent wrong decisions or unexpected events. In order to pay off this reduction in
watermark capacity, we propose two solutions in the following.
4.7.1 Methods for Improving the Scalability
As it was evident from the above example, the scalability of our solution is related to three
parameters including code length (l), family size (k), and shifts (λ). The number of possible
shift combinations is equal to the code length. So, the code length and family size are the two
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restrictive parameters. Apart from that, we have selected near-orthogonal codes which result
in performance degradation compared with the orthogonal codes and therefore decreases the
maximum number of aggregated watermarks. Here, we propose two approaches for making
our solution more scalable as follows:
1. Hierarchical labeling : Instead of assigning a unique code with distinct shift to every node,
we assign a unique code as a master secret to every cluster. Then within the cluster,
different shifted versions of this master code are spread. In other words, different codes
are assigned to different aggregators while different shifts of the same code are spread
over the cluster. We refer to the former code as Cluster Identification Code (CIC) and
the latter as Node Identification Code (NIC). This way, the scalability of our scheme
increases by N/M . The downside is that the complexity of the decoding will increase in
comparison with the non-hierarchical labeling scheme because now the correlation needs
to be done against all CICs. However, it still results in significant reduction in the search
space (which is equal to number of NICs) compared with adopting independent codes
without any shifts such as [Zhang et al., 2008].
2. Higher dimensional watermark construction: Another approach for increasing scalability
is based on folding a one dimensional sequence with good correlation properties into a two
dimensional array whose dimensions are relatively prime. Then, the resulting array can
be unfolded into sequences according to CTR The sequence. The folding/unfolding tech-
nique can be extended to three or higher dimensions results in remarkable improvement
of the system scalability. In Section 4.6.4.3, we introduced the Moreno-Tirkel method as
an example of such constructions. However, any other higher dimensional arrays with
the required characteristics, can be used interchangeably.
To determine which ensembles are best suited for our purpose, we run experiments in Section
4.9. We only consider three families of PN codes including God, Kasami, and the Moreno-
Tirkel sets. The studied features of these codes are summarized in Table 4.1. As you can see
in this table, most of the resulting codes from Moreno-Tirkel construction are balanced and
have higher linear complexity compared to their counterparts.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of PN family sets
Type Length
(l)
Max
correlation
bounds (%)
Balanced
family size
Total
family size
(k)
Normalized
complexity
Gold 2n − 1 2(n+1)/2 + 1
or
2(n+2)/2 + 1
l/2 l + 2 2n
2n−1
∼= 0
Small-
Kasami
22n − 1 √l 0 √l 1.5n
22n−1
∼= 0
Large-
Kasami
24n+2− 1 2√l 0 l ×√l 2n
22n−1
∼= 0
Moreno-
Tirkel
p× (p− 1) √l √l √l 0.5 or 1
4.8 Statistical Analysis
In this section, statistical properties of watermarked data streams is investigated. In particular,
we find the suitable embedding parameters that allows the analyser (or sink) to compute the
average and moments of the aggregated data stream.
Following Definition 4.15 for statistical invisibility, we need to prove that the embedding
procedure does not change the first and second moment of aggregated data for either time-
sequential or cross-stream aggregation operations. Through the subsequent analysis, it will
become evident that the watermark amplitude (αi) has a great impact on statistical invisibility
of our scheme.
Before proceeding further, we remind that generated watermark patterns have roughly
(or exactly in the case of balanced codes) zero-mean distribution of correlation values i.e.
E(si(t)) = 0 for t ∈ [0..T − 1]. Moreover, PN codes that we use enjoy the shift invariance
property which means cyclically shifted replicas of those codes have the same spectral char-
acteristic as the original sequences (Definition 4.12). So, the statistical values of the shifted
sequences can be substituted with the original ones such as var(sλi (t)) = var(si(t)).
For the remainder of analysis, the following assumptions are made:
• For node Ni, scaling factors are chosen from a distribution with a finite mean and vari-
ance, i.e. E(αi) = µ(αi) and var(αi) = σ
2(αi).
• For node Ni, its time-series data (di), scaling factor (αi), and signature code (sλi (t)) are
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mutually independent8.
• The local scaling factor of each node is derived from a distribution with a finite mean
and variance independently from scaling factors from other nodes, therefore E(αiαj) =
E(αi)E(αj).
4.8.1 Invariant to Time-sequential Linear Aggregation
First, we prove that our watermarking solution satisfies the statistical invisibility in regards
to time-sequential aggregation as stated in Equation 4.5. We derive the following equation for
the mean and variance:
E(dwi (t)) = E
(
di(t) + αis
λ
i (t)
)
= E(di(t)) + E(αi)E(s
λ
i (t))
since, E(sλi (t)) is zero by design, then
∀i E(dwi (t)) = E(di(t)) (4.10)
Similarly, for variance, σ2, we have:
σ2(dwi (t)) = E(d
w
i (t))
2 − E2(dwi (t))
= E
(
di(t) + αis
λ
i (t)
)(
di(t) + αis
λ
i (t)
)
− E2(di(t))
= E(di(t))
2 + E(α2i )E(s
λ
i (t))
2 + 2E(di(t))E(αi)E(s
λ
i (t))− E2(di(t))
Since E(sλi (t)) = 0, after a few calculations, we have:
∀i σ2(dwi (t)) = σ2(di(t)) + σ2(si(t))(σ2(αi) + µ(αi)) (4.11)
By observing Equation 4.11, one concludes that the variance of the time-sequential aggre-
gated signal depends on the choice of scaling factors as well as signature codes. Since binary
sequences have been used, σ2(si(t)) = 1 because every entry contributes 1 to the moment.
Therefore, Equation 4.11 becomes as follows:
σ2(dwi (t)) = σ
2(di(t)) + σ
2(αi) + µ(αi) (4.12)
8Note that, this assumption was not hold for the ECG watermarking scheme in Chapter 3, where scale
factors varied according to the significance of data samples.
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Note that µ(αi) is never zero, since the scaling factor αi is non-negative (see Equation 4.8).
In order to achieve invariance property, the mean and variance of the scale factor should satisfy
the following condition:
σ2(αi) + µ(αi) << σ
2(di(t)) (4.13)
We refer to the above condition stated in Equation 4.13 as condition (1). Thus, if condition
(1) holds, then
∀i σ2(dwi (t)) = σ2(di(t)). (4.14)
One important note to be made here is that the invariance properties stated in Equations
4.10 and 4.14 are size-limited, meaning that the mean and variance of a watermarked data
stream do not change for a window size equal to the watermark length; otherwise statistical
invisibility beyond the watermark length cannot be guaranteed.
4.8.2 Invariant to to Cross-stream Linear Aggregation
Second, we prove that our watermarking solution satisfies the statistical invisibility in regards
to cross-stream aggregation as stated in Equation 4.6. Similarly for cross-stream aggregation,
we set:
E(dwagg(t)) = E
( n∑
1
dwi (t)
)
= E
( n∑
i=1
(di(t) + αis
λ
i (t))
)
= E
( n∑
i=1
di(t)
)
+ E
( n∑
i=1
αis
λ
i (t)
)
= E(dagg(t)) +
n∑
i=1
E(αi)E(s
λ
i (t)).
Since E(sλi (t)) = 0, therefore:
E(dwagg(t)) = E(dagg(t)) (4.15)
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And similarly for variance, we have:
σ2(dwagg(t)) = E
( n∑
i=1
dwi (t)
)2
− E2
( n∑
i=1
dwi (t)
)
= E
( n∑
i=1
di(t)
)2
+ E
(
αis
α
i (t)
)2 − E2(dagg(t))
= σ2(dagg(t)) + E
( n∑
i=1
αis
α
i (t)
)2
Therefore,
σ2(dwagg(t)) = σ
2(dagg(t)) + E
( n∑
i=1
αi × sαi (t)
)2
(4.16)
Hence, we need to calculate E
(∑n
i=1 αi × sαi (t)
)2
as follows:
E
( N∑
i=1
αis
λ
i (t)
)2
= E
( N∑
i=1
α2i (s
λ
i (t)
2)
)2
+ E
( N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
αiαjs
λ
i (t)s
λ
j (t)
)
=
N∑
i=1
E(α2i )E(s
λ
i (t)
2) +
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E
(
αiαjs
λ
i (t)s
λ
j (t)
)
=
N∑
i=1
σ2(si)
(
σ2(αi) + µ(αi)
)
+
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E(αiαj)E(sisj)
so, we obtain:
E
( N∑
i=1
αis
λ
i (t)
)2
=
N∑
i=1
σ2(si)(σ
2(αi) + E(αi) +
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E(αiαj)E(sisj) (4.17)
Substituting 4.17 in 4.16, we get:
σ2(dwagg(t)) = σ
2(dagg(t)) +
N∑
i=1
σ2(si)
(
σ2(αi) + µ(αi)
)
+
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E(αiαj)E(sisj). (4.18)
According to Equation 4.18, for deriving the variance, the mean of cross-correlation (E(sisj))
is required that is mathematically complex to calculate. Instead, for having a numerical esti-
mation of the variance, if for example Gold codes were used, the cross-correlation frequencies
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take values as shown in Table 4.2, then σ2(dwagg(t))
∼= σ2(dagg(t)) +
∑N
i=1
(
σ2(αi) + E(αi)
)
.
One can see that condition (1) is sufficient as well for
∑N
i=1
(
σ2(αi) + E(αi)
)
 σ2(dagg(t))
and therefore the second moment of aggregation across streams is unchanged by embedding
watermarks.
Table 4.2: Cross-correlation properties of gold codes of length l = 2n − 1 ([Holmes, 1982],
Chapter 11).
Normalized cross-correlation Frequency of occurrence
n odd
−1/l ∼ 0.5
-2
(n+1)/2+1
l
∼ 0.25
2(n+1)/2−1
l
∼ 0.25
n even
−1/l ∼ 0.75
-2
(n+2)/2+1
l
∼ 0.125
2(n+2)/2−1
l
∼ 0.125
4.8.3 Statistical Invisibility
Third, we prove the statistical invisibility of our scheme in regards to preserving the correlation
coefficients according to Equation 4.7. For this purpose, we need to calculate the correlation
coefficients between data stream di and dj and show it is equal to that of watermarked data
streams. Therefore, we calculate ρ(dwi , d
w
j ) as follows:
ρ(dwi , d
w
j ) =
cov(dwi , d
w
j )√
var(dwi )
√
var(dwj )
=
E(dwi d
w
j )− E(dwi )E(dwj )√
E(dwi )
2 − E2(dwi )
√
E(dwj )
2 − E2(dwj )
. (4.19)
Calculating all terms in equation 4.19, we will have:
E(dwi )
2 = E
(
d2i + α
2
i (s
λ
i (t))
2 + 2diαis
λ
i
)
= E(d2i ) + E(α
2)E(sλi (t))
2
= σ2(di) + µ(di) + E(α
2
i )σ
2(si)
(4.20)
and,
E(dwi d
w
j ) = E((di + αis
λ
i )(dj + αjs
λ
j ))
= E(didj) + E(αiαjs
λ
i s
λ
j )
(4.21)
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Substituting 4.10, 4.20, 4.21 in the right side of Equation 4.19 as follows:
ρ(dwi , d
w
j ) =
E(didj) + E(αiαj)E(sisj)− E(di)E(dj)√
E(di)2 − E2(di) + E2(α2i )var(si)
√
E(dj)2 − E2(dj) + E2(α2j )var(sj)
=
cov(di, dj) + E(αiαj)× cov(si, sj)√
var(di) + E(α2i )var(si)
√
var(dj) + E(α2j )var(sj)
for binary PN code
=
cov(di, dj) + E(αiαj)E(sisj)√
var(di) + E(α2i )
√
var(dj) + E(α2j )
condition (1)
=
cov(di, dj) + E(αiαj)E(sisj)√
var(di)
√
var(dj)
= ρ(di, dj) +
E(αiαj)E(sisj)√
var(di)
√
var(dj)
Therefore:
ρ(dwi , d
w
j )
assumption (3)
= ρ(di, dj) +
E(αi)E(αj)E(sisj)√
var(di)
√
var(dj)
(4.22)
According to Equation 4.22, the second term should be much less than the first term in
order to have statistical invisibility. For PN codes with low off-peak correlation, E(sisj) is
bounded to a small number. Hence, if the following condition holds, one can make sure that
the statistical invisibility is achieved:
E(αi)
√
var(di) (4.23)
We refer to the condition specified in Equation 4.23 as condition (2).
Consequently, for having aggregation invariance property as well as statistical invisibility
the following conditions should be considered at the same time:
∀i
var(αi) + µ(αi) var(di(t))µ(αi)√var(di) (4.24)
For predicting the variance of sensory data, an initial run of the network is required. The
whole point of all above equations is that, apart from signature codes, the performance of
the scheme is completely relevant to watermark amplitudes. Adopting improperly designed
embedding values results in becoming vulnerable to collusion attacks, that is, a coalition of
traitors working together to create a new version of the content with no detectable traces of
the digital fingerprints [Liu, 2005].
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4.9 Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme. First, we investigate the
watermark survival after aggregating multiple watermarked data streams using combinations
of spreading codes of different lengths. Then, we test the reliability of our scheme in the
presence of attacks that compromise aggregate data integrity. Apart from data modification,
we also investigate the robustness of our scheme against node failure that is unavoidable in
sensor networks due to physical damage or battery depletion. We also, compare our scheme
with the secure data aggregation method that was proposed by [Zhang et al., 2008]. In their
scheme, Hadamard codes as orthogonal spreading codes are embedded by sensors. The codes
are available in length l = 2n with code set size of l, and cross-correlation bound (%) is zero.
The term Hadamard-SDA is used to refer to their scheme. More detail about this watermarking
scheme can be found in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2.
We used the publicly available sensory data from the SensorScope project consisting of
several environmental quantities. We analysed the humidity measurements collected every 30
seconds by 97 weather stations at EPFL campus [Barrenetxea et al., 2008]. The samples had
enough data resolution (12-bits ADC), so we chose scaling factors as random variables for
every station from a Gaussian distribution with mean and variance according to the condition
derived in Equation 4.24.
In order to investigate the feasibility of the hierarchical labeling (Section 4.7), we assume
that stations are arranged into a two level hierarchy structure including 10 clusters with size 9
except the last cluster with size 7 (10 + 9× 17 = 97 stations in total). We assigned each of 10
aggregators, a unique member of selected code family and within one cluster shift values are
equally spaced between cluster members except the aggregator, i.e. λi = i× b Taggregator fan-inc.
So, the aggregator fan-in is either 8 or 6 (for the cluster of size 7). This results in maximum
distance between adjacent correlation peaks and therefore decreases the probability of false
detection that might happen by time-offset misalignment. In order to simulate data aggrega-
tion, we assume each station adds its local sensory data with its watermark signature. Then
watermarked data are added together by aggregators and then aggregated into a single data
stream over the whole network.
Figure 4.11 compares the detection probability of our scheme in ideal situation (in the ab-
sence of any attack against data integrity) using three different code families including Gold,
Small and Large Kasami against the Hadamard-SDA scheme. In this figure, detection proba-
bility is the probability that the presented scheme authenticates the aggregate data properly.
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For demonstration purpose, the x-axis is labeled based on the closest similar length of different
codes. For instance, when x equals to 256, we have Hadamard codes of this length, but Large
Kasami codes are available in length 255, whereas there is no Gold code of length 255 (refer to
Table 4.1). The results indicate that embedding longer sequences improves the detection prob-
ability. Moreover, our scheme has best watermark detection when Small Kasami sequences are
used as watermarks. This is because Small Kasami sequences have better correlation properties
compared to other codes.
Figure 4.11: Detection probability for different spreading codes with different lengths against
Hadamard-SDA scheme.
In order to evaluate performance under data modification, an epsilon attack [Sion et al.,
2006] is modeled as an attack against data integrity, such that β percentage of the samples are
randomly modified from uniform noise distribution with ( = 0.6, µ = 0) as the amplitude and
mean of alteration for one station per cluster (11 stations in total). We also implemented a
three dimensional array as a variation of Moreno-Tirkel construction with Sidelnikov sequence
[Sidel’nikov, 1969] as the column sequence with cyclic shifts of the sequence along the two other
dimensions. The resulting one dimensional sequence has 17× 16 = 272 length with 289 codes.
The watermark detection probability (or watermark survival after data modification attacks)
for the length of order 256 is presented in Figure 4.12. The results indicate that higher data
distortion results in more accurate detection. This is due to the fact that, a threshold-based
approach is adopted for watermark detection and as long as the modifications do not exceed
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the threshold, it cannot be detected.
Figure 4.12: Detection probability in presence of epsilon attack with sequence length of 255,
289, and 256 for Small Kasami, Moreno-Tirkel, and Hadamard codes correspondingly.
The false alarm probability for different percentages of node failure is shown in Figure 4.13.
We observe that the probability of correct diagnosis of truncated aggregate data is higher in the
presence of large faulty sets which is a rational result because aggregated information reduces
in value when the majority of nodes have failed. Additionally, our watermarking method excels
the Hadamard-SDA using Small Kasami patterns but marginally closes to the Hadamard-SDA
using Moreno-Trikel sequences. For instance, when the percentage of node failure reaches 15%,
the aggregated data will fail the watermark-based authentication scheme using Hadamard-SDA
and Moreno-Tikel watermark approach, whereas generating watermarks with the aid of Small
Kasami sequences, the truncated changes can be detected earlier (in the presence of 10% node
failure).
Generally, our scheme outperforms the Hadamard-SDA scheme using Small Kasami codes.
If we choose Small Kasami sequences of length 255 as watermarks, an adversary cannot tamper
the aggregated result more than 9% (Figure 4.12) without being detected. This is aligned
with our approximate integrity verification goal. It is noted that all the comparisons are
made without considering the detection complexity and scalability. For instance, according to
simulation studies, the Hadamard-SDA scheme has a close performance to ours when Moreno-
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Figure 4.13: False alarm probability against node failure with sequence length of 255, 289, and
256 for Small Kasami, Moreno-Tirkel, and Hadamard codes correspondingly.
Tirkel sequences are used. With the former, correlation needs to be done among all possible
nodes (NICs) to confirm existence of individual watermarks, whereas our scheme can specify
missing watermarks with the order of cluster numbers (CICs) due to shift invariance property
in the hiding process. This is so because the Hadamard codes are orthogonal only for zero
shifts, but they exhibit higher cross-correlation at non-zero shifts and therefore are useless for
watermark localization in a jointly manner.
4.10 Summary and Future Works
In this Chapter, the secure data aggregation problem in WSNs was investigated. The dilemma
that we face here is sending plain data for maximizing energy efficiency or encrypting data on
a hop-by-hop basis for assuring authenticity of data. By contrast, the application of homo-
morphic primitives on data aggregation is still not reasonable due to the high complexity of
required operations. Instead, our scheme for joint verification of multiple data streams, is very
efficient and practical for applications with computational capacity.
The proposed solution is unique in the way that it exploits the correlation properties of
the signature codes to investigate the contribution of each data-source and therefore decreases
the code search space. The performance of our solution crucially depends on the correlation
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characteristics of the signature codes. Most such codes are available only for a few lengths and
the normalized linear complexity of the signatures asymptotes to zero. On the contrary, in this
chapter, a new construction for obtaining more secure hidden codes were adopted. Then, a
number of ways for increasing the scalability of the scheme were described. Finally, we derived
conditions for preserving statistical properties of data streams. Experiments confirmed that
our scheme is capable of achieving approximate data integrity of large datasets using Moreno-
Tirkel construction.
Admittedly, the use of PN codes that are generated by LFSRs offers hardware-friendly
encoding capability for sensors, but it has some restrictions. The main downside is that, the
decoding process requires the examination of full sequence length of data and must be per-
formed oﬄine. Alternatively, a shorter sequence length can be used to decrease the processing
time, but it decreases the detection probability according to the simulation result. Therefore,
there exists a trade-off between the desired error granularity and the detection time which
leads to different design decisions that might be adapted. Apart from that, the constructed
codes should be cryptographically secure. In this context, the linear complexity of sequences is
of interest. Unfortunately, the known ensemble generated by LFSR have poor linear span and
therefore, some remedies such as Moreno-Tirkel construction needs to be thought through.
4.10.1 Possible Future Directions
Our solution can generate verifiable answers for queries of type linear aggregations such as
summation or average. Although these are the most rudimentary aggregation measures that
are needed in many applications, there are other situations when these measures may not be
enough. In particular for gaining sensitive information from multiple data streams and rea-
soning about continues data, performing other sophisticated queries such as median, quantile,
k-top quires, or other multi-dimensional selection and aggregation queries are of interest.
In above circumstances, it might be semantically more acceptable to use alternative win-
dows to bound the amount of data rather than a basic sliding window. Examples of such
windows variants are overlapping sliding windows, k-proximity windows, Logarithmic time
window, distance-based, landmark windows, to name a few. This means the watermark prop-
erties should be preserved for such windows. We leave open the problem of designing such
robust watermarks to support a wider range of supported queries while preserving window
semantics.
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4.10.2 Looking Forward
So far, we have solved the problem of secure data aggregation with synchronisation assumption.
This assumption implies firstly that sensor clocks are kept synchronised all the time in order to
perform joint aggregation of multiple data streams, and secondly that the watermark encoder
and decoder are synchronised so that the watermark synchronisation point matches the data
synchronisation point. While this assumption might not seem restrictive, it potentially opens
up the possibility of a de-synchronisation attack to prevent successful information decoding.
Apart from that, achieving perfect clock synchronisation in sensor networks is not practical and
therefore some misalignments are inevitable in data aggregation process. To the best of our
knowledge, no one has looked at this constraint for the watermarked-based data aggregation
problem in WSNs.
In the next chapter, we will describe an algorithm to defeat the above de-synchronisation
problem. Instead of unfolding higher dimensional signatures, we will also describe a water-
marking method by transforming the host data into some higher dimensional form, and then
superimpose the watermark on aggregated data stream. The main reason for folding data
streams instead of signatures,is that higher dimensional signatures, often have better correla-
tion characteristics that might lose with projection along one or more of the dimensions. This
could eventually improve the performance of our system.
Chapter 5
Digital Watermarking of Sensory
Data Streams (part II):
Self-synchronised Mergeable
Watermarks
A man with a watch knows what
time it is. A man with two
watches is never sure.
Segal’s Law
In this chapter, the previous watermarking scheme described in Chapter 4 is revisited. The
main objective of this chapter is to obtain mergeable hiding codes that are resilient against
de-synchronization. Toward this goal, a method of embedding ‘synchronisation marks’ within
the aggregated data stream is proposed. Additionally, a higher dimensional watermark con-
struction for the revised scheme is demonstrated.
5.1 Introduction
Synchronisation is a common problem in many data communication applications. In digital
watermarking, in particular for the Spread Spectrum approach, synchronisation is one of the
key issues that has a great impact on decoding embedded information. In this approach,
watermark detection starts by alignment of a watermarked block with the detector. Losing
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synchronisation can destroy the watermark message or causes false detection. Therefore, in
this chapter we investigate the self-synchronising capability of the watermarking solution for
the in-network aggregate data authentication problem that we studied in the previous chapter.
Just to recall briefly, in Chapter 4, we proposed a composite watermark-based solution
for authentication of aggregated data in WSNs. Since sensor technology is used in many life-
critical or economic applications such as health-care, urban sensing, battlefield surveillance,
etc., a paramount challenge is to provide an explicit data authentication mechanism in order
to trust the final outcome. We argued that, from the security perspective, cryptographic
primitives such as homomorphic encryption can do better in protecting data compared to their
digital watermarking counterparts, but they impose large computational overhead because
decryption and re-encryption is necessary on a hop-by-hop basis and therefore these methods
become unsuitable for resource-constrained environments such as wireless sensor networks.
Our watermarks were constructed from an ensemble of near-orthogonal pseudorandom pat-
terns that were embedded into multiple data streams jointly. This construction gave a succinct
reduction in watermark detection complexity, i.e. batch detection feature which means the
existence of individual watermarks can be investigated by means of just one correlation oper-
ation (super-correlation according to Definition 4.14) for the aggregated data, instead of one
per stream. This is a great benefit when the network size increases. Also, the watermark pat-
terns were balanced (Definition 4.8), and therefore the average and moments of the aggregated
data stream is maintained. Apart from its good features, our previous method necessitates
the existence of exact timing information for decoding purposes because the watermarks are
embedded in absolute positions/times of the data streams and therefore a de-synchronisation
attack could potentially invalidate the detection process.
As outlined in Chapter 2, a de-synchronization. attack is one of the most effective attacks
against SS watermarking in which an attacker does not directly remove or jam a watermarked
signal, but instead shifts and wraps the watermarked content so that it is no longer recognizable
to the decoder. A bit more concretely, assume the watermark w is added to the host signal x
in order to construct the tamper-proof signal y as yi = xi+scale(wj), where scale() updates the
watermark amplitude to make it imperceptible from the noise floor of host signal. The indices
i and j show the sequence numbers in y and w, respectively. If the watermark synchronisation
point matches the data synchronisation point, i is equal to j. It is possible that an attacker
cyclically rotates the watermarked signal y by θ, so those indexes do not match any more, i.e.
|i− j| = θ and it is very likely that the watermark will be missed at the decoder.
Our previous work had the restriction that θ is a constant value and is known to the decoder.
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In this chapter, we do not make this assumption anymore. Instead θ is floating and is unknown
to the decoder. Moreover, if the watermarked signal y constitutes multiple watermarks, it is
possible that individual watermarks experience different delays; so the offset θ could be different
for each of them and therefore the watermark detection becomes a complex task. The aim of
this chapter is, then, extending the previous scheme with respect to de-synchronisation attacks
such that the decoder can still read multiple watermarks when they are floating in respect to
the data.
The synchronisation of our composite watermark solution is more subtle
than a non-compound watermark!
The problem of designing watermarks that are resilient to de-synchronisation attacks has been
looked at before (see [Maes et al., 2000], [Whelan et al., 2006], and [Sharma and Coumou, 2006]
for some examples). However, those schemes are not directly applicable for our scenario. The
main reason is that for a composite watermark that consists of a combination of several different
watermark embeddings, each in turn could become non-aligned with either decoder or other
watermarks. The former could happen due to lack of synchronisation between the encoder
and decoder (watermark de-synchronisation), and the latter may arise because of the ‘joining’
of multiple asynchronous streams (data de-synchronisation). The distinction between these
two types of de-synchronisation shall be described in Section 5.2. The data asynchrony could
happen due to reasons such as sensor clock de-synchronisation, jitter or sensor malfunction.
Whenever, there is a need for reasoning about a time-varying environment such as a sensor
network, the sensor observations must be time-stamped inside of the network. The in-network
times-stamping implies that sensors themselves must be time-synchronised; otherwise, there
will be ambiguity in reasoning about the environment.
The majority of the proposed aggregation protocols make an implicit assumption that a
node’s clock is kept synchronised with a global clock all the time. This assumption comes
from the fact that applications are not concerned with the details of synchronisation and they
simply expect a ‘correct’ clock to be available at any instant [Elson and Estrin, 2001]. As
we shall see in the following section, this assumption is fundamentally flawed and needs to be
considered for the secure data aggregation problem as well. To the best of our knowledge, no
one has looked at this constraint for the watermarked-based data aggregations.
One might argue that if multiple data streams are not synchronised, the whole application
would fail. So, why is it still important to retrieve the watermarks? Our argument is that the
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amount of time lags/offsets among multiple data streams cannot be a large number because of
period synchronization. However, the upper bound of the offset depends on the synchronisation
interval and the precision of the synchronisation scheme. Due to energy constraints limits, it
is difficult to perform fine-grained time synchronisation in sensor networks [Song et al., 2007]
and therefore the small values of misalignment in the aggregated stream are acceptable by the
application. As such, we attempt to ensure watermark survival when the offsets are relatively
small.
The approach that we take to solve this problem is by embedding two shifted watermark
patterns instead of one for every data source. This way, the difference between those two
shifted patterns remains the same even when the detection window leads or lags in respect to
the encoding window timing. Having a set of 2D watermarks does not mean we need to have
two dimensional data necessarily for watermark embedding. In the case of 1D data such as
temperature readings, we can simply take multiple consecutive windows of a data stream and
arrange them into a matrix form by accumulating those windows in time. This way, the window
size can also be considered as a shared secret that is required for the watermark decoding.
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section explains challenges of aggregated
data authentications without having the synchrony assumptions. Section 5.3 outlines related
works to defeat de-synchronisation for watermark detection. Thereafter, Section 5.4 elaborates
on the details of two dimensional patterns for watermark construction that are resilient against
aggregation Then, in Section 5.5, we explain our watermarking solution based on the realistic
model of asynchrony and in Section 5.6, the performance evaluation and an extensive analysis
of de-synchronisation robustness are given. In Section 5.7, two possible remedies to decrease
the computational complexity of watermark detection are suggested and finally Section 5.8
concludes this chapter and provide a few possible future works.
5.2 Challenges of Defeating Asynchronous Detection for
Aggregate Data Authentication
Before explaining the challenges that we face here, with the aid of an example, we illustrate
how the watermark decoding process can fail due to lack of synchronisation for a small network
including three sensors.
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5.2.1 An Illustrative Example of the Synchronised Mergeable
Watermarking Scheme: Modus operandi
Our initial attempt for constructing an ensemble of mergeable hiding codes, was simply shift-
ing a single PN sequence with good correlation properties and then embedding the shifted
sequence within a data stream, as described in Section 4.6.4.1. The intuition was if in a cross-
correlation between an embedded sequence and a template, the two differ only by a shift, then
the correlation peak will be shifted by that amount. This shift constitutes the watermark mes-
sage. Therefore, for this example, we select a binary maximal-length sequence (m-sequence) of
length 31 (where watermarked samples carry one information i.e. wj ∈ {±1}) as the primitive
watermark pattern because of its random appearance and good correlation properties. The
correlation properties of m-sequences are already studied in Chapter 4.6.4.1.
We, then construct three signatures as watermarks for the three sensors by cyclically shifting
the watermark pattern (the original m-sequence) according to three unique shift values, say
{5, 11, 20}. Therefore, the watermark pattern for sensor 1 is the m-sequence shifted by 5
to the right cyclically. For sensor 2 and 3, the same m-sequence is shifted by 11 and 20
correspondingly. For brevity, we assume that the watermark amplitude that was denoted
by α in Chapter 4 is set to 1 (i.e. yi = xi + wi for j = i). So, three sensors add their
signatures (a sequence of ±1 values) to their local data periodically. Then, the aggregator
computes summation of the three watermarked streams for every time instant. The composite
watermark data stream could be envisioned as one data stream with three distinct watermarks.
The suggested watermark decoding process (see Chapter 4.6.6), first removes the mean value
of the composite data. Then the correlation between the zero-mean data stream and the tem-
plate signature (the m-sequence for this example) is obtained. After applying a matched filter,
three dominant peaks appear in the correlation values, one for each sensor at its corresponding
offset reveals the encoded message. Figure 5.1 depicts the result of correlation between the
m-sequence and the summation of the three shifted sequences. The plot on the left is related
to the situation where watermark encoder and decoder are synchronised Therefore, the water-
mark detection process is able to retrieve the watermark information by performing only one
correlation instead of three individual correlations. In Chapter 4, we referred to this feature as
batch detection and the corresponding correlation calculation for retrieving those correlation
peaks at once, as super-correlation.
We then extended our scheme using different shifts of different PN patterns instead of
different shifts of only one pattern to increase the payload size and also the security of our
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Figure 5.1: Retrieved correlation peaks for three sensors when no de-synchronisation is at-
tempted (left plot) and when watermarked data stream of sensor 2 (at position 11) is shifted
by 9 which causes it to overlap with that of sensor 3 (right plot).
scheme (see Chapter 4.7). In the next section, we have a detailed look at the potential problems
with our previous watermark solution.
5.2.2 Watermark De-synchronisation
One of the attacks on almost any type of watermarking system is de-synchronisation [Sharma
and Coumou, 2006], in which the attacker does not directly remove or destroy the watermarks;
instead he makes it non-recognisable to the watermark decoder by doing some operations on the
host data. In the case of multimedia such as images or videos, rescaling size of the watermarked
image/video or watermark translation are examples of de-synchronisation operations. In the
non-media domain, the de-synchronisation operation could be shifting and wrapping around
the watermarked data-stream. This challenge is to date, one of the most difficult and least
resolved problems in the field of digital watermarking [Sadasivam et al., 2011].
For the previous example that was depicted on the left of Figure 5.1, the watermark in-
formation is encoded at the absolute position of the retrieved correlation peaks. This implies
that the detection window should start from the beginning of the embedding window or at
least from a shift modulo the window size; otherwise the exact position of the peaks cannot be
determined. Back to our example, an adversary may shift the watermarked stream of second
sensor by 9 and subsequently, the watermark verifier only retrieves 2 peaks. This is because
the second peak at position 11 is shifted to the position 11+9=20 and collides with third peak
(which is also at position 20). Therefore, the decoded watermarks for both sensor 2 and 3
is 20. As shown in the right Figure 5.1, the coincident peaks will show as being twice the
amplitude of the previous case and this could indicate the possibility of the collision. However,
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relying on peak amplitude for watermark detection is not a safe option in a noisy environment.
The main reason is that the peak height may vary due to scaling, noise or other measurement
inaccuracies so that only peak existence can be confirmed.
In the literature, use of Spread Spectrum watermarking is suggested for alleviating the
watermark de-synchronisation problem, but not entirely [Wayner, 2009]. For instance, for a
window size of say 128, if only a small number of samples, say 20, are lost, then it is unlikely
that this change will destroy the entire message, because spreading the message over a window
of 108 ensures that there will still be 108 elements carrying the message. This is the case when
the information is not stored in the absolute position of correlation offset and only the presence
of the watermark is in question.
We categorize the SS watermark detection schemes into coherent and non-coherent detec-
tion. For non-coherent detection, only the existence of a watermark is investigated. Using a
conventional detector, the existence of a watermark is represented by a correlation peak. In
coherent detection, not only the presence of the watermark, but also the position of watermark
or correspondingly the timing information of watermark in a data stream is verified. Consider
a sequence of length l as a watermark. It can be shifted cyclically and still yield distinct infor-
mation. Therefore, if we have a set of k non-interfering/orthogonal signatures, then adopting
cyclic shifts enable us to encode k(log2 l+1) bits of information. Hence, coherent detection can
increase the payload size, but it opens up the possibility of impairing watermark detection by a
de-synchronisation attack, for example by causing displacement between encoder and decoder
in the time domain. One can apply an exhaustive search to retrieve the synchronisation index
though. A major shortcoming of exhaustive search detection is high computational complexity
as well as a dramatic increase in false detection rate [Sharma and Coumou, 2006].
Mathematically formulated, the decoder must be able to decode the message from the
received signal z(t) which is the combination of the watermarked signal y(t) = x(t) +α×w(t)
and a white Gaussian noise n(t), i.e. z(t) = y(t) + n(t). For so doing, the correlation between
the received signal and the watermark signal over decoding window of length l is computed as
a periodic cross-correlation as C(τ) = ∑l−1t=0 z(t)w(t+ τ). This results in a correlation peak at
lag equal to zero, if the encoder and decoder are synchronised It is possible that the embedded
watermark shifted circularly by a known value λ as the watermark key i.e. wλ(t) = shift(w(t), λ)
where shift() represents the spatial cyclic shift. Then, C(τ) = ∑l−1t=0 z(t)wλ(t + τ) will attain
its maximum value at the corresponding shift offset λ (coherent detection).
In Figure 5.2 the insecure channel is modeled as the addition of white Gaussian noise
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followed by a de-synchronisation attack that changes the received signal z(t) to zˆ(t) 1. The
de-synchronisation attack is parameterized by θ as the shift/offset value that tampers the
position of correlation peak to λˆ = λ + θ. This can be done by an interpolation filter2. The
synchronisation problem is then, to estimate the offset θ applied by the adversary to retrieve
the watermark key λ. Without any a priori knowledge of the offset θ, the periodic correlation
will fail as zˆ(t) and wλ(t) are no longer synchronised. The reason is that, the cross-correlation
is a shift-invariant operation, but the peak location is not. Since it is unknown when the
watermark signal starts, it is crucial that the decoder locks to the received watermark signal.
Figure 5.2: De-synchronisation attack model (the symbol |.| refers to the watermark magni-
tude).
In this chapter, we are interested in constructing good coherent watermark detectors that
are resilient against de-synchronization. For the rest of the chapter, we shall use the term
decoder/detector to mean only the coherent decoder/detector, unless otherwise specified. In
the next section, we look at the joining of asynchronous data streams, referred to data de-
synchronization, that is often ignored in secure data aggregation schemes for sensor networks.
5.2.3 Data De-synchronisation
Another problem that we might encounter is data aggregation over asynchronous data streams.
The definition of asynchrony in data processing environments is different in different contexts.
Some of the existing definitions in data streaming applications are outlined as:
1. Misalignment or time lags among multiple data streams such as in [Wu and Gruenwald,
2010],
1We have revised the Spread Spectrum figure that was depicted in Chapter 4.2 to represent the de-
synchronisation parameters.
2The reader is referred to ref. [Voloshynovskiy et al., 2001] for investigating the details of applying an
interpolation filter.
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2. Differences observed between the arrival order of the data points at the aggregator and
their time generation order such as in [Tirthapura et al., 2006],
3. Asynchronous data dissemination in which different data sources have different data rates
such as in [Srivastava and Widom, 2004].
Ideally, a proper watermarking scheme should be sufficiently robust to withstand all of
aforementioned asynchrony problems. To the best of our knowledge, none of the watermarking
schemes proposed for secure data aggregation have been designed to adapt to these difficulties
in sensor network data streams. In our scheme, we only focus on the asynchronous data streams
only based on the first definition namely, time misalignment over multiple data streams. We
hope our construction opens insights for solving the whole problem in the future.
We focus on timestamp joining of multiple data streams. A widely used aggregation func-
tion for this scenario would be summation in which the values of the aggregated data stream
are built by the summation of multiple data values with identical timestamps. A common
pitfall here is that the local clocks are kept synchronised all the time which is not valid neces-
sarily [Elson and Estrin, 2001]. To clarify the problem, the summation of three data streams is
depicted in Figure 5.3. Consider that data sources use their local clocks to timestamp data. At
the beginning, three data sources are time synchronous based on a global clock and therefore
the aggregated data stream can be built based on identical timestamps (the plot on the left).
However, after a while the local clocks deviate from the global clock and become out of syn-
chrony (the plot on the right). As opposed to the de-synchronisation model described in the
previous section, the parameter θ could be different for individual data streams; therefore, data
stream 1 experiences delay of δ1, data stream 2 experiences δ2, and data stream 3 experience
δ3.
Lifetime is the interval that sensors clocks remain synchronised. Sensor networks need
resynchronisation over a wide range of lifetimes. It is quite possible that the local clocks
become asynchronous after a while, therefore re-synchronisation is needed. This is equivalent
to shifting streams against each other so that the values with identical timestamps can be
aggregated [Klein and Lehner, 2009]. By so doing, the watermark positions are shifted against
each other and therefore the detection process will fail. It is also possible that the time-
synchronization becomes invalidated by means of a delay attack [Song et al., 2007] where an
adversary delays the transmission of time synchronisation messages among distributed data
sources to magnify the offset between the time of a benign node and the actual time.
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Figure 5.3: Left and right plots show summation of synchronous and asynchronous data
streams, respectively.
Having these difficulties in mind, in this chapter we aim at finding a synchronisation in-
variant watermarking scheme. For this purpose, we extend the 1D watermarks to 2D using
Distinct Sum Array construction that gives a set of near-orthogonal arrays with minimum
inter-watermark interference (see Definition 4.13). Other 2D constructions from 1D sequences
are listed in [van Schyndel et al., 2000].
5.3 Related Works
In Chapters 2 and 4, related works to the secure in-network data aggregation problem in wire-
less sensor networks by means of digital watermarking techniques and homomorphic crypto
primitives, were discussed correspondingly. Unfortunately, all the presented solutions require
tight synchronisation between the watermark encoder and decoder. To the best of our knowl-
edge, our synchronisation-invariant watermarking scheme is the first of its kind to provide this
possibility for aggregate data authentication of sensory data streams. Therefore, we mention
a few works with the similar ideas from the multimedia domain that has inspired our work.
The most common existing solutions in the multimedia literature for resolving de-synchronisation
problem include (i) embedding watermarks in an appropriate synchronisation-invariant domain,
(ii) feature-based embedding methods, (iii) embedding preambles or pilot symbols as synchro-
nisation marks, and (iv) exhaustive search for finding synchronisation points at the decoder
[Sharma and Coumou, 2006].
The first technique embeds watermark information in a transform domain that is invariant
to specific geometric transformations, and thereby ensures that synchronisation is not lost if the
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signal is subjected to those transformations. An example is Fourier-Mellin transform for images
that wraps the image data from a frequency domain to a log-polar coordinate system3. If the
watermarks were embedded in Fourier-Mellin, it would be invariant to rotation, translation,
and scaling (RST) [Ruanaidh and Pun, 1998]. While invariance of the transform in front of
RST operations holds for continuous data, it fails to produce a bijective mapping between
spatial and transformed domains in the discrete case, even if the watermarked image has not
undergone any transformation. Another example of an invariant watermark is a Legendre-
based watermark that has interesting property of invariance under Fourier transformation
[Van Schyndel et al., 1999]. Unfortunately, the number of such watermarks are limited (see
Chapter 4, Section 4.6.4). This can ease collusion-based detection of the template Legendre
watermark and pose security threats to watermark itself.
The feature-based watermarking methods aim in binding the watermarks with steady fea-
ture points of host data that are geometrically invariant and therefore avoid the need to search
for synchronisation during the extraction process. In the multimedia watermarking termi-
nology, these approaches are the key towards the second-generation watermarking meaning
that watermarking approaches evolve from information embedding in pixels toward embedding
using semantically meaningful features of the multimedia signals, either for the purpose of
synchronisation or for embedding itself. An example is [Bas et al., 2002], wherein a Harris
detector and Delaunay Tessellation are used to extract invariant features and define water-
marking regions, respectively. The major shortcoming of feature-based watermarking methods
is that they have significant implementation hurdles mainly because accurate estimation of
multimedia signal features is in itself a challenging research problem [Sharma and Coumou,
2006]. Apart form that, the embedding operations often spend considerable computing time
converting into the invariant domain and extracting feature points. Therefore, the real-time
constrains for tamper-detection cannot be respected.
Another approach to maintain synchronisation is embedding synchronisation marks in front
of the watermark to help with inverting attacks. For example, in [Wang and Zhao, 2006], the
authors embedded Barker codes repeatedly as pilot symbols in order to locate the beginning
of the embedded information. Barker codes are small PN sequences with good autocorrela-
tion characteristics usually used for frame synchronisation in digital communication systems
[Proakis and Salehi, 2008]. Unfortunately, pilot symbols are theoretically suboptimal and not
3Fourier-Mellin transform is equivalent to the Fourier transform in a log-polar plane: (x, y)→ (µ, θ) with x =
eµ cos θ, y = eµ sin θ.
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information-bearing4. This reduces the embedding efficiency to a great extent [Sadasivam
et al., 2011]. Apart from that, inserting preamble symbols is additional distortion to host data
because that is only intended for synchronization.
For SS watermarking where the detector has to make a binary decision about the exis-
tence of watermarks, an alternative approach to combat de-synchronisation is performing an
exhaustive search. To this end, multiple correlation tests are performed and compared against
a threshold to search the watermark with largest output for re-synchronisation over all pos-
sible geometric distortions. This implies that, a straightforward implementation, requires an
algorithmic complexity that is too high (almost infeasible), for a meaningful range of attacks.
To decrease this complexity, one could employ joint estimators-decoders that decode the wa-
termark and estimate the de-synchronisation parameters at the same time. For instance, in
[Whelan et al., 2006], the authors explored the use of phase-locked loops to track the sampling
grid offsets applied by an adversary. The performance of this scheme is poor when the offset
is moderate or large. Additionally, most such schemes focus on solving only one geometric
distortion at a time. Obviously, there are methods that combine the mentioned techniques to
achieve a watermarking scheme robust to larger sets of de-synchronisation attacks, but there
is still no widely acceptable and secure solution to this problem [Kang et al., 2011].
Our method is closely related to the watermarking scheme proposed by [Maes et al.,
1999]. This seminal work has inspired many other watermarking solutions to combat de-
synchronization. In particular, this scheme was tailored for the Visual Identity Verification
Auditor (VIVA) project [Depovere et al., 1999], the goal of which was to demonstrate a profes-
sional broadcast surveillance system. For this purpose, broadcast material is pre-encoded with
an invisible watermark identifier. Later on, their scheme was also proposed for DVD video
copy protection by Philips, Digimark, and Macrovision [Maes et al., 2000]. In the proposed
system, shifted versions of primitive watermark tiles are embedded in the spatial domain of
images (videos for the VIVA project) and the detection algorithm looks for the embedded
watermarks by finding correlation peaks in the Fourier domain. Recently, [Jia et al., 2013]
proposed a watermarking method for tracing anonymous traffic flows 5. The scheme does not
require synchronisation between encoder and decoder as self-similarity in the modulated traffic
flows caused by homogeneous PN codes will appear as periodic peaks. Likewise, authors in
[You and Pu, 2015] proposed a scheme to compute the fingerprints solely based on the distances
4 It is known that, Barker codes do not exist for odd lengths > 13, and for even length, there is a lot of
evidence for their non-existence for length > 4.
5 This application of watermarking for breaking communication anonymity was already explained in Chapter
2, Section 2.4.
Two Dimensional Watermark Patterns 152
between adjacent peaks in audio signal from stereo channels. The relative position distances
and the classes of peak pairs are coded to form sub-fingerprints. The video watermarking
method proposed by [Su et al., 2017] embeds shifted watermark patches into the feature points
of a video bitstream such that cross-correlation peaks appear in one of eight possible locations
and that location carries hidden information accordingly. Since the idea of all these works are
borrowed from [Maes et al., 1999], in Section 5.5, more details about this watermarking scheme
as well as its distinction to our solution is provided.
5.4 Two Dimensional Watermark Patterns
The mergeable hiding codes introduced in Chapter 4, are constructed as the linear combination
of an ensemble of k orthogonal one dimensional pseudorandom codes. In this chapter, instead,
we use two dimensional pseudorandom codes and fold data streams instead, to superimpose
the 2D watermarks over them. The reasons that we use 2D watermark patterns are:
1. Unfolding higher dimensional arrays in 1D, often causes good correlation properties to
be lost with projection along one or more of the array dimensions (see Section 4.6.4.3).
2. We used Distinct Sum Array construction [Tirkel and Hall, 2005] to extend the dimen-
sionality of 1D sequences. This construction offers additional diversity and security over
binary arrays, rendering them more robust to cryptographic attack,
3. The 2D construction will increase the amount of payload information that one can embed,
i.e. watermark capacity. This shall be looked thoroughly in Section 5.5.
There exist numerous ways to design 2D orthogonal watermarks, in particular by trans-
forming 1D sequences to arrays while preserving their correlation properties as reviewed in [van
Schyndel et al., 2000]. In the previous Chapter, we studied one of such approaches, namely
exponential quadratic from Moreno-Tirkel construction (see Section 4.6.4.3). For the sake of
brevity, here, we use a simpler version of this construction, namely Distinct Sum Array (DSA)
to describe our proposed watermarking scheme clearly. Although the other Moreno-Tirkel con-
structions are equally usable without requiring any change in our watermarking solution, the
DSA is a special case of the more general Moreno-Tirkel construction.
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5.4.1 Definitions Related to 2D Watermarks
Using 2D watermark patterns, some basic definitions related to Spread Spectrum watermarking
need to be extended. From now on, we use the terms 2D sequences and arrays interchangeably.
Definition 5.1. Two dimensional cross-correlation function. Let s and r be two arrays
of length N = a× b. The 2D (periodic) cross-correlation is defined as:
Cs,r(τ1, τ2) =
a−1∑
i=0
b−1∑
j=0
s(i, j)r(i+ τ1, j + τ2) (5.1)
Similar to the 1D, the auto-correlation function is the CCF between an array and its shifted
version (r = s).
Definition 5.2. Golay Merit Factor (MF). Let s be a sequence (or an array) of values
with length N . The merit factor of s is defined as:
MF =
N2
2
∑N−1
i=1 c
2
i
(5.2)
where ci is the aperiodic autocorrelation as defined by c(i) =
∑N
j=i+1 s(j)s(j − i). Note that
the numerator is the peak value (which may not be at c0) and the denominator includes this
values as well.
In fact, the merit factor is a spectral measurement criterion for ‘goodness’ of sequences; the
larger the MF, the more uniformly the signal energy is distributed over the frequency range
[Golay, 1977].
Definition 5.3. Watermark Constellation. A watermark constellation denoted as pi, is the
2D correlation pattern displayed as a gray-scale intensity image with pixel values in the range
of [0,255]. This way, the correlation values are proportional to the pixel intensity: if the gray
value of white is taken to be 0, darker pixels correspond to stronger correlations. As we shall
describe in Section 5.7, such visual layouts can facilitates the task of watermark detection.
5.4.2 Distinct Sum Array Construction
The Distinct Sum Array (DSA) construction proposed by Tirkel and Hall generates a square
array by accumulating different cyclic shifts of a ‘seed’ sequence at multiple rows that are
separated by a distance k [Tirkel and Hall, 2005]. The requirement for the seed sequence
is having a PN sequence of a prime length p with good auto-correlation properties such as
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Legendre and m-sequences (see Chapter 4.6.4.1). By appending shifted rows of cyclic shifts of
the seed sequence, matrices with good 2D auto- and cross-correlation are synthesised that offers
additional diversity and security over binary 1D sequences and can be folded and unfolded,
rendering them robust to cryptographic attacks.
The DSA construction contains an adjustable parameter r ∈ {1, .., p− 1}, which is seed
sequence independent. Therefore, for a seed sequence of length p, it is possible to construct
p − 1 square arrays. More specifically, the 2D square array bjk is generated from the seed
sequence ak of prime length p as follows:
bjk = ak+τj mod p τj =
rj(j − 1)
2
(5.3)
where τj is defined as the cyclic shift of the seed sequence relative to the top row from row j.
Figure 5.4 illustrates the DSA construction method. A 2D array is generated by placing
a suitable sequence in the top row. The following rows are generated by applying differential
cyclic shifts of the form r times 0,1,2,3,4. Element 1 of the seed sequence is highlighted each
time to show the shift pattern.
Figure 5.4: Distinct Sum Array construction method.
The auto- and cross-correlation of the DSA construction are determined by the number of
matching rows. Synthesizing two different matrices of such a construction, one can guarantee
that the matrix only has 0 or 1 of its rows matching with a displaced version of itself and
therefore low mutual cross-correlations.
In the next Section, we use a DSA array to embed watermark at horizontally and vertically
shifted locations of the array. Since a DSA array can be shifted by (p − 1) × (p − 1) times,
it is possible to increase the information capacity by combining more arrays with low mutual
cross-correlation that can be obtained by different r values. Moreover, if the seed sequence is
balanced , the resulting 2D arrays are balanced as well and possess a recursion relation between
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successive shifts. As we discussed in Chapter 4.8, this matters because embedding balanced
watermark patterns make our scheme robust against statistical tools. Next we describe our 2D
watermarking solution.
5.5 A New Regime for Obtaining Synchronisation-invariant
Mergeable Watermarking Codes: Previous Scheme
Revisited
This section starts with a slightly different version of our mergeable watermarking codes
that was presented in Chapter 4 which takes advantage of higher dimensional PN codes in-
stead of one-dimensional counterparts. Then, this scheme will be extended to avoid the de-
synchronisation problem that was explained thoroughly in Section 5.2.
5.5.1 Notations
In this Chapter, the following notations will be used. We use capital letters to show matrices,
small letters for vectors and scalars. Unless otherwise stated, the subscript i indicates the
values belonging to node Ni in the network. For example, di(t) shows the data value for node
Ni at time t. The de-synchronisation parameters that were described in Section 5.2.2 and
5.2.3, are denoted as θ for amount of drift to the aggregated watermarked data stream and δi
to represent the amount of drift to the individual data stream belonging to node Ni.
5.5.2 Network Model and Assumptions
Similar to Chapter 4, we consider a wireless sensor network consisting of a large number
of nodes, where the network is hierarchically organized into a two-tiered clustered structure
through a clustering algorithm such as LEACH [Heinzelman et al., 2000]. There exists a sink
node that connects the network to outside infrastructure such as the Internet. Within each
cluster (subnet), nodes report their sensory data to the cluster head a.k.a. aggregator. The
aggregator in turn aggregates and forwards the result to the sink node.
For solving the problem of secure watermark-based data aggregation, we consider the fol-
lowing classification:
1. Synchronised network: The whole network has common time-based clocks including wa-
termark encoder(s) and decoder(s).
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2. Synchronised subnets: Each subnet has its own clock synchronised within its nodes but
not synchronised with other subnets. Also the watermark encoder in each sensor is not
locked to the decoder in the aggregator.
3. Free-running network: None of the network components are synchronised to each other.
In the previous chapter, we have solved the problem for the first situation, namely syn-
chronised network. Now in this chapter, we revise the proposed solution by embedding the 2D
watermark patterns instead of 1D.
The second and third situations resemble the ambiguity problem that arises in radar and
sonar applications for target identification [Drakakis, 2006]. In these applications, the time and
frequency difference between emission and reflection of emitted pulses provides the distance
and speed of the target correspondingly. Introducing both time delays and frequency shifts to
the system result in calculating wrong distance and speed and even spurious targets. The chal-
lenge is, therefore, in finding 2D patterns of ones and zeros for which the 2D auto-correlation
function (ambiguity function) has minimum out-of-phase values so that at any given time, if
two frequencies coincide, none of the remaining ones will. The ambiguity problem is not solved
in the general case [Golomb and Gong, 2005] and solutions are provided by putting some re-
strictions on allowed data values. Likewise, here we solve the synchronised subnets scenario
by restricting the amount of possible shifts as we explain in Section 5.5.5. The free-running
network is outside of the scope of this thesis, because finding minimum agreement patterns is
still an open mathematical problem.
5.5.3 Watermark Generation and Insertion (DSA Watermarking Scheme)
In alignment with On-Sensor-Watermark (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3), our goal is to make data
stream authentication a very lightweight operation for all parties involved, and establish it as
a standard tool for tamper detection. Therefore, each node adds a scaled version of its PN
pattern to its data stream periodically in the spatial domain. The PN pattern is generated
from the DSA construction described in Section 5.4.2. A block diagram of the embedding
procedure is depicted in Figure 5.5.
First, a square noise pattern of size p× p, p being a prime number is selected from the set
of (p− 1) PN patterns generated by the DSA construction as described. The only restriction
for DSA construction is having a seed sequence of prime length with good auto-correlation.
Examples of such seed sequences are Legendre sequences and m-sequences (see Section 4.6.4.1).
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The selection is based on the adjustable parameter r which should be different for every node.
Then, in order to make the watermark depend on a secret key, the square pattern is shifted
horizontally by h to the right, and vertically by v downwards. Therefore, the watermark
information is encoded in the horizontal and vertical shifts (the secret key pair) of the basic
PN pattern.
The question that might arise here is that, if it is necessary that shift values be unique for
every node (data source). In response to this question, we state that if the batch watermark
detection is desired, the shifts should be unique; otherwise one can select an arbitrary offset
(less than p× p) because the embedded PN patterns are different for different nodes and it is
possible to retrieve them by performing individual correlations. As we are still interested in
batch detection, we assign distinct shifts to different nodes. So the key pair (h, v) is unique
for every node. This way, a secret sharing scheme is required to exchange the key pairs for the
whole network if the synchronised network is considered. For the case of synchronised subnets,
secret sharing is only required within the subnets.
Figure 5.5: Watermark generation and embedding block diagram (the symbol << shows the
right cyclic shift operator).
Having the 2D shifted watermark pattern, a local scaling factor (watermark amplitude) is
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calculated for every data point in the data stream to make the watermark invisible from noise
floor. Finally the scaled version of the shifted watermark pattern is added to the data stream.
Following the 2D notations, the watermark embedding procedure for data stream i, can be
stated as follows (we refer to it as the DSA watermarking scheme):
Dwmi (m,n) = raster(di, l) + Λi(m,n).W
h,v
i (m,n) (5.4)
where W h,vi (m,n) = shift2(Wi(m,n), h, v), Wi = {bjk}ri is the 2D watermark pattern
generated by DSA construction from Equation 5.4 for a unique ri value and shift2() represents
a 2D cyclic shift by (h, v).
In the above equation, the raster() operator takes l2 elements of a data stream di as input
and makes a square array of that data stream of size l × l. It should be noted that in our
scheme l = p in order to fully tile the data stream with the 2D watermark pattern. Then
Dwmi (m,n) is the watermarked data value in 2D space which is basically the watermarked
data value of stream i at time equals to ((m − 1) × l + n) and the elements of Λi matrix
are the watermark amplitudes for node i at different times. It is possible to add constant
watermark amplitudes for all data points in the stream, but this makes the watermarking
scheme vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks. Hence for achieving better security, we generate
the matrix Λi as a random variable based on a Gaussian distribution N(µ, σ) whose power
spectrum matches that of the data, rendering it statistically indistinguishable from it [Zhang
et al., 2008]. We investigated how to choose the mean µ and variance σ of the distribution
in order to preserve the statistical properties of the data stream after embedding watermarks
(Equation 4.24 of Chapter 4).
Assume each node performs the watermark embedding procedure periodically according to
Equation 5.4. Then the watermarked data will be sent to the aggregators Through aggregation
process, the watermarked data streams are added together to form a joint data stream and it is
also possible that the aggregator embeds its unique watermark as provenance before forwarding
the result to the next node in the routing path.
5.5.4 Watermark Detection
Following the watermark embedding process, the 2D PN patterns are shifted and superimposed
on multiple windows of data streams and the information is encoded in the horizontal and
vertical shifts of those patterns i.e. (h, v) pairs. Similar to the previous watermarking scheme,
the detection is performed by a 2D super-correlation (Definition 4.14) against a template
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pattern which is now the summation of DSA patterns with zero shift; i.e. template =∑N
j=1Wj . Therefore, the watermark detection process involves retrieving shift values in the
composite watermark.
The block diagram of the detection process is illustrated in Figure 5.6. A group of p(= l)
consecutive windows of the aggregated stream are rastered to a buffer of size p× p. Then, the
mean value of the resulting buffer is removed for minimising the interference due to multiple
data streams. This step is necessary because the embedded patterns have almost zero mean
and so should the data. After that, the zero mean signal is correlated against the equivalent
template matrix of the same size p× p (summation of the zero shift DSA patterns). In other
words, we are effectively performing a pattern matching for watermark constellations, and
the horizontal and vertical coordinates of retrieved correlation peaks is used to decode the
embedded information.
Before reporting the peak coordinates, we apply a 2D matched filter (such as a high-pass
Laplacian filter) on the correlation values in order to minimize inter-watermark interference and
also the interference of composite watermark with residual data. This improves the precision
of the watermark detection. After this step, an impulsive peak detection algorithm can be used
for finding significant correlation peaks and their coordinates. The peak detection algorithm
shown here involves comparing the correlation values (or decision variables) with a certain
threshold.
If detection is successful, in the presence of no tampering, the output includes a constellation
of correlation peaks (see Definition 5.3), where the number of retrieved peaks over the window
size (p × p) is equal to the number of nodes that contributed in the aggregation function
(assume n nodes), and the encoded information for node Ni corresponds to the pair shift values
(hi + 1, vi + 1). An example of the retrieved watermark constellation pi1 for a small network
consisting of five sensors is depicted in Figure 5.7. In this example a Legendre sequence of
length 47 is used as the seed sequence for the DSA construction.
Up to now, we have assumed that none of the de-synchronisation problems that we described
above has occurred in the network. This assumption holds true for the synchronised network
situation. However, this is not a realistic assumption and we need to deal with the asynchrony
problem that can potentially happen in the synchronised subnets. In a synchronised subnet,
the watermark encoder is not locked to the decoder which means the detection window does
not necessarily start from the beginning of the embedding window. It is equivalent to shifting
the aggregated watermarked stream during the detection.
As we have embedded different shifts of different patterns as opposed to different shifts of
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Figure 5.6: Watermark detection block diagram.
one pattern, it is possible to set one of the watermarks with pre-known knowledge of (h, v)
values as a reference. Then, we can perform an individual correlation (instead of a super-
correlation) against the watermark pattern of that reference node, i.e. W h,fref to find the time
lag between the encoder and decoder i.e. W hˆ,vˆref , where hˆ = h+ θ
h and vˆ = v+ θv, (θ = (θh, θv))
are the de-synchronisation parameters and θv = θ div p, θh = θ mod p where div() is integer
division). Therefore, the detection window can be shifted according to the calculated offset θ in
order to retrieve the original watermark constellation. However, this solution is not favourable
because it is possible that the reference PN pattern W h,vref used for finding the time offset
between encoder and decoder, belongs to a sensor that is failed because of physical damage
or battery depletion or any other reason and therefore the contribution of that node in the
current decoding window is in doubt. Thus a proper solution that is resilient against node
failure, is needed.
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Figure 5.7: The retrieved watermark constellation pi1 for five nodes. As an example, the
encoded information by node 4 and 5 can be investigated by existence of correlation peaks at
(19,21) and (32,14) correspondingly.
Relative or absolute quantification dilemma
The shift-invariant scheme proposed by Maes et al. solved the asynchrony problem by embed-
ding watermark information into relative shifts of different patterns instead of absolute shifts
[Maes et al., 1999]. However, this approach does not solve our problem entirely. The reason is
that in our setting, different watermarks are embedded by different entities as opposed to theirs
in which the whole image/video is modified by one entity. This means, time misalignments
for different watermarked streams is not necessarily the same (the δi parameter). Hence, it is
possible that the (dominant) correlation peaks for different nodes collide with each other and
consequently the retrieved watermark constellation becomes different from the original one.
We refer to this collision as the peak ambiguity problem. Additionally, relying on a particular
node as the reference point for retrieving the relative shifts is not a safe solution because of
the high probability of node failures in sensor networks [Zhang et al., 2008].
To make the argument more clear, an example of the peak ambiguity problem is illustrated
in Figure 5.8. In this figure, the watermarked data stream of node n5 for the previous example
(Figure 5.7) is shifted by (34,7) and therefore the retrieved constellation (pi2) has been changed
(pi1 6= pi2). The ambiguous decision here is whether the correlation peak at point (19,21)
belongs to only one of the two nodes n4 and n5 (that is the case when one of them has failed)
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or both of them (in the case time misalignment).
Figure 5.8: The correlation peak ambiguity problem where the watermarked data stream
belongs to node 5 is shifted by (34,7).
In the next section, we propose our synchronisation invariant scheme.
5.5.5 Synchronisation Invariant scheme: Twin Peaks Approach
Now we revisit the described watermark embedding scheme, DSA watermarking, to make it
robust against de-synchronisation. As such, for every node, two shifted PN patterns instead
of one are embedded, so the watermark constellation will have two correlation peaks for every
node and information is encoded as the relative distance between those two peaks. We call
this method, Twin Peaks Watermarking (TPW) scheme.
Again for data stream i, p consecutive windows of size p(= l) are required for the encoding
process. Following the same notation used for the synchrony scheme, the watermark embedding
procedure presented in Equation 5.4, can be re-written as follows:
Dwmi (m,n) = raster(di, l) + Λi(m,n).WW
h,v
i (m,n) (5.5)
where WW h,vi (m,n) = shift2(Wi(m,n), j, k) + shift2(Wi(m,n), j+h, k+ v), j, k ∈ {0, p− 1}.
Compare this equation with the previous one. In Equation 5.4 having a delay of t clocks,
results in a shift of t added to h, which changes the relationship between h and v. Similarly
a delay of h × t clock results in t shifts added to v. In contrast, adding delay to Equation
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5.5 will not change the relative distance of h and v. Therefore, having two peaks for every
node solves the de-synchronisation problem between encoder and decoder, as relative distance
among twin peaks remain unchanged and is also resilient against node failure because it does
not rely on any other watermark as a reference point. However, it is still vulnerable to the
peak ambiguity problem, if one or both of the twin peaks for different nodes collides with each
other and therefore the TPW scheme still requires refinement to decrease the false detection.
The following examples show the difficulties of this problem.
Example 5.1. Consider the two following twin pair watermarks for two nodes where W1 and
W2 are constructed by DSA with m-sequence of length 31 and different r values:
WW 10,71 = shift2(W1, 5, 3) + shift2(W1, 15, 10)
WW 21,242 = shift2(W2, 7, 4) + shift2(W2, 28, 28)
Given two nodes, there are 4, 3 or 2 possible peaks though the watermark detection pro-
cedure. The case of 4 peaks is what we ideally expect as illustrated in Figure 5.9 a. The case
of 3 peaks occurs, if 2 peaks coincideone from each node (Figure 5.9 b). The case of 2 peaks
occurs when both two peaks of the two nodes coincide (Figure 5.9 c).
Example 5.2. This example is akin to the question that having n correlation peaks (n even),
can we conclude they belong to n/2 nodes, if no de-synchronisation is attempted at all?
Let us consider the three following constructed watermarks:
WW 6,161 = shift2(W1, 11, 11) + shift2(W1, 17, 27)
WW 17,162 = shift2(W2, 17, 11) + shift2(W2, 3, 27)
WW 23,163 = shift2(W3, 11, 11) + shift2(W3, 3, 27)
Figure 5.10 depicts the resulting peak constellation which includes 4 peaks instead of 6 as
one of the peak twins for node 3 collides with one of the peaks twins of the other two.
Unfortunately, the peak ambiguity problem is an inherent part of our watermarking scheme
as we cannot control the amount of shifts for different data streams (δi). Therefore, we exclude
the free-running network from our scheme and attempt to solve the synchronised subnets case
by posing some restrictions on the possible amount of drifts that every data stream could
experience. We impose the two following restrictions:
A New Regime for Obtaining Synchronisation-invariant Mergeable Watermarking Codes:
Previous Scheme Revisited 164
Figure 5.9: Peak ambiguity problem (Example 1). (a) ideal constellation, (b) WW1 is shifted
by 1 horizontally to the right and by 2 downwards. (c) WW1 is shifted horizontally by 25 and
vertically by 23.
1. The peak constellation should not include more than one peak pair in a row. For this
purpose, parameter j in Equation 5.5 (i.e. row number) should be unique for every node
and also the peak pair should be in the same row which means the amount of vertical
shift v = 0.
2. The amount of possible drifts for every data stream is within the seed sequence length,
i.e. for data stream i, |δi| < p. This way the corresponding 2D drift δi = (δhi , δvi ) only
has h value as δvi = δi ÷ p = 0 which means the row of the watermark does not change.
By imposing these two restrictions, the twin pair watermarks in Equation 5.5 will be changed
to the following:
WW hi (m,n) = shift2(Wi(m,n), j, k) + shift2(Wi(m,n), j + h, k) (5.6)
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Figure 5.10: Peak ambiguity in the absence of de-synchronisation (Example 2) where 4 peaks
belong to three nodes instead of two.
Therefore, the resulting constellation obtained from the correlation includes two peaks for
every node and the relative distance of those peaks (horizontal distance) constitutes the decoded
information. It is important to notice that retrieving row number or j is not necessary for the
watermark detection as the encoded information is embedded in the relative shift between
the twin pairs; otherwise relying on the pair’s coordinates make the scheme vulnerable to
de-synchronisation attacks.
To visualize the impact of these restrictions on the TPW scheme, the possible valid and
invalid constellations for a network of three nodes are depicted in Figure 5.11. The encoded
values for three nodes are 2,4,6 correspondingly by the following watermarks:
WW 21 = shift2(W1, 1, 1) + shift2(W1, 3, 1)
WW 42 = shift2(W2, 1, 6) + shift2(W1, 5, 6)
WW 63 = shift2(W3, 1, 11) + shift2(W3, 7, 11)
All of the constellations in Figure 5.11 a are valid as we do not have more than 2 peaks per
row and the distance of those are equal to the encoded information. pi1 is the ideal synchronised
constellation. pi2 is an example of synchronised subnets where the encoder and decoder start
points have drifted with respect to each other. pi3 and pi4 are examples of drifted watermarked
data streams (for drifts less than 31). For example, pi4 is related to the case when watermarked
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stream 1 and 3 are shifted horizontally to the right by 29 and 10, respectively. Now the
distances among their pairs are 29 and 25 instead of 2 and 6. The reason is that now the
second peak is moved behind the first peak because of cyclic wrap around and therefore the
distance is -2 that is equal to (29-31), for watermark 1. So 2 and 29 have the same ‘congruent
distance’ in our term. The constellations pi5 to pi8 (Figure 5.11 b) are invalid because:
• pi5: difference of 9 (or 22) is not valid;
• pi6: more than two peaks per row are not allowed;
• pi7: having same differences are not allowed;
• pi8: having congruent differences for different rows is not valid.
Figure 5.11: (a) 31× 31 possible constellations for the configuration described in the text. (b)
31× 31 invalid constellations.
The watermark detection algorithm for the TPW scheme after rastering and removing the
mean is illustrated in Algorithm 5.1, where watermark information is decoded from the peak
constellation by calculating the distances among peak pairs. Meanwhile if any of the decoded
distances are not valid, we stop the batch detection process and do the individual correlation
instead, to retrieve the twin pairs for every node and find the tampered data stream(s).
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Algorithm 5.1 Twin Peak Detection Algorithm
1: Perform two dimensional correlation;
2: Apply a 2D (Laplacian/Median) filter;
3: Apply the peak detection algorithm;
4: Store peak coordinates of constellation pi′ into array A such that A(i) = (xi, yi). . scan
the constellation pi′ from upper corner row by row.
5: if |A| mod == 0 then . the number of peaks are even
6: Calculate the distance array by subtracting x values of peak pairs i.e.:
h′ = {A(x2i)−A(x2i−1)}|A|i=1
7: else
8: individual correlation();
9: end if
10: Define a set of non-visited distances nv initialized by all of the valid distances;
11: for i = 1 to |A| do
12: if (h′(i) 6∈ nv and p− h′(i) 6∈ nv) then . neither the retrieved distance nor its
congruent distance is valid.
13: individual correlation(); . skip the for loop.
14: else
15: nv = nv\{h′(i)} . remove the distance from non-visited ones.
16: end if
17: end for
18: if nv = ∅ then . all of the distances are visited.
19: Report pi′ as a successful constellation.
20: else
21: individual correlation();
22: end if
5.5.6 Discussion
In this chapter, we have opened the problem of de-synchronisation in sensor networks where
the aggregate data authentication is achieved by a digital watermarking approach. Our general
solution to this problem is embedding a constellation of p×p pattern that results in two peaks
and the information is stored in horizontal and vertical peak pairs’ distances as described in
Equation 5.5. This way, the problem of de-synchronisation is partially solved, subject to the
restrictions mentioned, and has the advantage that it is fault tolerant as there is no reference
point for decoding to rely on.
As presented in [Wang and Zhao, 2006], the authors defined fine de-synchronisation against
coarse de-synchronisation where the amount of offset applied to the watermarked signal is rela-
tively small. Our TPW scheme is completely resilient against both types of de-synchronisation
attacks, if only the encoder and decoder are not synchronised. However, it is intolerance to
A New Regime for Obtaining Synchronisation-invariant Mergeable Watermarking Codes:
Previous Scheme Revisited 168
coarse de-synchronisation if multiple watermarked streams themselves are not synchronised
with each other. So, we have made the assumption that the shift that a data stream expe-
riences is within the bounded range and designed watermarks in a way that no more than
2 peaks appear in every row of the watermark constellation (Equation 5.5). We argue that
this is a reasonable assumption to make because synchronisation is periodically performed in
sensor networks and therefore the deviation of a node clock cannot be a large number. This
way, our scheme is resilient against fine de-synchronisation of multiple streams. However, if an
adversary introduces a large delay (more than p), the watermark decoding will fail.
In summary, our watermarking scheme has the following properties:
• Multiple watermarks can be aggregated with minimal inter-watermark interaction and
extracted as a group operation (batch detection),
• It is possible to encode information in the horizontal and vertical values of shifted wa-
termark patterns,
• Statistical invisibility over the sequence length (watermark pattern) is achieved,
• Fault tolerance in a sense that decoding of one node information is not dependent to
others (because of encoding information in relative distance of peak pairs),
• Resilient against (fine and coarse) de-synchronisation between encoder and decoder,
• Resilient against fine de-synchronisation of multiple watermarked streams for offsets
smaller than p.
In our scheme, we used square arrays of length p×p as watermark patterns. The constraint
of prime length and square aspect are restricted to the DSA construction. However, our method
will work with any family of p× q binary arrays that have good 2D correlation properties. It is
clear that arrays with longer periods are desired as the range of possible shifts will be larger,
and consequently the resiliency of our scheme to de-synchronisation attacks will be increased.
The TPW algorithm can be used for hardware-generated, real-time watermarking of stream-
ing data in a simple and cost-effective manner. The watermark encoding includes DSA con-
struction using m- or Legendre sequences as seed. Both of these sequences can be stored in
hardware with a flexible number of sizes: p for the Legendre and 2n − 1 for m-sequences as
stated here [van Schyndel, 2010]. The watermark decoding is relatively complex compared
to the encoding because of the 2D correlation calculations. In Section 5.7 we propose two
solutions in order to reduce the complexity of the decoding calculations.
Experimental Results 169
In the method that we proposed, the (signature) aggregation step can itself be considered
as secret side information if aggregation is not part of the application. For example, consider
the e-healthcare scenario that we described in Chapter 3, where patient biomedical signals
were captured by multiple sensors, collected by a collector entity such as a Smartphone, and
subsequently transmitted to a cloud infrastructure for taking further medical investigations.
In the end-to-end secure solution that we presented there, every sensor inserts its signature
into the captured biomedical signal before forwarding it to the Smartphone. In this case,
summation of the different biomedical signals is not applicable since only individual sensor
readings are of interest; however, it is advantageous that the Smartphone sum those sensory
readings to verify the authenticity of several signals at one time jointly.
The important part of our scheme is the ensemble of 2D PN codes, which means if we have
multiple watermarked data, the decoder can verify whether they are tampered or not by per-
forming an aggregation operation such as summation, and look for the aggregated signature
instead of individual ones. This way, our scheme is not only useful for aggregate data au-
thentication, but also for other streaming environments where the authenticity of several data
streams needs to be investigated. Additionally, if those data are captured from distributed
data sources that are not necessarily synchronised all the time, using our scheme, it is possible
to read the embedded watermarks without requiring a full re-synchronization.
In the following section, we investigate the performance of our watermarking scheme using
different watermark patterns with different settings.
5.6 Experimental Results
In this section, we carry out experimental evaluation of our suggested watermarking scheme.
First, the efficiency of 2D watermark patterns against 1D counterparts themselves (without
any host data) is studied. Next, the performance of the presented watermarking scheme in the
presence of data tampering as well as node failure is investigated, using variants of DSA water-
marks with different seed sequences. Thereafter, the watermark detection probabilities using
different 2D watermark patterns are compared and we show that despite the de-synchronization
attack, the twin pair scheme is effective under the assumption that the amount of delay for
individual streams is within the seed sequence length.
Experimental Results 170
5.6.1 Simulation Setup
As stated in Chapter 1, we perform our evaluation on two datasets of different size and topology:
The simulated SCADA data of a water distribution system [Almalawi et al., 2014] and the
SensorScope network [Barrenetxea et al., 2008]:
• SCADA dataset includes synthesized data of a water distribution network for a small
town including three areas A, B, and C supplied with their own water tanks as depicted
in Figure 5.12. For example, RTU4 (Remote Terminal Unit) controls the status and
speed of the pumps P1, P2, and P3 according to the water level reading of Tank1 and
the information are subsequently sent to control devices (MTU and HCI) to avoid catas-
trophic failures [Almalawi et al., 2014]. For the simulation, we used the speed data for
the 3 pumps in Area 1 as the aggregation values needed to control the water level of
Tank1.
• SensorScope is an outdoor network deployment consisting of weather stations for sens-
ing several environmental quantities. Similar to Chapter 4, we analysed the humidity
measurements collected every 30 seconds by 97 weather stations at EPFL campus. For
emulating the in-network data aggregation, the stations are arranged into a two level
hierarchy structure including 10 clusters with size 9 except the last cluster with size 7
(10× 9 + 1× 7 = 97 stations in total).
For the SCADA dataset, we only have three different data streams generated from the 3
pumps and 1 aggregator which is the RTU4. We assign each pump a uniquely shifted watermark
pattern. For example, for the DSA construction, we assign each pump (and also the RTU4)
a DSA with a unique r value and a unique shift pair (h, v). The watermark distribution for
the second dataset, SensorScope is based on the Hierarchical Labelling Scheme as described in
Section 4.7 of the Chapter 4 in which the aggregator is assigned a unique watermark known
as Cluster Identification Code (CIC) and shifted versions of that particular watermark are
spread within the cluster known as Node Identification Codes (NICs). In the case of DSA
construction, 10 watermarks are required for 10 clusters, each with a different r value and
within the cluster a unique horizontal and vertical shift is applied to the CIC watermark
to construct a NIC. The summary of different parameters for the two datasets are listed at
Table 5.1. For both datasets, the watermark amplitudes are selected as random variables from
a Gaussian distribution (according to Equation 4.24) to make the watermarks statistically
invisible.
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Figure 5.12: Simulation of a water distributed system (Figure 7 in [Almalawi et al., 2014]).
Table 5.1: Summary of parameters for the two datasets.
Watermark parameters
Dataset Data range Agg.
fan-in
No. of
required
wm patterns
Scaling
factor
Distribution
scheme
SCADA pump seeds
∈ [0, 1]
3 4 Gaussian
distribution
a unique wm
with unique shifts
Sen-
sorScope
humidity
readings
∈ [0, 100]
8 or 6 9 or 7
per cluster
Gaussian
distribution
hierarchical
labeling
We have implemented the presented watermarking scheme and conducted experiments with
both datasets. Before investigating the efficiency of our scheme against de-synchronisation, the
performance of 2D generated watermark patterns against 1D counterparts in a fully synchro-
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nised network is studied in the following.
5.6.2 One Dimensional Watermarks versus Two Dimensional
This section investigates the performance of the mergeable hiding codes with and without host
data as follows.
Watermark-only Analysis
First, we have measured the performance of different watermarking patterns themselves with-
out encoding them within any host data (i.e. di = 0 in Equation 5.5) to compare the con-
structions themselves as presented in Table 5.2. For this purpose, we take the Small Kasami
(SK) sequences as 1D watermarks and compare them with the 2D counterparts which are
constructed based on the DSA (Equation 5.4) and TPW (Equation 5.5) schemes of the closest
length. The available SK sequences up to length 5000 are 15, 255, and 4095. As the param-
eter p in DSA construction should be prime, the DSA watermarks are not available in those
lengths. For example, for the SK of length 15, we used DSA with Legendre of length 5 which
gives us the 2D watermarks of length 5× 5 = 25. Since, binary m-sequences of length 5 do not
exists, we take the closest length, 7 that results in 2D DSA watermarks of length 7× 7 = 49.
Note that all of the seed sequences that we use in this section are described in Section 4.6.4 of
Chapter 4.
The main metrics used to compare different watermarks are peak value, Generalised Merit
Factor (GMF), peak to background noise ratio, and the maximum correlation bound. As
outlined in Definition 5.2, MF is widely used as a means of comparing sequences for aperiodic
correlation measures. This allows only sequences which have only one dominant peak value.
Since our TPW results in more than one peak in periodic correlation, we adjust this definition
as follows:
Definition 5.4. Generalised Merit Factor (GMF)
GMF =
∑K
i=1M
2
i∑N−1
i=1 |ci|2 −
∑K
i=1M
2
i
(5.7)
where K is the set size of dominant peaks and ci is the periodic autocorrelation. Compared
to the Definition 5.2, the numerator includes the set of maximum values instead of just one.
In Table 5.2, peak strength is shown as a ratio between the correlation peak and the ideal
(p2), and is shown in db. For example, the peak value of DSA construction with Legendre seed
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Table 5.2: Comparison of different watermarks without any host data
PN ensemble Watermark
length (l)
Peak
strength
(db)
GMF Peak to
background ratio
Normalized
cross-correlation bound
Small
Kasami
15 0 1.4241 3 0.333
DSA(Leg.) 5× 5 = 25 -1.94 4 4 0.2
DSA(m-seq) 7 = 49 0 7.1458 7 0.184
Twin Pairs
(Leg.)
5× 5 = 25 4.08,-1.94 4 2 0.6
Twin Pairs
(m-seq)
7× 7 = 49 6.19, 0.52 10.2447 4.33 0.571
Small
Kasami
255 0 1.0707 18 0.067
DSA(Leg.) 17× 17 = 289 -0.53 16 16 0.067
DSA(m-seq) 31× 31 = 961 0 31.0323 31 0.343
Twin Pairs
(Leg.)
17× 17 = 289 5.49,-0.53 16 16 0.267
Twin Pairs
(m-seq)
31× 31 = 961 6.03, 0.03 32.9156 16.07 0.137
Small
Kasami
4095 0 1.0161 63 0.016
DSA(Leg.) 61× 61 = 3721 -0.14 60 60 0.016
Twin Pairs
(Leg.)
61× 61 = 3721 5.88,-0.14 60 30 0.067
sequence of length 5 is p × (p − 1) shown as -1.94 db relative to the watermark length (25),
whereas the DSA m-sequence peak of the length 7 seed sequence is exactly p2 (0 db). For the
TPW scheme, two peak values are reported because the periodic autocorrelation of two shifted
watermarks results in 3 peaks, one at the lag zero and two at the lags equal to the shift values.
For TPW with Legendre of length 5, one peak value is 4.08 db and the two other are -1.94 db.
The negative value states that the peak value at the corresponding offsets are less than the
watermark length (which is 25 for the example). Additionally, the normalized cross-correlation
bound is given in order to compare the amount of MWI between members of a PN ensemble
(see Definition 4.13).
According to the results, we observe that the performance of the small Kasami (SK) is close
to that of the DSA with Legendre seed sequence. However, the 2D construction improves the
GMF. The reason is that, it results in small off-peak values (close to zero) and therefore most of
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the energy of the constructed array is presented at the peak. Also, the performance of DSA is
marginally better compared to the TPW which means that in the presence of synchronisation,
we do not need to use the TPW scheme.
Watermarked-data Analysis
Second, we investigate the ability of retrieving watermark information when encoded within
the two datasets. For watermark decoding, before reporting the correlation values, a 3 × 3
Laplacian filter is applied to boost the detection performance. We can do this because the
array correlation is almost invariant to the Laplacian, whereas the underlying host data is not.
Table 5.3 compares the detection probability of SK of length 255 compared to the 2D con-
structions with m- and Legendre sequences for the two datasets. Additionally, the Percentage
Root Difference (PRD) of the aggregated data is investigated to quantify the signal distortion
introduced by the watermark embedding process (see Equation 3.1 in Chapter 3 for the PRD
calculation).
As expected, the watermark detection has better performance for the SCADA dataset since
the number of embedded watermarks is fewer compared to the SensorScope dataset. Also, in
the case of a synchronised network the performance of 1D and 2D constructions are similar.
Again, the performance for the twin peak pairs is marginally worse than the DSA with just
one peak.
Table 5.3: Detection probability (for the synchronised network).
SensorScope dataset SCADA dataset
PN ensemble Watermark
length (l)
PRD of
agg. data (%)
Detection
probability (%)
PRD of
agg. data (%)
Detection
probability (%)
Small
Kasami
255 4.1567 84.3 2.623 92.26
DSA(Leg.) 289 3.7448 89.02 2.6091 93.55
DSA(m-seq) 961 2.1435 93.21 1.8115 98.88
Twin Pairs
(Leg.)
289 4.5982 76.86 3.45 82.4
Twin Pairs
(m-seq)
961 3.6287 91.96 2.5741 94.59
Recall that, the proposed watermarking method in Chapter 4 had the best performance
when SK sequences were used as watermarks. More specifically, for the SensorScope deploy-
ment, choosing SK sequences of length 255, an adversary could not tamper the aggregated
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watermarked data stream more than 9% without being detected. Additionally, the false alarm
probability in the presence of 20% of node failure was negligible. Therefore, we replicate the
same scenario that included the epsilon attack (as an attack against data integrity) of 9% ran-
domly selected samples to be tampered from the uniform distribution with ( = 0, µ = 0) as
the amplitude and the mean of alteration and compare the watermark detection probability of
SK of length 255 with the 2D counterparts as depicted in Figure 5.13. In this figure, detection
probability refers to watermark survival against epsilon attack. The false alarm probability of
different watermarks in the presence of node failures is also investigated in Figure 5.14.
According to the Figures 5.13 and 5.14, the performance of watermark detection for a
synchronised network is best when DSA watermarks are generated from m-sequences of length
31. Note that, the seed sequence length of the DSA construction needs to be a prime number,
so the closest commensurate length of m-sequence to compare with the SK ensemble was 31.
Figure 5.13: Detection probability in the presence of epsilon attack for two datasets.
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Figure 5.14: False alarm probability in the presence of node failures for two datasets.
5.6.3 De-synchronisation in Action
The de-synchronisation problem is implemented by the two following scenarios.
• For simulating a de-synchronisation attack between the encoder and decoder, we con-
sider a scenario whereby an adversary applies a wrapping operation (spatial shift) to the
aggregated watermarked data stream such that the watermarked sample with index t is
moved to the index t′. For this purpose, we gradually increase the de-synchronisation
parameter θ and shift the aggregated watermark stream by that amount to investigate
the watermark detection performance.
• For simulating a delay attack, a set of randomly selected watermarked streams experience
spatial shifts (of value δi for data stream i). As such, we generate a set of time offsets
and shift the data stream i based on the corresponding malicious time offset. The time
offsets are generated based on a uniform distribution over the interval (1,100) modulo
p to bound the maximum time drift to the sequence length p (in consistent with our
restriction on the allowable time drifts).
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Figures 5.15 a and b show the watermark detection performance using m-sequence of length
31 for both DSA and TPW schemes in the presence of node failure. Starting with the case
where no de-synchronisation is attempted, the DSA (one peak per stream) and TPW (two
peaks per stream) schemes have similar performance. However, when offset between encoder
and decoder increases, the decoder is more likely to make incorrect decisions in the DSA
scheme. According to the figure, even small values of θ lead to a large decrease in detection
probability. In contrast, the performance of TPW scheme is unaffected by the inclusion of
offset between the watermarked aggregated signal and original one and therefore it is resilient
against this attack. The reason is that DSA scheme is not synchronisation invariant (Equation
5.4) as opposed to the TPW scheme (Equation 5.6).
Figures 5.16 a and b show the numerical results for number of nodes with malicious time
offsets (as horizontal axis) and detection probability (as vertical axis) according to the second
scenario described above. We inserted the malicious time offsets every other period (equal to
window length) into data streams that belongs to randomly selected nodes (up to 3 nodes for
SCADA dataset and 6 for SensorScope dataset). Since DSA does not withstand a delay attack,
the results are only presented for TPW scheme using different seed sequence.
The results indicate that our Twin Pair watermarking scheme can withstand the delay
attack in a synchronised subnet, with reasonable performance using m-sequence of length 31
or Legendre sequence of length 29 as the seed sequence.
5.7 A Quick Note on Tweaking the Watermark Decoding
In contrast to traditional SS watermarking approaches, in this chapter, we extended the corre-
lation filter to design watermark templates that enable information-binding functionality, such
that the information to be bound is mapped into (relative) locations in the correlation plane.
This way, instead of applying correlation filter individually, one super-correlation can decode
the encoded information. As mentioned in Section 5.5.5, the possibility of asynchrony can
prevent successful operation of the super-correlation and instead individual correlation might
be needed. Under such circumstances, the watermark detection becomes the computational
bottleneck of our scheme. Therefore, in this section we propose two ‘tweaks’ to the scheme in
order to lower the complexity of watermark detection.
The first tweak is in optimizing the calculation of 2D correlations based on a high per-
formance parallel model such as MapReduce [Dean and Ghemawat, 2008]. Briefly speaking,
MapReduce simplifies large-scale data processing based on a map function that processes input
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Figure 5.15: Watermark detection probability with de-synchronisation between decoder and
encoder of θ value using 2D construction (m-sequence of length 31 as seed) for (a) SCADA
dataset and (b) SensorScope dataset.
key/value pairs to generate intermediate key/value pairs and a reduce function that merges
and converts intermediate key/value pairs to obtain the final results. In [Zhang and Yu, 2011],
the authors suggested two efficient algorithms for parallelizing the n-point correlation function
that are intrinsically appropriate to be applied on MapReduce and other parallel computing
environments.
The second tweak is in generating watermark constellation such that permitted distances
between peak pairs will have the “minimal agreement pattern” property. A pattern with
this property has major agreement with shifted copy of itself only in particular positions and
otherwise only minor agreements [Golomb and Taylor, 1982]. Therefore, if a de-synchronisation
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Figure 5.16: Watermark detection probability using TPW scheme in the presence of delay
attack for (a) SCADA dataset and (b) SensorScope dataset.
problem occurs, the difference of correlation patterns will overlap with the original one in at
most one location. This tweak eliminates the need for individual correlations.
Finding arrays with minimal agreement pattern is a widely studied problem in Doppler
sonar and radar communications and their study is still evolving. One well-known example
of such patterns are Costas arrays [Drakakis, 2006]. A Costas array is an n × n grid of dots
and blanks, one dot in each row and each column, with the property that no two of the
(
n
2
)
line segments connecting pairs of dots are equal in both length and slope. An example of
Costas array of size 6× 6 is given in Figure 5.17 (a). Another well-know pattern based on the
similarity between the dot configuration of the Costas array and the moves of the chess pieces,
Summary and Future Works 180
is ‘non-attacking queens’, wherein queens are arranged in a grid such that no queen can attack
its row, column or its diagonals. An example of 8 × 8 non-attacking queens constellation is
depicted in Figure 5.17 (b).
The other benefit of using such minimal agreement pattern is that they result in minimum
dominant peaks in the correlation planes even in the lack of synchronisation and therefore the
correlation plane will be sparse. This allows an easy visual forensic analysis for the sensors
whose correlation patterns diverge from the pre-known patterns. This is a great benefit in
particular for large data streams where processing hundreds of thousands of data points for
tamper detection becomes extremely tedious.
The above tweaks are, however, abstract and their actual implementations require further
study that we leave as future studies.
Figure 5.17: (a) A Costas array of size 6× 6 shown with a shifted copy of itself. For any shift,
at most one pairs of squares overlap. (b) A non-attacking queens constellation of an 8 × 8
chessboard.
5.8 Summary and Future Works
In this chapter, we proposed a watermarking-based authentication scheme for data aggregation
environments with stringent resources such as WSNs. We have presented a two dimensional
watermarking construction for imperfectly synchronised watermarks embedded into an aggre-
gated data stream. This has been achieved by adding a constellation of watermarks that makes
the de-synchrony problem to be discerned within allowable bounds. For this purpose, a DSA
construction is used as it allows multiple watermarks to be added with minimal inter-watermark
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interaction. The information is encoded by a peak constellation pattern consisting two peaks
per data steam (twin peaks) that contributed in the aggregated data stream.
Our watermark decoding procedure is a free running process in a sense that the decoder
does not need to lock to the watermarked aggregated signal to start the detection process.
Additionally, if the individual watermarks are shifted against each other because of either
intrinsic clock drifts of sensors (that results in lags among different data-streams) or by a delay
attack, the watermark decoding does not fail as long as the amount of shifts are less than the
seed sequence length used in the DSA construction. The price for the free running detection,
is an increase in computations to decode all the asynchronised watermarks. We also proposed
two suggestions to reduce the complexity of watermark detection.
We conducted several experiments to verify the suitability of our scheme. The results
demonstrated the ability of the proposed scheme to combat the de-synchronisation problem.
In summary, the first set of experiments indicates that using the 2D watermarks gives similar
performance to that of 1D watermarks. Both Legendre and m-sequences have perfect response
to the DSA construction and the best watermark decoding is achieved using DSA watermarks
generated with m-sequences of length 31. In the presence of de-synchronisation between en-
coder and decoder, the TPW scheme has much better performance compared to the DSA
scheme. In the aggregation process, when the asynchrony between multiple data streams hap-
pens (within allowable bounds), the DSA is completely intolerance, whereas the TPW scheme
can withstand this problem with high probability.
5.8.1 Possible Future Directions
The remaining work in future along this line is solving the asynchrony problem for a general
case. This requires further investigation of orthogonal patterns that do not require tight
synchronisation for a successful detection. Towards this goal, we found a class of PN sequences
what is known as Complete Complementary Codes (CCCs) [Han et al., 2007]. In these class,
orthogonality is based on a “flock” of sequences jointly. Therefore, every user is assigned a flock
of element codes (instead of only one) as its signature codes. CCCs have most of the required
characteristics for obtaining asynchronous mergeable hiding codes; i.e., zero auto-correlation
sum in each sequence set for every non-zero shift and zero cross-correlation sum between any
pair of distinct sequence sets for all shifts. However, their small set size limits their applicability
for a large scale network. Apart from this, the two suggested tweaks, are merely intuition; they
only serve to explain how we may hope to decrease the detection complexity. More theoretical
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and experimental investigations on the actual improvements to lower detection complexity are
needed.
The other possible future work that this research has not considered for aggregate data au-
thentication problem is aggregation across different sensing modalities. The sensors collecting
the data may have different sampling rate or fail for some period of time, leading to incon-
sistent sampling rates and therefore, the contribution of different sensors in the aggregated
data stream and subsequently aggregated signatures (watermarks) is different. Under such
circumstances, being able to pick up watermark trails in the middle of aggregated data stream
is a very useful capability that requires further investigation.
5.8.2 Looking Forward
From Chapter 3, we began watermarking of streaming data. Different types of data streams
have their own characteristics that necessitate adjustment of exiting data watermarking ap-
proaches to cope with those particular characteristics and ultimately not destroy the data
usage after watermark insertion. In the next chapter, we shall look at another type of stream-
ing data with spatiotemporal characteristics and propose an interesting application of digital
watermarking for perturbing spatiotemporal data streams.
Chapter 6
Digital Watermarking of
Spatiotemporal Data
Nothing puzzles me more than
time and space; and yet nothing
troubles me less.
Charles Lamb
The theme of this chapter is digital watermarking of spatiotemporal data stream as a way of
obfuscating information. Data obfuscation is the process of masking sensitive information in a
manner that data usability is not violated. Because embedding watermarks introduces tunable
distortions in host data, it is possible to mask the original data for the applications where
privacy is of great concern. Our solution is given as a general framework for data protection
in an Internet of Things setting.
6.1 Introduction
Spatiotemporal data refers to data that pertaining both to space and time. Strictly speaking,
there are two types of spatiotemporal data [Aggarwal, 2015]: 1) spatial and temporal attributes
are measured for studying a primary variable such as temperature; 2) the temporal attribute
is itself measured for studying the spatial attribute such as trajectory of a moving object. The
first type is similar to the data streams that were already studied in previous chapters, but
with the extra dimension of space. For those data streams, we only watermarked the main
data attribute (i.e. ECG values for Chapter 3 and sensory readings for Chapters 4 and 5), so
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the proposed watermarking techniques are also applicable to the first type of spatiotemporal
data. In this chapter, the second type of spatiotemporal data is of interest.
Our aim here is to propose a dual watermarking solution for spatiotemporal data: one
distortion-based watermark for spatial attribute and one distortion-free watermark for temporal
attribute. This is, in fact, in align with the first principle of watermarking as defined by [Sion
et al., 2006]:
“Given a Work and a set of associated dimensions of value (usability domains), a
sound watermark algorithm results in an encoding that necessarily alters the Work
in all of these domains.”
The result of applying the above principle in a watermarking solution is a higher resilient
watermark so that an adversary needs to perform a proportionally higher amount of work to
destroy or remove the encoded information.
In this chapter, watermarking is portrayed as an effective tool for data obfuscation. Be-
cause embedding watermarks introduces tunable distortions in host data, it is possible to mask
the original data for the applications where privacy is of great concern. Contrary to conven-
tional watermarking, the visibility constraint can be relaxed – the distortion introduced by
the watermark is used to reduce data precision to below levels where privacy can be compro-
mised. Therefore, our goal is privacy preservation of spatiotemporal data by means of digital
watermarking methods.
The current state-of-the-art notion for privacy-preserving data publishing such as aggregate
statistics is differential privacy. Intuitively, differential privacy states that any possible outcome
of an analysis should be “almost” equally likely, independent of whether any individual opts
in to, or opts out of, the data set [Dwork and Lei, 2009]. As will be explained in Section 6.2.3,
differentially private schemes constitute expensive calculations to ensure privacy and therefore
can only be developed for static datasets. In this chapter, however, we are mainly concerned
with big data applications like smart cities, in which data are usually unbounded, transient,
and require query results to be updated when new data arrive [Bertino, 2015]. Therefore, we
would like to minimize the privacy cost using digital watermarking techniques.
To achieve the above goal, a top-down approach is taken: first a comprehensive privacy
preservation framework is proposed that is generic enough to apply for many Internet of Things
(IoT) constrained environments and then this framework is tailored specifically for protecting
spatiotemporal data. The main motivation behind our framework is that, irrespective of the
privacy preservation techniques that can be used for distilling sensitive information, privacy
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might be compromised before those techniques take effect1. This is mainly due to the high
connectivity and distributed nature of IoT resources that make data protection a complex task
and therefore the privacy enforcement should be deployed at earlier stages. In the following,
the complexity of privacy protection of IoT data will be further explained.
6.1.1 A Brief Preamble on Privacy Protection of IoT Data
The IoT represents a technology revolution that is promoted by the proliferation of Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID), sensors, mobile devices and ubiquitous Internet. In the IoT
vision, connectivity extends to the point, where almost anything can connect to the Internet
[Hodges et al., 2013]. In spite of such remarkable connectivity, the privacy of individual asso-
ciates with these things is a grant challenge for a global IoT deployment. Many IoT applications
such as remote healthcare monitoring, energy grids, navigation systems, homeland security and
defense gather sensitive information that might violate individual privacy [Bertino, 2015].
One of the conventional approaches for privacy preservation is using an obfuscation function
in order to reduce the granularity (e.g., accuracy, fidelity and specificity) of information. Such
obfuscation techniques include generalization and suppression, data masking and perturbation
methods such as random noise addition and data swapping. These methods are useful for
privacy preservation of published datasets where the data is distilled based on the trust level of
the data consumer, preferably in an irreversible manner to maximise data protection [Bakken
et al., 2004]. Directly applying of these obfuscation techniques for IoT data is not feasible. To
explain why, we must first understand the main privacy requirements of collected data in an
IoT setting.
First, IoT data is collected from a myriad of distributed things that maybe owned by
different organisations or people. This establishes a federated environment whereby the own-
erships and control of things and their data is distributed. Therefore, the possibility of privacy
breaches increases compared to a centralised data store, where data is collected and stored in a
seemingly isolated device and is controlled by a single person or organisation. For instance, if
an adversary targets an Intranet of things in an IoT-enabled hospital setting, he might be able
to access medical sensor data before they are stored in the hospital database [Roman et al.,
2013]. In such circumstances, even applying the strongest privacy preservation method at the
time of data storage may not be effective as the privacy has already been violated. Hence,
1In fact, the majority of differentially private schemes assume that data is perfectly secure or data curator
is perfect and the only concern is how to share data with others such that the privacy of individuals are not
violated.
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it is imperative to protect the privacy of the data during the earliest phases of its lifecycle.
The essence of a comprehensive solution to protect the privacy of IoT data through the whole
data life-cycle is also addressed recently by Bertino [Bertino, 2016], in particular during data
collection and data sharing phases.
Second, protection of large volumes of data generated by IoT devices is very complex,
in particular when IoT data is used by unknown applications without their owner’s consent
[Roman et al., 2013]. This privacy challenge directly related for one of the main benefits of
IoT, i.e., allowing third-party applications to use the IoT devices and data produced by others.
To protect privacy, the owner of any IoT data needs to control the disclosure of his or her data.
Traditional authorisation models lead to a binary decision, that is whether the access to data is
granted or denied. However, IoT applications can benefit by having access to different granular
information. For instance, a taxi driver may be willing to reveal his precise whereabouts to the
taxi company he is working with for safety reasons. In contrast, he may prefer to send only
his cloaked location (for instance the current suburb) to traffic authorities. This way, the data
owner is not only able to control whom to share data with, but also is able to determine how
much he is willing to share.
Third, providing the aforementioned privacy preservation introduces additional complexi-
ties in terms of provisioning and management of extra information required for determining the
granularity of information. For example, in the case of the taxi driver, he might even restrict his
exact whereabouts to the taxi company during the night trips in specific suburbs or a patient
might allow his physician to access his health record only during the examination. Therefore,
we will need to maintain the driver or patient’s preferences for sharing their information and
this needs to be provided efficiently in real-time for practical usages. Such information in IoT
literature is called context and is often used to make more flexible and intelligent decisions.
We aim to solve the above challenges by proposing a novel framework for privacy preserva-
tion of IoT data using the contextual information to achieve flexible privacy. The general idea
behind our framework is depicted in Figure 6.1. Assume O is a privacy conscious object (or a
thing). This object O has four sensitive data items that are shown here with different shapes
(a square, circle, triangle, and pentagon). Depending on the contextual information, the gran-
ularity of accessed data varies. Granularity, in this context, refers to the ‘blurred’ precision of
the data. This ‘blurred’ precision is dependent on access, application, user or usage properties.
We call this term granularity to distinguish it from the data ‘precision’, which is an absolute
measure based on sensor properties. For this purpose, we use an obfuscation function that
returns a masked version of O, i.e. fOb : O → O′ depending on the desired granularity level gl.
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Figure 6.1: Multi-stage privacy protection. The colour intensity represents varying noise gran-
ularity.
One could consider O and O′ as sample and spatiotemporal precision variation respectively.
Additionally, for end-to-end protection of sensitive data, we apply multiple privacy preser-
vation functions, each of which is denoted by fi with index i for the i
th function, on the data
before the dissemination phase. This way, our context-driven framework mimimizes any po-
tential loss of privacy, but also takes advantage of efficient contextualization techniques such
as [Yavari et al., 2017a] and [Yavari et al., 2017b] that have been developed specifically for
IoT to provide the scalability and efficiency required by IoT applications. In Section 6.3.1, the
requirements for these functions will be provided in detail.
6.1.2 Design Goals
The focus of this chapter is designing a reasonably secure, fast, and lightweight privacy preserv-
ing solution to meet the requirements of IoT applications. Central to our design is the notion
of flexible privacy –the data owner should not only be able to control the data access, but also
the accuracy of his data (whom, how much). This control can be done based on contextual
information of either data owner (e.g., location, time, emergency situations) or data consumer
(e.g., role, physical co-location, or time of access). The more contextual the information, the
finer is the disclosure granularity that can be achieved. In our suggested framework, we also
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advocate the privacy protection at multiple phases of data life-cycle to afford maximum data
protection2. Previous data obfuscation methods are inferior to ours for IoT settings, where
dynamic obfuscation is required, but also data should be protected at multiple stages before
the actual delivery.
Our design approach is to keep the privacy preservation framework as general as possible
to provide for a diverse selection of implementations. We customize our framework for a smart
vehicle system and propose a lightweight multi-tier privacy scheme suitable for spatiotemporal
data. In summary, the contributions of this chapter are listed as follows:
• Introducing a general framework for end-to-end privacy preservation of IoT data through
its entire lifecycle. The proposed privacy preservation framework permits a variety of
alternative implementations.
• Proposing a context-driven granular obfuscation technique for IoT data based on visible
data watermarking techniques.
• Describing the design and implementation of a smart vehicle system that uses the pro-
posed framework and context-driven granular obfuscation.
• Illustrating the efficiency and scalability of the context-driven granular obfuscation frame-
work and comparison with a state-of-the-art differentially private scheme .
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In the next Section, some necessary back-
ground is given, along with a survey of the most common approaches for privacy preservation.
In Section 6.3, the details of our conceptual privacy preservation framework is given, and then
in Section 6.4, the suggested framework is customized for a smart vehicle system, wherein a
lightweight multistage privacy preserving method based on digital watermarking is presented.
The performance results are presented in Section 6.5. Section 6.6, concludes this chapter and
suggests possible directions for future research.
6.2 Preliminaries
This section introduces some preliminaries laid as foundation stones for our privacy preservation
framework. Additionally, a review of related works for privacy preservation techniques in
general and spatiotemporal obfuscation in particular is presented.
2This is different from data transmission security schemes.
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6.2.1 Basic Concepts
Definition 6.1. Data granularity. Data granularity denotes the level of detail of data, or
precision of information or measurement units of data that can be identified. The choice of data
granularity is application dependent. For instance, for GPS coordinates, spatial granularity
may be expressed in terms of logical locations such as building name, street name, suburb name
or city. Also, one may decide to control discourse in terms of data precision such as meters,
kilometres, feet, or other location precision [Bertino et al., 2009a]. For the sensory data type
that was studied in Chapter 4 and 5, the aggregated values such as mean and variance are also
examples of data granularity (in contrast to granularity of individual sensory data).
Definition 6.2. Context. A context is defined as any information that characterizes the
situation of an entity. Examples are time, location, role, activity, speed, etc. The contextual
information are often retrieved from an ontology of concepts [Perera et al., 2014]. We divide
context from a perspective of both who is querying the data and who the query is about as
described in the following.
Definition 6.3. Data Context (Cdata) and Application Context (Capp) The Data Con-
text refers to the context associated with the collected data (such as time and speed for a
smart vehicle). The Application Context is the contextual information in which the queries
are issued, such as the role of the data requester (physician, nurse, police, etc) or physical
co-location (of a physician with the patient)3. Accordingly the set of contextual information
for both Data and application are denoted as CSdata and CSapp.
Definition 6.4. Pseudo-sensitive context. A pseudo-sensitive context is defined as con-
textual information, the privacy of which does not need to be preserved necessarily, but it
affects the disclosure granularities of sensitive data. For instance, assume that a smart vehi-
cle periodically reports its vehicle id and GPS coordinates along with the time and speed (as
contextual information). Then the vehicle id and GPS coordinates could be the sensitive data
items whereas, the time and speed of the vehicle can be always revealed for safety reasons. In
this case, a driver might decide to share his exact GPS coordinates during day, but not during
night trips. Even though time is not sensitive information here, but it changes the disclosure
of the sensitive data.
3Although workarounds for privacy preservation use the term object and subject to refer requested data and
data requester respectively, instead here we use term data and application. The reason is that in IoT literature,
the term object and subject are used in Resource Description Framework (RDF) that is the basis of the Semantic
Web for better data management performance [Hasemann et al., 2012]. In order to avoid any confusion with
the RDF representation and our system, we avoid using object and subject.
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Definition 6.5. Contextual query. A contextual query is defined as a query with contextual
information being passed in the search query, such as role or spatiotemporal attributes of data
requester. This type of query is not issued by the data requester itself; instead we assume there
is a contextualization service such as [Yavari et al., 2017a] that enriches the search query by
the contextual information.
Definition 6.6. Disclosure rule. A discloser rule restricts the granularity of the returned
information under some contextual constraints. In our framework, a disclosure rule has two
main parts in the form of conditions → gl. The conditions are the contextual information
possibly for both data and application and the gl is the disclosure granularity, the value of
which depends on the characteristic of data.
6.2.2 Dynamic Linear Feedback Shift Register
In Chapter 2 (Section 2.3), LFSRs were introduced as favourite primitives for generating pseu-
dorandom numbers, in particular for applications with constrained computational complexity.
Random numbers generated by a LFSR, have good statistical properties that resemble the
characteristics of truly random numbers. For our application, data obfuscation, the generated
random numbers should be cryptographically secure as well. This requirement translates into
high linear complexity (see Definition 4.5). Unfortunately, the linear complexity of the LFSR is
poor4. Therefore, a new line of research has emerged to improve the secrecy of LFSR-generated
random numbers. Some of the proposal include adding a source of truly random number gener-
ator, combining multiple LFSRs, irregularly decimating LFSR generators, and Dynamic Linear
Feedback Shifts. In this chapter, we use Dynamic Linear Feedback Shift (DLFSR) generators
for achieving secure PN numbers. An DLFSR is basically a LFSR whose feedback polynomial is
modified at run-time. An extensive review of the other techniques may be found here [Peinado
and Fu´ster-Sabater, 2013].
The general notion of DLFSR is first presented in [Mita et al., 2002]. In this short paper, PN
numbers generated from a LFSR whose feedback polynomials are updated based on the state of
a secondary LFSR. A predefined set of primitive polynomials are used to exchange the feedback
polynomials. In fact, the dynamic feedback converts the deterministic linear recurrence of
the primary register into a probabilistic recurrence. A simple example is presented, and the
properties of the output sequence are studied and compared with the output of a conventional
LFSR of similar length. The results of the analysis indicated a big improvement in terms of
4The linear complexity of a binary PN sequence of length l generated by a LFSR is log2 l.
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security without losing the statistical properties. After this seminal work, there are several
extensions to improve the DLFSR construction, in particular for authentication of low-cost
RFID tags (of type EPC Gen2 and EPC Gen3 5). Recently, the DLFR is further developed
by [Peinado et al., 2014] that resulted in improvement of both period and linear complexity of
the sequences generated by DLFSRs. In the following, this construction is described.
The Peinado et al’s construction consists of two LFSRs of different lengths and a counter.
The primary LFSR is controlled by the counter, whose value depends on the internal state
of the secondary LFSR and therefore the primary LFSR polynomial is changed in a round
robin fashion. In other words, there exists a secondary LFSR that clocks regularly combined
with a primary LFSR with irregular clocking. This results in a source of PN generator with
higher period and linear complexity compared to the simple LFSR. Figure 6.2 demonstrates
the generation process that includes the following steps:
1. Both LFSRs are loaded with the corresponding seeds.
2. The counter is initialized with the state of the secondary LFSR.
3. The primary LFSR begins to generate bits using polynomial p1(x) until the counter
outputs the signal CLK2 to change the polynomial. Then p2(x) is selected.
4. Simultaneously, the counter begins the countdown. When the zero state is reached, it
outputs the signal CLK2.
5. The secondary LFSR keeps stopped until the counter activates signal CLK2. At this
time, the LFSR evolves to the next state and stops again. The new state is loaded in the
counter.
From the above steps, it is evident three values are needed for both LFSRs in order to
generate random numbers: LFSR order (length of register), initial value of the register, and
the initial selected polynomial. We denote these values by (l1, iv1, poly1) and (l2, iv2, poly2) for
the primary and secondary LFSRs, respectively. Also, the authors suggested l2 = log2 l1 in
order to avoid the generation of too long partial sequences by each polynomial.
In Section 6.4, this construction, denoted by DLFSR(l1, l2), is used to generate secure PN
numbers for spatial cloaking.
5 EPC Gen2 and Gen3 tags are international RFID standards for the use in the supply chain worldwide.
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Figure 6.2: Block diagram of the Peinado et al’s DLFSR.
6.2.3 Related Works to Privacy Preservation
There are clear parallels between our work and two popular techniques for privacy preservation
namely access control and disclosure control. The purpose of access control is to limit the
actions or operations that a legitimate user of a system can perform, whereas information
disclosure control aims at publishing/sharing data such that the privacy of individuals is not
compromised. There has been a considerable volume of research on developing both access and
disclosure control methods. We do not attempt to survey all these techniques here. However,
the summary of the most related ones to our framework are given in the following.
The most common access control mechanisms include Discretionary Access Control (DAC),
Lattice-Based Access Control (LBAC), and Role-based Access Control (RBAC) [Bertino and
Sandhu, 2005]. The DAC model is discretionary in the sense that the owner of the requested re-
source controls the access to that resource. Each access request is checked against the specified
authorizations. If there exists an authorization stating that the user can access the resource
in the specific mode (read or write), the access is granted, otherwise it is denied. LBAC, also
known as mandatory access control, enforces one-directional information flow on the basis of
a predefined lattice of security labels which are associated with every resource and user in
the system. A user is granted authorization to access a given resource if some relationship,
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depending on the access mode exists between the user and that resource in the lattice. RBAC
determines access level via the role abstraction, rather than by just identity or clearance of the
requester. In this model, a role is a semantic construct which is often a representation of a job
in an organisation
In an IoT setting where the data and access control policies dynamically change, the above
access models are not suitable to adapt these changes. In order to address such compliance
requirements, the next line of research enrich access polices with contextual information. For
instance, several extensions to the basic RBAC model are purposed to incorporate context
variables. Notable among these approaches is the one proposed through the Generalized RBAC
(GRBAC) model [Covington et al., 2001]. GRBAC introduces environmental information such
as temperature or location to activate roles based on the value of conditions in the environment
where the request has been made. Likewise, a context-driven RBAC model was proposed for
health-care applications [Hu and Weaver, 2004], whereby the contextual information including
time, location, user identity, and object type invoke the relevant access policies for a specific
role. A major deficiency of these approaches is that, data access is either granted or denied,
and therefore these do not account for the specificity of information which a multi-granular
data model allows.
In order to provide flexibility for situations where different granularity is needed, informa-
tion disclosure control, and in particular data obfuscation is advantageous. Data obfuscation is
a technique to purposely degrade the sensitive information to a desired granularity6. Existing
obfuscation approaches include, but are not limited to data perturbation, data anonymization,
generalization and suppression, random sampling, and data swapping [Bakken et al., 2004].
For instance, in [Mivule, 2012] the authors compared different noise addition models including:
additive noise; multiplicative noise; logarithmic multiplicative noise. They attempted to find
the optimal amount of noise required to obfuscate data while preserving privacy. As discussed
in the Introduction, preserving privacy in an IoT setting only at the time of data dissemination
does not ensure complete data protection and the whole data lifecycle needs to be considered
to assure end-to-end privacy. Bertino also discussed the necessity of a comprehensive solution
to protect the privacy of IoT data, in particular during data collection and data sharing stages
[Bertino, 2016].
6The dictionary definition of obfuscate is “to make so confused or opaque as to be difficult to perceive or
understand” as defined in http://www.thefreedictionary.com.
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Is Differential Privacy applicable for IoT data?
Differential Privacy (DP) [Dwork, 2008] is a notable privacy notion from the area of statistical
databases for quantifying and bounding privacy loss. Its goal is to protect an individual’s data
while publishing aggregate information from databases. Mathematically speaking, a random-
ized algorithmM provides -differential privacy, if for all pairs of adjacent databases x and x′
and any set of possible outcomes S ⊆ Range(M),
Pr[M(x) ∈ S] ≤ Pr[M(x′) ∈ S]× e
where parameter  > 0 denotes privacy level: Smaller  yields a stronger privacy guarantee.
A typical way to achieve DP notion is to add controlled random noise to the query output,
for example drawn from a Laplace distribution. While DP has rigorous privacy guarantee for
static datasets, applying differential privacy for an IoT setting presents three main challenges
as follows:
1. Many of the privacy preserving methods for statistical databases assumes that data is
perfectly secure (a curator is perfect) and the only concern is how to share data with
others such that the privacy of individuals are not violated. But here, privacy may be
already violated during data collection.
2. DP is too complex to be applied for a streaming data model. One needs to calculate all
possible combinations between neighbouring data points to find the amount of noise to
be added. That is to say, there is a privacy guarantee but with the cost of expensive
calculations
3. There is no privacy guarantee for queries about specific individuals. In our described
setting, the protection needs to be enforced on the fly for a single user instead of only
statistical queries7.
Therefore, an alternative privacy protection scheme is needed for protection of IoT data.
Note that we do not claim our proposed scheme provides the strongest privacy. However, it is
sufficiently secure for implementation on IoT devices with stringent memory and computation
constants. More importantly, our obfuscation framework extends that privacy beyond data
storage to end-users.
7As will explained in Section 6.4.1, the Paramedic Service and Parking Locator Service need to know the
location of an individual, so there is no benefit in applying DP mechanisms for such queries.
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6.2.4 Related Works to Spatiotemporal Obfuscation
Because our general privacy preservation framework is studied for trajectory data streams,
related works to this domain is discussed here as well. Our proposed solution for the envisioned
smart vehicle system that shall be described in Section 6.4, is semantically coherent with the
privacy protection against location-based services (LBSs) like Google Maps, Mapquest, or
Foursquare. Since queries may disclose sensitive information about individuals, enhancing
location privacy has gained a lot of attentions from academia.
A line of research for preserving privacy when the identity of the users is not relevant for
the provision of the LBS, adopts the K-anonymity principle [Ciriani et al., 2007] to transform
a point location into a cloaked region such that the user is indistinguishable from other (K−1)
users. Another example is a user-anonymizer-LBS named Casper [Mokbel et al., 2007] that
maintains the locations of the clients using a pyramid data structure, similar to a Quad-tree.
Let user u asks a query and c be the lowest-level cell of the Quad-tree where u resides. If c
contains enough users (i.e. |c| ≥ K) , c becomes a cloaking region; otherwise, the horizontal ch
and vertical cv neighbors of c are retrieved. If |c ∪ ch| ≥ K or |c ∪ cv| ≥ K, the corresponding
union of cells becomes the cloaking region; otherwise, the anonymizer retrieves the parent of
c and repeats this process recursively. A more generalized approach is Hilbert Cloak [Kalnis
et al., 2007] based on a Hilbert space filling curve that can guarantee privacy for any distribution
of user locations.
Another line of research closest to ours is authenticated LBSs, whereby a user cannot
remain anonymous but still wishes to retain location privacy. In this regard, Duckham and
Kulik proposed a few rules as the key principles of research on location privacy, which make
it different from other privacy preserving research [Duckham and Kulik, 2005]. An example of
these rules is that, privacy against LBSs cannot be protected by anonymity or replacing the real
user identity with a pseudonym one because anonymity presents a barrier to authentication
and personalisation. The authors suggested to take location-specific information into account
for designing location protection mechanisms. Examples of this information are predictable
mobility of humans, the constraints of the area within which people move, and the importance
of a formal definition of fundamental terms (such as the precision and accuracy of information).
In [Krumm, 2007] various location privacy techniques including noise addition and spatial
cloaking are studied. One important founding of this research is that inference attacks can
be made difficult by artificially introducing a large amount of noise to the sensor locations.
A dummy-based location privacy approach for mobile service is proposed by [Lu et al., 2008],
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in which fake/dummy queries are deliberately generated according to either a virtual grid or
circle to cover a user’s actual location. Hiding sensitive locations [Mun et al., 2009] is another
alternative to data perturbation or spatial cloaking. When a user approaches a location which
has been priorly defined as sensitive, the application generates dummy location traces. In
[Duckham, 2010], a comprehensive framework for balancing the individuals needs for high-
quality information services and the location privacy is presented. For this purpose, the author
proposed to degrade the quality of the location information and provide obfuscation features
by adding n points at the same probability to the real user position.
The majority of the above methods only focus on location privacy. However, revealing
timeliness of spatial information, opens up the possibility of time-and-location attack [Hwang
et al., 2014] and results in breach of privacy. To the best of our knowledge, there are only a
few privacy preservation techniques that do not disregard the temporal cloaking of trajectory
data. An example of combining spatial and temporal cloaking can be found in [Hwang et al.,
2014].
Recently, there are some efforts that adapt traditional privacy enhancing techniques with
strong privacy guarantee such as private information retrieval and differential privacy for LBS
applications. Methods based on the former scheme allow a user to retrieve data from a database,
without disclosing the index of the data to be retrieved to the server. For instance, if a sever
S holds a database with n bits, say X = (X1, ..., Xn), user U should be able to retrieve the
value of Xi, without disclosing the value of i to S. However, due to computational complexity,
it is unclear at present if these approaches can be applied in a real LBS setting [Puttaswamy
et al., 2014]. The latter scheme aims to extend the standard differential privacy for spatial
data streams. In particular, a new generalized notion of privacy, Geo-Indistinguishability is
proposed [Andre´s et al., 2013]. Intuitively, a mechanism provides Geo-Indistinguishability,
if two locations that are geographically close have similar probabilities to generate a certain
reported location. Therefore, the neighbouring concept in the standard differential privacy
[Dwork and Lei, 2009] can be measured by the Euclidean distance metric. This method is
included in Section 6.5 for performance comparison.
To the best of our knowledge, the only work that directly uses watermarking for obfuscation
of trajectory data is recently presented in [Vlachos et al., 2015]. The proposed technique ensures
preservation of hierarchical clustering operations after watermark insertion that is important for
distance-based mining applications such as anomaly detection or classification. This method is
suitable for watermarking of trajectory datasets but cannot be used for on-the-fly watermarking
of a trajectory stream. The detail of the scheme can be found in Section 2.5.5 of Chapter 2.
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6.3 Context-driven Multi-stage Privacy Preservation
Framework
In this section, we introduce our conceptual privacy preserving framework that has two main
parts: multi-stage privacy protection and dynamic obfuscation.
6.3.1 Multi-stage Privacy Protection
Our first goal is to protect data earlier before the data dissemination stage. In Section 6.1,
O was defined as a privacy cautious object with k sensitive data items, the privacy of which
is important to be preserved. We assume, the sensitive data is enriched with pseudo-sensitive
context information. As described in Definition 6.4, this is privacy-relevant information that
affects the disclosure granularities of the data. We then define k privacy preservation functions
to protect the privacy of k sensitive data items, each of which is denoted by fi to protect the
privacy of the corresponding sensitive data di. The three main requirements for such functions
include:
• Security to guarantee the privacy of the protected data,
• Reversible privacy, in a sense that the original data can be re-created from obfuscated
data during run time access, and
• Lightweight functionality to meet the IoT constraint requirements.
The first requirement necessitates the existence of some trapdoor information held by a
legitimate entity, such as a private key, or seed value. The second requirement is reversible pri-
vacy that is actually needed to achieve our dynamic obfuscation goal. Therefore methods like
generalization and suppression, or random noise addition are not acceptable as they transform
data into another form in an irreversible manner. And the last, but not least is low compu-
tational complexity of the functions f . For instance, relying on a heavyweight cryptographic
mechanism such as homomorphic encryption [Gentry, 2010] to obtain privacy guarantees is too
expensive for devices with tight resource constraints.
It is important to note that the privacy preserving functions can be applied in different
stages of the data lifecycle based on the security requirements. For example, in Figure 6.1, f1
occurs at the collection point, while f2 and f3 are applied at data dissemination stages. Ideally,
a successful security solution should provide an end-to-end protection of data, which means
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that the data, should be protected from the data acquisition point to the final destination.
But the real-time processing and constraint computational capacity of IoT devices make the
end-to-end protection an ambitious goal. Therefore, a trade-off must be sought to provide
reasonable security in an IoT setting. In reference [Bertino, 2016], the authors recommended
privacy protection at data collection and data dissemination stages.
Based on the stage at which the privacy function is intended to be applied, one can decide
about the security aspect of the function. For instance, if function f resides on sensors (data
collection stage), it should have low complexity. In contrast, if the protection is taking place
at the storage stage by a high-power computer, a more complex function is acceptable. Apart
from the stage, the 5V features of big data, namely Volume, Variety, Velocity, Veracity and
Value should be accommodated in the design of privacy functions. For instance, if the variety
of sensitive data is not high (such as vehicle id), a RSA with 256 bit key length can be used, but
for time and location data, even an encryption method with relatively small key and ciphertext
decrease the system efficiency (in terms of query response time).
For the rest of the chapter, we shall use the term data and context to mean only the
sensitive data and pseudo-sensitive context respectively, unless otherwise specified.
6.3.2 Dynamic Obfuscation
So far, only privacy protection of data before the dissemination stage is discussed. Now, we
describe, how the flexible privacy can be achieved at the time of data dissemination.
In our framework, an obfuscation method is used that offers coarser or finer granularity
disclosure based on the information that is present in a contextual query. The rationale behind
our scheme is that, data that is obfuscated at earlier stages, can lead to a static disclosure con-
trol model, which may not be suitable for IoT environments with a wide range of applications
that consume this data. Even within one application domain, the disclosure granularity might
be different for different data consumers based on the context such as role, location, or time.
To achieve dynamic obfuscation of data, we introduce an obfuscation function fOb, the goal
of which is to provide varying degree of content information (granularity) to the application
(data consumer) based on contextual information i.e. Cdata and Capp values. In other words,
fOb(d) is a version of the original data with a lesser degree of information precision depending
on the allowed disclosure rules. This necessitates the existence of disclosure rules to determine
the level of data obfuscation that will be explained next.
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6.3.2.1 Scaling up dynamic obfuscation
The question that arises here is whether flexible privacy can be accommodated with respect
to big data characteristics. Consider the following example.
Example 6.1. Assume, Alice wants to find the current location of Bob. Some example of
disclosure policies are listed as follows:
• Rule 1: If Alice is a paramedic currently located at Melbourne, and Bob has an incident
in Melbourne, the precise location of Bob is shared with Alice.
• Rule 2: If Alice is an employee with Melbourne city branch of 13cabs, and Bob has a trip
at Footscray suburb over night, he only shares his street name with Alice .
• Rule 3: If Alice is an employee in VicRoads, and Bob is driving in Heidelberg Rd, Chandler
Highway, or Malvern Rd during weekdays, he shares his suburb name with Alice only
during her working hours.
Given disclosure rules such as the above, it is clear that an exhaustive testing of every
context of both data and application (Cdata, Capp) for every request is prohibitively expensive.
In the above example, only one data requester (Alice) and one thing (Bob’s GPS reader) was
considered. In IoT visions, millions of things are connected to the Internet, and will generate
big data at unprecedented scale (Volume characteristic of big data). In such a setting, often
a subset of things is queried. Apart from that, some contextual information such as time and
location may frequently be updated and therefore the response latency can be dramatically
high (Velocity characteristic of big data).
To address the above issues and in making our obfuscation scheme scalable, we consider two
aspects in our framework design. First, we make the flexible privacy dependent on disclosure
rules, not all the possible values for individual contexts. In other words, once a query is issued,
the existing rules are scanned to find a match. If there is a match, the data is obfuscated based
on the stated granular rules, otherwise the data is not revealed at all8. This way the complexity
is relative to the number of existing rules, not the number of all possible combination of multiple
contexts (i.e both Cdata and Capp). Second, we propose a rule-indexing scheme to further speed
up finding the corresponding rules. This scheme is based on prime factorization to scale up
our framework, which is described next.
8Here, the default behaviour of our privacy preserving system is zero disclosure. It is also possible to grant
full disclosure, if there is no rules for the requested data in the system.
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6.3.2.2 Disclosure Rule-Indexing Scheme
In this chapter, we have made the assumption that the cost of answering a query in terms of
response time is proportional to the number of disclosure rules that needs to be examined. To
reduce this cost, this section presents a rule-indexing scheme, the idea of which is borrowed
from ConTaaS, an Internet-scale contextualization service [Yavari et al., 2017a]. This service is
capable of processing a massive amount of IoT streaming data using a RDF query processing
engine. The graph-like nature of RDF has brought difficulties to query processing, in partic-
ular for very large graphs that contain hundreds of millions of RDF triples. Notable research
on RDF engines such as hash-indexes [Neumann and Weikum, 2008] and vertical partitioning
[Weiss et al., 2008] goes a long way towards the scalability goals, but cannot handle hundreds
of millions of triples with interactive response times. Because ConTaaS only uses simple arith-
metic operations like multiplication and unique factorization (of composite integers), we can
reap dramatic benefits for accelerating access to the relevant rules and subsequently decreasing
query response time. Following this approach, instead of scanning the entire table consisting
of disclosure rules, all these rules are indexed in such a way that the query itself determines
only a subset of disclosure rules to be examined.
Before explaining our scheme, recall from Definition 6.6 that a disclosure rule maps a set
of conditions to a granularity level (conditions → gl). Our framework, does not put any
limitation for expressing gl values in terms of logical or numeral granular data representation.
We assume there are d possible granularity levels gl1, gl2, ..., gld for a particular data item.
Additionally, we need to reach a consensus on defining the disclosure rules. Generally,
regular expressions can facilitate rule representations to support even complex rules. There
are also more specific options such as Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [Cranor et al.,
2002] or Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) [Horrocks et al., 2004] that can be used. In
this chapter, we have chosen, SWRL to express disclosure rules, but other languages can be
used interchangeably. For instance the first rule of the Example 6.1, can be expressed using
SWRL as
(paramedic(?requester) ∧ hasCurrentLocation(?requester, ?Mel-
bourne) ∧ hasIncident("Bob") → shareLocation (?maximumPreci-
son).
The disclosure rules need to be defined by a security manager or equivalent that are in
charge of preserving privacy of things (in associated with people). Although these rules are
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determined before the system implementation, the security manager can dynamically add new
rules or delete some of them when needed. Once the disclosure rules are defined, the next step
is indexing them as follows.
Our proposed indexing scheme consists of two steps: context labeling and rule translation.
First, an identifier is assigned to every context that is present in the disclosure rules, whose
value is the next available prime number. We denote the prime identifiers for application
contexts and data contexts with cidapp and ciddata, respectively. The assigned identifiers will
be stored in two separate tables, namely application context identifiers (ACI) and data context
identifiers (DCI) tables. Second, every existing disclosure rule is translated into two compound
identifiers, one for application and one for data. For this purpose, atomic and compound
context identifiers are defined as follows.
Definition 6.7. Atomic and Compound Context Identifier. An atomic context identifier
is a prime number that is assigned to the context presents in a disclosure rule. A compound
context identifier is constructed by multiplying several atomic context identifiers. In contrast to
atomic identifiers that are represented by small letters cidapp and ciddata, compound identifiers
are shown by capital letters, i.e. CIDapp and CIDdata.
In fact, the compound context identifiers can greatly help in materializing the relevant
disclosure rules without going through all of them. For an existing disclosure rule, the two
mentioned compound identifiers are calculated and the resulting identifiers are associated with
each other according to that rule. Finally, the translated rules are stored in a table, we refer
to it as mapped rule index (MRI) table.
The compound identifiers are used as keys to retrieve the disclosure rules. Once a query is
issued, the corresponding context identifiers are determined by means of a unique factorization9.
If the obtained prime numbers or any of their partial products exist in the MRI table, the
relevant disclosure rules will be retrieved. This way, rules are stored in a more compact
way and therefore, the query efficiency will be improved. The following example clarifies the
proposed indexing scheme.
Example 6.2. For the Example 6.1, if we assume Bob’s vehicle id is “car1234”, the existing
contexts and the associated atomic context identifiers for the first rule can be as follows:
<Alice, Role, Paramedic>, cid1app=5
9As already mentioned, we assume the query is contextualised in the system by means of a contextual service
such as ConTaaS [Yavari et al., 2017a] (see Definition 6.5).
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<Alice, Location, Melbourne>, cid2app=11
, and
<car1234,Location, Melbourne>,cid1data=7
<car1234, Incident, yes>, cid2data=11.
Likewise, for the second rule, we will have:
<Alice, Employee, 13cab>, cid3app=19
, and10
<car1234, Location, Footscray>, cid3data=13
<car1234, Time, Night>, cid4data=17.
Then the above rules will be stored in the MRI table as shown in Table 6.1. Now assume the
contextual identifiers of an issued query is (CIDapp = 429, CIDdata = 221). Since factorization
of 429 = 3×11×13, one can infer that all the contextual information related to this application
is also relevant to the 143 and since the compound identifier 143 already exits, the r11 (as shown
in Table 6.1) will be retrieved quickly.
Table 6.1: A sample of MRI table for Example 6.2.
rule
id
CIDapp CIDdata gl
. . . .
. . . .
r10 5× 11 =
55
7× 11 =
77
gl1 (defined for sharing precise location)
r11 11× 13 =
143
13× 17 =
221
gl2 (defined for sharing location with
granularity of street name)
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
The scalability of our rule indexing approach depends on the number of prime numbers.
Although there are infinitely many prime numbers11, the number of known primes less than
10The second rule of the example 6.1 has the <Alice, Location, Melbourne> that is already assigned
context id of 11, i.e . cid2app=11.
11See http://primes.utm.edu/howmany.shtml for more information.
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1023 is evaluated to be ≈ 1.9 × 1021. Additionally, in our scheme, the context identifiers of
application and data are independent, so the practical upper bound of our indexing scheme is
twice i.e. ≈ 3.8 × 1021. We assume, this number is enough for indexing contexts existing in
disclosure rules of the proposed framework.
One important note to be made here is that we only used the above method for decreasing
the number of possible look-ups. The main reason is that incorporating contextual information
with disclosure rules, multiple granularity of information can be obtained. However, this could
increase the complexity of relating contextual disclosure rules to incoming queries and negate
the achieved benefits. Our rule indexing method used prime labeling and factorization to
decrease this complexity but any other approaches can be used as well.
Next, the main components of our framework architecture are reviewed.
6.3.3 Security Service
In the presented framework, the task of dynamic obfuscation is accomplished by a Security Ser-
vice that follows the principle of Security-as-a-Service model [Bertino et al., 2009b]. However,
our goal is to achieve content security as opposed to transport security to govern disclosure
control. For a convenience in explanation, we have logically decoupled several tasks of this ser-
vice into three principles: Application Context Engine; Data Context Engine; and Disclosure
Decision Point. But this does not mean, there are three different principles; in fact they are
all part of one entity, i.e. the Security Service.
I. Application Context Engine
The main task of the Application Context Engine (ACE) is finding contextual information of
the incoming data request. Upon receiving a query, ACE, first authenticates the data requester.
If the authentication is successful, then the next step is forming the context set i.e. CSapp and
CSdata. The ACE delegates the formation of the latter set to the Data Context Engine and is
itself responsible for forming the CSapp.
At this step, we can assume that the contextual information for the application is either
stated in the query (in case, our framework utilises contextual queries as stated in Definition
6.5), or the application context engine extracts them itself. For instance, the provided credential
could reveal the role of the data requester or the IP address can be used to find the location
of the requester. Apart from that some of the contextual information such as time might need
to be translated to other high level context (such as “working hours” or “night”) and therefore
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the application context engine should interpret this context. The details of such interpretations
are out of scope of this work.
II. Data Context Engine
The Data Context Engine (DCE) has two main tasks: forming the context set for the queried
data i.e. (CSdata), and obfuscating the data before its dissemination to the data requester.
For both tasks, the DCE might need to decode some of the information (either context
or data) using the relevant privacy preservation function. Remember, the multi-stage privacy
protection that we achieved by applying k different functions to protect sensitive information.
For instance, if a physician wants to have access to heartbeat data of patients who have a family
history with cardiovascular disease, this information might be stored in the patient’s health-
record that is already encrypted (say by function f1). Therefore, the DCE needs to reverse
the transformation process prior to retrieving contextual information. Additionally, once the
granularity rule for the data requester is found, the data itself might be protected in a database,
if it has been defined as sensitive data (say by function f2 for heartbeat data). Therefore, the
data is first decoded and then obfuscated prior to its dissemination to the destination. That
is why we emphasised the low complexity and reversible privacy requirements of function f .
III. Disclosure Decision Point
Disclosure Decision Point (DDP) is where the tables ACI, DCI and MRI have been stored
(see Section 6.3.2.2). Once, the CSapp and CSdata are obtained from application and data
context engine, the Disclosure Decision Point (DDP), translates each individual context to
the prime identifier using table ACI for application context and DCI for data context. Then,
the compound identifiers CIDapp and CIDdata are calculated by multiplying the relevant
identifiers. Finally, the MRI table is scanned for a match. If so, the corresponding granularity
level (gl) is given to the Data Context Engine that obfuscates the data accordingly, and sends
it back to the data requester. Otherwise, the access disclosure is denied (as we consider denial
for non-existing rules to be the default state).
Next, the described framework is tailored for a smart vehicle system and the privacy preser-
vation functions as well as obfuscation function are defined and implemented for this system.
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6.4 Case Study: Smart Vehicles
In this section, the proposed framework is customized for a smart city scenario. Smart cities rely
on current advances in technologies, such as IoT, networking, data analytics, recommendations,
and decision support, to deliver better quality of life to citizens. The indispensable building
blocks towards smart city vision include smart healthcare, smart vehicle, smart grid, etc.
Although, we described a general purpose framework, for the case study, we will focus on
smart vehicle deployment.
Smart vehicles are the key to the revolution that is forging the modern intelligent trans-
portation system. The connected vehicles are already on the market, and it is estimated that,
by 2020, 75% of globally shipped cars will be connected to the Internet [Greenough, 2016],
and this obviously opens up privacy issues. The reason that we choose smart vehicles is that
the types of data generated by smart vehicles include spatiotemporal streams (i.e. trajec-
tory data) that are changing frequently, and therefore context-driven privacy preservation is
inherently a difficult task. More specifically, there are types of smart vehicles in terms of
Internet-connectivity namely brought-in or built-in connectivity. The former option caters
connectivity through a Smartphone of the driver/passenger, whereas the latter option relies
on cellular service in the on-board infotainment system. Since the built-in smart vehicles have
more stringent requirements on latency and reliability for control or monitoring purposes [Lu
et al., 2014], a lightweight privacy protection is preferred.
6.4.1 System Overview
An overview of our smart vehicle system is depicted in Figure 6.3. At the bottom of this
figure, there are smart vehicles that with the aid of sensors and RFIDs, transmit their data to
a cloud storage periodically. We have considered five main services/applications in our system
including Paramedic service, Road Safety service, Parking Locator, Fuel Station locator and
Diagnostic Health services. The Paramedic service is an emergency service that is available to
smart vehicles in the case of accidents. The Road Safety service provides traffic information
such as road congestion, recommending paths and also driving offences. The Parking Locator
and Fuel Station Locator are essentially location-based services for finding available parking
spaces and nearby fuel stations, respectively. And finally the Diagnostic Health services, gather
information about people who might be in the presence of contagious diseases. In the Section
6.4.3, we explain how this could be related to the trajectory data. Next, we demonstrate our
data model.
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Figure 6.3: An overview of a smart vehicle system.
6.4.2 Data Model
A smart vehicle is a moving object that is equipped with one or more sensors. In our data
model, streaming trajectories obtained by these sensors are treated as sensitive information that
we want to protect. For a moving object MO, a trajectory data stream TrMO is represented
as a sequence of pairs TrMO = {< p1, t1 >,< p2, t2 >, ..., < pnow, tnow >}, where position pi
is a Cartesian point coordinates shown as xi and yi with ordered timestamps ti. The (xi, yi)
values could be easily obtained by mapping GPS coordinates i.e. longitude and latitude using
a Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) transformation.
Apart from the trajectory stream, every individual data point is enriched with a set of
contextual information that we denoted by CSdata. For the particular dataset that is used for
the implementation, the context set includes vehicle id (vid), and current speed spi. Therefore,
the information for the object MO at time ti includes (< pi, ti >, vid, spi). As the dynamic
data obfuscation depends on contextual information of queried data and data requester, we
also need to define the application context (CSapp) for our system as described in the following.
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6.4.3 Spatiotemporal Granularities and Disclosure Rules
As was discussed in Section 6.3.2, there are different ways to define granularities. Without
loss of generality, for spatial granularity (glspatial), we consider location precision (in terms of
kilometres, meters, feet, etc) and for the temporal granularity (gltemporal), we only consider a
binary granularity meaning the time information should be revealed or not.
To make it clear, let us review some of the discourse rules for different services. If a vehicle
involves an incident, the precise location and time is shared with the Paramedic service. The
Diagnostic Health service is allowed to have access to only spatial data with granularity of 1
meter, i.e (glspatial = 1m and gltemporal=0). This disclosure rule for our case study has been
motivated by a scenario where a drive is suspected for a super-contagious diseases such as (say)
Ebola, and therefore the Diagnostic Health needs to know the places that the driver has been
visited in order to stop spreading the disease. However, the order of visiting places does not
matter to this service and thus does not need to be revealed. For a general scenario, having
d granularity levels, the (d − 1) least significant bits of location coordinates are set to zero
for the worst case (applications with least discourse granularity) in order to mask the precise
coordinates.
It is important to note that for a particular service, the granularity could change based on
the contextual information. For instance, the Road Safety service might be authorized to have
access the location information with (glspatial = 100 feet and gltemporal=0), but if the vehicle is
traveling beyond the street limit, the exact location and time might be revealed to this service.
6.4.4 Privacy Protection at a Glance
We consider trajectory stream as sensitive data the privacy of which needs to be protected.
Therefore, there are two main data attributes, spatial and temporal. In this regard, our system
resembles the privacy protection against location-based services that were reviewed in Section
6.2.4. The majority of those proposed methods, only focused on location privacy and did
not consider the importance of revealing timeliness of spatial information that could result in
breach of privacy [Hwang et al., 2014]. Also, it is important to distinguish between uncertainty
in spatiotemporal information and obfuscation [Duckham and Kulik, 2005]: The former focuses
on imperfection as the result of the inherent limitations of the measurement or representation of
spatiotemporal information, whereas the latter refers to imperfection as the result of deliberate
degradation of information quality. In this chapter, data obfuscation relates to the uncertainty
of the latter case.
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In our system, a two-tier privacy preservation (k = 2) is suggested, one for privacy preserva-
tion of spatial data at the data collection stage, and the other for temporal data that is applied
at the data storage stage. Therefore, we achieve spatiotemporal privacy, while data is at rest.
Additionally, function fOb is used to obfuscate data according to the desired granularity level
at the time of data dissemination. Figure 6.4 illustrates an example of our spatiotemporal
privacy preservation approach, where the original trajectory of a moving object is not only
replaced with the cloaked locations, but also the sequence of these locations are perturbed.
Figure 6.4: Spatiotemporal privacy preservation. (a) Original trajectory: Supreme Court
of Victoria → Royal Melbourne Hospital → University of Melbourne → RMIT University,
(b) modified trajectory: cloaked(RMIT University) → cloaked(University of Melbourne) →
cloaked(Supreme Court of Victoria) → cloaked(Royal Melbourne Hospital).
In order to respect the low complexity of IoT devices, both suggested privacy preserving
functions f1 and f2, and also f
Ob function are lightweight, while we have tried to make them
as secure as possible, given IoT device constraints. For this purpose, we make use of digital
watermarking methods and pseudorandom numbers generation because of their hardware-
friendly nature. In fact, f1, f2, and f
Ob are pseudonoise addition, (hashed-based) scrambling,
and data masking (than can be coupled with one-time pad partial encryption, if a more secure
transmission is needed), respectively.
More concretely, function f1 is a distortion-based digital watermarking method where the
watermark is added with high amplitude as opposed to conventional watermarking usages in
Case Study: Smart Vehicles 209
which the watermark is ought to be invisible. These watermarks are generated from a more
secure version of the LFSR that are described in the next section. In contrast, function f2
is a distortion-free watermark; if there are n items, they can be arranged in n! ways. If the
arrangements are given numbers, then there are log n! bits. In other words, any set of n items,
{x1, ..., xn}, can conceal log2 n! bits of information in the sorted order. This information can
be keyed or hidden by sorting on pi(xi) instead of xi, where pi is a secure permutation function
based on encryption or hash.
A possible criticism of our system for privacy of smart vehicles might be the lack of cryptog-
raphy protection before data dissemination stage12. We emphasize this choice is deliberate, as
our framework is intended for content security as opposed to transmission security (see Section
6.3.3) and encryption methods can be used in conjunction to protect data during transmission.
However, the price for this additional security would be an increase in query response time for
the deployed system.
6.4.5 Privacy Preserving Data Collection - Spatial Cloaking
The spatial privacy in our system is achieved by adding PN values (watermarks) to the location
coordinates on the sensors. To alleviate computational overheads for sensor devices, we use
the Peinado et al’s DLFSR construction that is lightweight and poses high period and linear
complexity (see Section 6.2.2). Therefore for an adversary, it is difficult to guess the generated
random numbers, unless the secret parameters i.e. (l1, iv1, poly1) and (l2, iv2, poly2) are known.
Assume, the ith generated random number obtained from the DLFSR(l1, l2) is ri. The
watermark is then, a scaled version of the ri that is added to the location coordinates to make
it inaccurate. For the location pi = (xi, yi), the watermarked location p
′
i is calculated as follows:
p
′
i = (x
′
i, y
′
i) = (xi + αx × ri, yi + αy × ri) (6.1)
where αx and αy denote the obfuscation scaling factors, or watermark amplitudes.
Clearly, the higher the scale factors, the better spatial privacy can be achieved as the
accuracy of the data decreases. This way, trajectories can be hidden on the fly at the point
of origin. The Security Service needs to be able to obtain the original values if necessary.
Therefore, for every moving object MO, eight secret parameters need to be exchanged a-prior
with the Security Service including {(l1, iv1, poly1), (l2, iv2, poly2), (αx, αy)}.
12As the data dissemination stage, we apply one-time pad partial encryption to protect the dissemination of
non-masked information.
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Note that the Equation 6.1 assumes a bipolar DLFSR (i.e. alphabet of 2, +1 and -1), for
simplicity, but one can also consider DLFSRs using an alphabet, A, which is a prime number,
and balance it by subtracting floor (A/2). The DLFSR construction works identically provided
both LFSRs use the same alphabet. The sequence values are then uniformly distributed from
−A/2 to +A/2.
6.4.6 Privacy Preserving Data Storage - Temporal Clocking
Temporal privacy is achieved by scrambling the obfuscated locations. Note that the temporal
cloaking does not change the timestamps. Instead, the coordinates are shuﬄed positionally to
obscure the timeliness of location information. For instance, if vehicle “car1234” has been at
University of Melbourne at time 5pm, and then RMIT University at time 8pm, we swap the
locations, but the time values themselves are preserved. At the time of data dissemination,
the Security Service decides whether the correct order of trajectories needs to be revealed to
the application. This is an example of distortion-free watermark whereby the data samples are
arranged according to a secret order. An example of such watermarks is proposed by [Kamel
et al., 2016].
In contrast to the spatial cloaking, the temporal cloaking is done by the Security Service.
This means we have more freedom to choose a stronger privacy preservation method (compared
to the LFSR) as long as the time complexity is not high. For this purpose, we define a
secure permutation pi : [1..b] → [1..b] to scramble data in a particular order such that the ith
watermarked point p
′
i is substituted by p
′
pi(i) and b is the required buffer size (that is a power of
2). For example, a trajectory of length 4,
{
< p
′
1, t1 >,< p
′
2, t2 >,< p
′
3, t3 >,< p
′
4, t4 >
}
, may
be replaced with
{
< p
′
4, t1 >,< p
′
1, t2 >,< p
′
2, t3 >,< p
′
3, t4 >
}
for a certain permutation pi.
There are many different ways for having secure permutation such as using a block cipher,
hash functions, congruential random numbers, to name a few. Here, we have chosen a simple
yet effective secure scrambling method based on hash functions that is described bellow.
Assume Hash() is a one-way keyed hash function with the output size of l bits and the
buffer size is b = 2c. We apply a non-overlapping window of size c to the hash output and
encodes it to a decimal value. We then advance the window by c values. This leads to l/c
numbers that correspond to the permutation indexes. However, it is possible that some of
the numbers collides. In such circumstance, we skip the duplicate values. The beauty of this
scheme is that hashed value can be customized for individual moving objects by using a secret
key or its combination with other contextual information such as vehicle id. The security of
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this permutation lies in the security of the hash function and the buffer size b. The longer the
buffer, the number of possible permutations will be higher and a brute force attack will be less
effective. On the contrary, a very long buffer results delays the reverse process and decrease
the system efficiency in terms of query response time.
By coupling temporal scrambling with spatial cloaking, we ensure data is protected at the
rest. If the complexity of the Hash() is still too much for the IoT device, a simpler stream
cipher such as Self-Shrinking Generator (SSG) [Fu´ster-Sabater and Caballero-Gil, 2011] or
Trivium [Katagi and Moriai, 2008], could be employed. While potentially less secure, they
have the advantage of using LFSR’s for the generation. We would expect in the near future
for all IoT devices to be capable of secure connections, so the above are only interim measures.
6.4.7 Privacy Preserving Data Dissemination - Dynamic Obfuscation
The data dissemination stage is triggered by receiving a query from an application. At this
point, we assume the query is contextualized and therefore the corresponding granularities i.e
glspatial and gltemporal are retrieved from the Disclosure Decision Point. Before obfuscating data
based on these two values, the Security Service first needs to obtain the exact location and time
and then based on the glspatial, the least significant bits of the spatial points are masked. In the
case of range queries where an object whose location falls within a time interval is requested
(example is between 8am - 12am), the Security Service decides whether the time information
of the moving object should be revealed based on the gltemporal.
In order to obtaining original information, the Security Service uses the secret values to re-
generate the random numbers required for reversing scrambling and noise addition procedures.
For the former, the queried data point needs to be retrieved from the permuted index p
′
pi(i).
And then, for the latter, the watermark values (αx × ri and αy × ri) needs to be subtracted
from p
′
pi(i). The last step is obfuscating the original coordinates by, for example, masking the
least significant bits.
For implementation, we consider maximum precision of 1 meter that is well bellow the
precision of GPS coordinates, and at the same time sufficient for many application. We, then,
consider 4 different granularity levels, such that for the lowest level, the three LSBs are set
to zero, whereas for the highest level no bit will be masked. Geometrically, the obfuscated
location, fOb(pi) can be represented by a circle with pi at center, and 2
glspatial is the radius in
meter unit. The more undefined bits, the circle area will be larger, the better privacy can be
achieved while the utility of data might also becomes a concern. The entire privacy preservation
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process from watermarking at sensors up to data retrieval are illustrated in Figure 6.5. As it
is shown in this figure, in our framework data remains protected throughout its lifecycle and
is decoded by the Security Service upon retrieval.
Figure 6.5: Sequence diagram for spatiotemporal privacy preservation. The dashed line sepa-
rates the data collection and storage stages from data dissemination. (As explained in Section
6.3.3, the three components of the Security Service are part of one service and are only de-
coupled here for demonstration purpose.)
We mentioned that our Security Service mainly deals with protection of data content as
opposed to the data during transmission. If the data transmission is also required to be
protected, we recommend using a partial encoding such as one-time pad with a user session
key to protect the unmasked bits (i.e. most significant bits) of the location data to enforce
transmission security as well. This way, there is no point form point of origin to the final
destination, where data is left unprotected. For sensors with the capability, the above can be
implemented using connections secured by SSL/TLS.
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6.5 Performance Evaluation
We developed the described smart vehicle system as a proof of concept. For this purpose, the
large-scale TAPASCologne dataset is used, which contains trajectories of the car traffic in a
city of Cologne, Germany [Uppoor et al., 2016]. The trajectories covers a region of 400 square
kilometers for a period of 24 hours. The dataset comprises more than 700,000 individual car
trips. Each record of TAPASCologne dataset contains the time (with 1-second granularity),
the vehicle identifier, its position and speed. Figure 6.6 shows the distribution of vehicles over
the 24 hours. Also, we have defined 5000 disclosure policies expressed based on SWRL (see
Section 6.3.2). All the experiments are performed on a DELL workstation with an Intel i7-4790
3.26GHz CPU and a 8GB RAM.
Figure 6.6: Number of vehicles per time interval for the TAPASCologne dataset over 24 hours
(The x-axis shows time and the y-axis shows the number of vehicles).
The performance of our system is investigated in terms of processing time for retrieving
trajectories. For our system, this includes the time that is required for reversing the pri-
vacy transformations (permutation and watermark extraction) and dynamic obfuscation (data
masking). For simulating queries, we divided the 24 hours into time intervals of size 7.5 min-
utes, and retrieved the trajectory of vehicles that are present in that particular interval for
different services that we named in Section 6.4.1.
Our method is compared against the following systems:
1. Two crypto-systems. Instead of spatiotemporal cloaking, in these systems, GPS coordi-
nates are encrypted to measure the security overhead of data protection at the database.
Therefore, every time data leaves the system, it needs to be decrypted in order to re-
trieve original values and then masked with the desired granularity level completing the
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Figure 6.7: Processing time of our approach (using 16-bit DLFSR and 160-bit SHA permuta-
tion) against the 64-bit DES and 128-bit CLEFIA crypto-systems.
dynamic obfuscation goal. Two block cipher schemes are chosen: a conventional block
cipher, 64-bit DES and a lightweight block cipher, 128-bit CLEFIA (developed by Sony
Corporation in 2007) [Shirai et al., 2007]. The latter is a proposal under consideration in
ISO/IEC 29192-2 and it has the best overall performance compared to other comparable
lightweight encryption methods as described in [Katagi and Moriai, 2008].
2. A differentially private system: As already discussed in Section 6.2.4, Geo-Indistinguishability
is the extension of differential privacy for spatial data stream by adding noise drawn from
a 2-dimensional Laplacian distribution [Andre´s et al., 2013]. For efficiency, this is done
in polar coordinates by selecting an angle uniformly and a radius from a Gamma dis-
tribution. Because, the noise addition needs to be done on-the-fly, a window is defined
by which the neighbouring points are only considered within the scope of window. In
other words, an adversary is allowed to distinguish locations which are far away from
each others. This results in a w privacy guarantee, where  and w are privacy level (that
quantifies the privacy risk) and window size, respectively13.
The results of the two crypto-systems against ours are shown in Fig. 6.7. One interesting
observation is that the processing time of all systems follows the data distribution behavior.
For instance, during the peak hours (such as morning and afternoon), the processing time of
retrieving trajectories for all 3 systems is higher which is clearly because there are more cars
in those intervals. The other observation is that the processing time of the more lightweight
13The original definition is for -differential privacy, where  is a difference between the probability of receiving
the same outcome on two different datasets.
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CLEFIA is much better than DES, however still far from our system (roughly speaking our
system is 10 times better than DES, and 4 times better than CLEFIA). Apart from processing
time, the crypto-systems are inferior to ours in a sense that the data cannot be protected by
encryption methods at the sensor level, due to high complexity of the operations and therefore
the data is protected only at the database. Hence, we can conclude that our system outperforms
the encryption counterparts in terms of both response time and data protection at sensor level
and database as well.
For the Geo-Indistingishibility, the performance and privacy guarantee vary by window
size. Therefore, we chose 15 window sizes (from 16 to 240 trajectory samples per window) and
only report the mean processing time for resolving queries. The results are given in Fig. 6.8.
The horizontal lines indicate where the performance of our system and ClEFIA, approach Geo-
Indistingishibility. It can be seen that Geo-Indistingishibility is comparable with our system
for window size of about 16, and ClEFIA for window size of 112. Further discussion shall be
given in Section 6.5.1.
Figure 6.8: Mean processing time of Geo-Indistingishibility against our approach and 128-bit
CLEFIA.
To better understand the security overhead related to different parts of our system, we
breakdown the running time that is taken by the Security Service for query contextualisation,
reversing temporal cloaking (permutation), reversing the spatial cloaking (watermark inser-
tion), and dynamic obfuscation (data masking) in Figure 6.9. According to this figure, the
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most time consuming part is related to permutation and query contextualisation. In particu-
lar, the permutation and contextualisation contribute on average 55% and 30% of the overall
running time. This is still an acceptable cost for having multi-granular obfuscation. Another
important point to be made here is that, not all components are present for all accesses. For
example, for the Paramedic Service, the security overhead is much less compared to other
services as the time order does not matter to this service and therefore the total running time
does not include the permutation component (saving 55% in this case).
Figure 6.9: Running time breakdowns for different parts of our system including query con-
textualization, finding permuted indexes, extracting watermarks, and dynamic data masking.
6.5.1 Discussion
We argued that, from a thing-oriented perspective, data protection at dissemination stage is
insufficient to preserve privacy of individuals. In order to push protection to earlier stages,
digital watermarking is used as an intriguing alternative for highly complex privacy preservation
techniques. At the time of data dissemination, the obfuscator masks the sensitive data based on
contextual information. The results confirmed that the cost of our multi-stage data protection
is reasonable for the implemented smart vehicle system. In particular, our approach is more
efficient and scalable than crypto and differentially-private alternatives. In regards to the
crypto-systems, we applied a lightweight encryption scheme on IoT data (CLEFIA), but the
performance is still not desirable in terms of query response time.
In related to the differentially-private implementation, first of all the security of data from
source is not considered. This results in formation of weak links that makes the privacy guaran-
Performance Evaluation 217
tee questionable. Second, the scheme calculates all possible combinations between neighbouring
data points to find the amount of noise to be added within a window. Therefore, each sample is

w private. For a fixed amount of , the larger window size, the stronger the privacy guarantee
will be. According to Fig. 6.8, Geo-Indistinguishability is compelling with ours with window
size of 16. This number is very small and results in weak privacy guarantee. That is to say,
there is a strong privacy guarantee (only at the storage stage), but with the cost of expen-
sive calculations for a large window size. Apart from that, the temporal correlation between
the neighbour points (temporal privacy) is not considered which opens up the possibility of
time-and-location correlation attack [Hwang et al., 2014] against this implementation.
For the implemented system, the synchrony between watermark encoder (i.e. sensors) and
decoder (Security Service) is not taken into account. In fact, if some data is missing during
data transmission to the cloud or the sensors stop working for a while, it is possible that
the decoding process becomes unsuccessful. One possible solutions for this problem is using
synchronization invariant watermarks such as Twin watermarks proposed in Chapter 5, but
we leave this for future work.
From the security standpoint, two parts influence our privacy preservation, spatial and
temporal cloaking. Firstly, the security of spatial cloaking is based on the linear complexity
of the DLFSR generator. For the implementation, we used a DLFSR with polynomials of
the order 16 and 4, that generates random numbers with period and linear complexity of
p = 7864200 and LC = 1920 [Peinado et al., 2014]. This increases the linear complexity by
a factor of almost 120 compared to a simple LFSR –and this is achieved without losing the
good statistical properties of the LFSR14. It is also possible to use higher order LFSRs for
the primary and secondary polynomials to further increase the security. Because the linear
complexity of this DLFSR generator is not mathematically investigated for a general case by
the authors [Peinado et al., 2014], we have chosen this length to be able to compare it with
the basic LFSR. Apart from the random numbers, the scale factors are part of the secret
information that is only known to the data owner and Security Service.
Secondly, the security of temporal cloaking is related to the security of the permutation.
For this purpose, we used a one-way keyed hash function to scramble watermarked data points.
A good hash function Hash() must satisfy the two following properties:
1. One way transformation: Given a hash value h it should be difficult to find any message
msg such that h = Hash(msg);
14The period and linear complexity of an LFSR with order 16, is 65535 and log2 2
16 = 16, respectively.
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2. Collision resistance: It should be difficult to find two different messages msg1 and msg2
such that Hash(msg1) = Hash(msg2). Such a pair is called a hash collision.
Due to the one-way property of hash function, even if given h = Hash(msg, key) in the
temporal cloaking, the attacker is unable to obtain the secret key from the hash value. In
addition, hash functions are often used in the generation of pseudorandom bits (e.g., NIST
special publication [Barker and Kelsey, 2007]). The randomness of hash function guarantees
the permutations for scramble temporal cloaking is unpredictable without knowledge of the
secret key key. Also, the uniformity of the distribution of hash values guarantees that all valid
permutations can be generated on the basis of hash values.
In terms of privacy guarantee, a transport layer connection such as TLS can be used to
maintain privacy from IoT device to data storage. For devices incapable of handling the
complexity of TLS, we offer a lightweight alternative, while not a guarantee, may be sufficient
for the application (Please refer to Section 6.4.6). We remind that our obfuscation framework
extends that privacy beyond the storage to end-users. Even though, strong privacy from data
storage onwards to the end-users can be achieved by a differential privacy approach, the high
complexity of the calculations, prohibits its utilization for IoT applications in which data are
usually unbounded, transient, and require query results to be updated when new data arrive
[Bertino, 2015].
6.6 Conclusion and Future Works
In this chapter, we took a leap forward to proactively discuss the possibility of breaching
privacy at the early stages of IoT data collection which is more likely to happen in the fu-
ture of smart city developments. Even if privacy preservation approaches have already been
proposed for some specific IoT applications, a comprehensive framework, general and flexible
enough to deal with IoT constrained environments in a real setting, is still missing. In our
novel framework, data is not only protected before leaving its device, but also it is protected
using other security methods at different points of the entire system to afford maximum data
protection. Additionally, our framework supports flexible data granularities for obfuscating
sensitive information.
The proposed framework was implemented for a smart vehicle system, whereby the spa-
tiotemporal data stream is protected by means of digital watermarking and data scrambling.
In order to achieve dynamic data obfuscation, contextual information was integrated with dis-
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closure rules using our specific rule indexing scheme. Having more contextual information,
one can obtain finer discourse granularity. However, taking too much context into account for
disclosure control is not a prudent decision, since the complexity of the system increases. There
is a middle ground here, but it is very dependent on individual application and performance
limits. The results confirmed that the computational complexity of our system is very modest
and outperforms the crypto and and differentially-private solutions. Our privacy preserving
methods mostly depends on secure pseudorandom generation. However, being a framework,
one can substitute many different privacy-preserving algorithms which can then be combined
to build more complex solution to meet the security requirements, while respecting the IoT
characteristics.
6.6.1 Possible future works
There are many avenues for future works in particular from the IoT perspective. In our
framework, we assumed that the Security Service (specifically, the Application Context Engine)
is in charge of determining whether the conditions of disclosure rules are satisfied; however,
the details are not discussed. For instance some context represents a semantic notion such
as “nearby”, “far”, and “emergency” that need to be verified prior to retrieving the relevant
disclosure rules. Another example is continuous queries, where the conditions of disclosure
rules do not necessarily hold for the entire authenticated session like if a user moves to another
location. Under such circumstances, enforcing continuity of disclosure constraints without
posing too much complexity on the system is a difficult task. On the other hand, a user of
such system might need to verify the authenticity of Security Service. This is in fact a matter
of mutual trust, where trust relates to the confidence in known information. The suggested
framework encompasses a Security Service principle as the main point of privacy preservation.
So if this service is compromised, the authenticity of information will be in doubt. The task
of data authenticity becomes harder when only obfuscated information is available at the user
end. These issues are potentially interesting open problems that needs a deeper look.
We have emphasized the protection of data in collection, storage and dissemination stages.
To achieve this, watermark information was embedded within the captured data at the point
of origin. However, the protection might not be longer effective after subsequent processing on
watermarked data such as data cleaning or data mining. This, in fact, relates to the watermark
robustness in terms of surviving legitimate data processing. The reason that this issue was not
discussed for our frameworks is that, the watermark robustness is application-specific and one
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cannot design a watermarking scheme that is robust against any arbitrary data processing. For
instance, for data types that were studied in Chapters 4 and 5, the mergeable hiding codes had
robustness against data aggregation that was an important operation for ultimate reasoning
about sensory data. Hence, as a future work, privacy protection at other stages of data lifecycle
can be investigated.
The experimental evaluation is a critical part of evaluating the presented framework. We
claimed that, this is a general privacy preservation framework and can be used for a wide
range of IoT applications. If the results are going to confirm the suitability of the framework,
evaluation needs to take a better estimation of a real system in particular for implementations
that scale to large. For instance, we used a naive SQL repository for storing and querying
privacy cautious data objects. However, there are other IoT-specific frameworks for improving
scalability and efficiency of these systems. Examples are SSN and SWEET to describe sensors
and observations (ontologies), RDF to describe resources, SPARQL and SPARQLstream for
query optimization as listed here [Aggarwal et al., 2013]. We plan to incorporate these specific
models into our empirical study to ensure our framework is amenable to real-world use of IoT
applications. Additionally, exploring alternative privacy preservation functions to benchmark
the best possible one that suits the characteristics of IoT data, would be an interesting extension
to our presented framework.
6.6.2 Looking forward
The last decade has seen rapid improvements in the understanding of data hiding techniques.
The mainstream research has focused on multimedia though. Therefore, the domain of non-
media watermarking is still not nearly as mature as that for media. Many watermarking
schemes in the literature actually provide a somewhat different interface from the watermarking
primitives that described in the this dissertation. In the next chapter, we outline the main
lessons that have learnt from watermarking of non-media data stream and their significance
to this domain. Additionally, we summarize the future works to further extend this study. As
the last aim, we look at new trends and the future of digital watermarking with the evolution
of big data.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
If a man will begin with certain-
ties, he shall end in doubts; but if
he will be content to begin with
doubts he shall end in certainties.
Sir Francis Bacon
This chapter presents a summary and discusses the major findings of the work presented
in this dissertation. The challenge and importance of the research are highlighted. The work
is also critically evaluated and possible areas for future investigation are briefly explored.
7.1 Summary and Discussion
The focus of the research presented in this dissertation has been digital watermarking of non-
media data streams. From the outset, we identified the differences between media and non-
media watermarking of data and the primary limitations of applying conventional watermarking
methods for non-media data. We provided a new outlook on watermarking of non-media data
in terms of preserving data usability for data mining operations. In fact, digital watermarking
techniques designed for such data should not interfere with the ultimate goal of the data mining
process, but should also improve the security concerns that are typically application-specific.
Following our novel taxonomy described in Chapter 2, each distinct data domain would benefit
from the availability of a suitable watermarking solution. This dissertation focuses on the
development of watermarking methods suitable for three types of non-media data, including
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ECG data, sensory stream, and spatiotemporal data. We briefly recapitulate the pertinent
research conducted in each chapter.
Chapter 1 presented an important step toward understanding the problem domain of non-
media data streaming. In particular, the magic triangle of transparency, robustness and ca-
pacity was revisited for this new domain. Some of the common assumptions made in the
multimedia watermarking such as the existence of a large noise bandwidth, availability of all
data samples at the time of watermark encoding and quality assessment relying on human
observation, are re-examined for the generic types of data. Then, a new taxonomy of existing
data watermarking methods, inspired by data mining research, was suggested. This classifies
data into six categories: time-series; biological sequences; graph-structured data; spatial data;
spatiotemporal data; and streaming data. The rationale for choosing this taxonomy was that
the ultimate goal of data collection is gaining knowledge through the data mining process and
therefore the watermarking system should be designed to be compatible with the data min-
ing goals. Three data types of the presented taxonomy, namely biological sequences, sensory
streaming data, and a spatiotemporal data stream, are the main subjects of the core chapters
of this dissertation.
Chapter 2 reviewed the necessary backgrounds to digital watermarking. Since, pseudonoise
sequences with near-optimal correlation properties are used for watermark generation in the
succeeding chapters, a generous review of these sequences is also included. The chapter next
presented the recent applications of non-media data hiding techniques to further motivate the
significance of this domain. To the best of our knowledge, this is the latest comprehensive
investigation into watermarking applications after the one that was presented by [Cox et al.,
2007] for the first 50 years of digital watermarking. Then, the watermarking taxonomy de-
scribed in Chapter 1 was studied thoroughly and the main watermarking properties in terms
of magic triangle (of transparency, robustness, and capacity) were compared for every distinct
type of data.
Chapter 3 initiated the task of watermarking a single data stream with two main objectives
of On-Sensor-Watermark insertion and Trust-but-Verify data outsourcing. The former implies
data protection at the very early stage of capturing data and the latter aims at proofing data
possession as well as ensuring integrity of remote data storage. The chapter, then, attained
these objectives for an e-healthcare deployment, wherein biological data from a patient are
periodically captured and transmitted to a cloud storage for diagnosis and treatments. In
order to ensure data integrity, a practical real-time watermarking scheme for ECG data was
presented. The biggest impediment was preserving cardiac diagnosis of ECG data, namely
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PQRST characteristics. To resolve this issue, a sliding order-statistics window was employed
to find the running maxima and minima associated with the PQRST values. The presented
method maintained the position of these extremes in terms of timing. By adapting the window
size to be close to detector resolution, the extreme heights did neither change significantly
during watermark insertion.
The performance study on the real ECG dataset confirmed that the ECG characteristic
points are completely recoverable within sensor resolution and, as a result, the diagnostic
significance is limited by PRD. The chapter also extended the performance evaluation for
various ECG data related to four heart ailments. It was shown that the average PRD for
inserting 5 bits information per sample for Normal, LBBB, APC and PVC beats were bounded
to 2.5072, 3.2719, 4.2695, and 1.5353 db respectively. Additionally, the watermark error was
directly proportional to the relative changes in the signal introduced by the watermark. The
chapter found that the proposed watermarking solution has the best performance for PVC
beats and the lowest for the APC beats. Nevertheless, the watermarking solution was able to
successfully detect modification, deletion, and injection of bogus data for all four ECG data
types. The watermark described in this chapter was fragile and had also high information
capacity that was achieved without making the watermark implementation complex.
Chapter 4 investigated watermarking of another type of non-media data stream for applica-
tions where the aggregation of multiple data streams is of particular interest. For instance, in
a sensor network for environmental monitoring, the combination of information gleaned from
multiple sensors into an aggregated data stream is often used for further analysis and critical
decision making. To liberalise the use of cryptography primitives for authenticity of in-network
data aggregation on a hop-by-hop basis, this chapter showed how multiple watermarks can be
embedded in an aggregated data stream jointly using some appropriate pseudorandom ensem-
ble described with minimal mutual interference between the watermarks. The main required
characteristics for constructing such mergeable hiding codes were low off-peak auto-correlation,
low cross-correlation, balance, and large linear complexity. Then in order to increase the scala-
bility of the scheme for networks where the number of required unique watermarks is large, two
proposals were made: hierarchic labelling and folding one dimensional sequences into arrays.
The Moreno-Tirkel construction described in this chapter was an example of such arrays. Also,
this chapter provided the statistical invisibility proof of the watermarking solution to compute
the average and moments of either individual or aggregated data streams.
The chapter then investigated the performance of different PN sequences in the presence of
attacks that compromise aggregate data integrity. The conducted experiments showed that, by
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choosing Small Kasami sequences of length 255 as a watermark ensemble, an adversary cannot
tamper with the aggregated result by more than 9% without being detected. It is notewor-
thy that the Moreno-Tirkel construction achieved similar results with significant improvement
in information capacity and security against brute-force attacks. In contrast to encryption
primitives or message authentication codes, our solution made efficient use of bandwidth as
the watermark information was encoded within the data itself. Additionally, with the aid of
a super-correlation, our approach had a succinct reduction in watermark detection complexity
and therefore was superior to other existing watermarking solutions.
Chapter 5 extended the mergeable hiding codes for supporting imperfectly synchronised
watermarks. This enables the watermark decoder to pick up a watermarking trail in the mid-
dle of a data stream that is necessary for an online tamper/failure detection. The chapter
also discussed the other source of watermark de-synchronisation that has not been addressed
in literature before i.e. joining of multiple asynchronous streams. This could happen either
because of intrinsic clock drifts within the sensors or by a delay attack. In contrast to the
previous chapter, this chapter made use of two dimensional PN sequences (arrays) for wa-
termarking to increase information capacity and achieve greater robustness and security. For
this purpose, instead of unfolding watermark arrays, multiple consecutive windows of data
streams were arranged into a matrix form by accumulating those windows in time. Then a
constellation of watermark patterns generated by the DSA construction was superimposed on
folded data streams. In order to support the asynchrony detection, the chapter extended the
DSA construction by embedding two shifted watermark patterns per data stream such that
watermark information was encoded in relative horizontal distance between the two patterns.
We referred to this solution as Twin Peak Watermarking (TPW).
Next, Chapter 5 presented a comprehensive experimental study to verify the suitability
of our scheme using the SCADA and SensorScope datasets. The results demonstrated the
ability of the proposed scheme to combat the de-synchronisation problem. In summary, the
first set of experiments indicated that using the 2D watermarks gives similar performance to
that of 1D watermarks. Both Legendre and m-sequences had perfect response to the DSA
construction and the best watermark decoding was achieved using DSA watermarks generated
with m-sequences of length 31. In the presence of de-synchronisation between encoder and
decoder, the TPW is completely tolerant, whereas with the asynchrony between multiple data
streams, the scheme can withstand this problem with high probability as long as the lags among
different data-streams is less than the seed sequence length used in the DSA construction. The
chapter ended with a few tweaks to lower the complexity of watermark detection procedure.
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Chapter 6 demonstrated a novel use of spatiotemporal watermarking for data obfuscation.
In its current formulation, digital watermarking seems to focus more on controlling distortion
which amounts to achieving invisibility. However, in this chapter, digital watermarking is not
supposed to be invisible anymore; in fact it is used to perturb sensitive information more or less
depending on the desired granularity level. To achieve this goal, first a general framework for
privacy preservation of IoT data was suggested. In this framework, data is not only protected
before leaving its device, but also it is protected using other security methods at different
points of the entire system to afford maximum data protection. Additionally, the presented
framework was capable of multi-granular obfuscation by enforcing context-aware disclosure
policies. Next, the chapter tailored this framework for a smart vehicle system, whereby spa-
tiotemporal data were periodically collected from a myriad of constrained complexity devices.
A dual watermarking scheme was presented: one distortion-based generated by DLFSR at the
data collection for protecting spatial data and one distortion-free generated by a hash-based
permutation at data storage for protecting temporal data. The context-aware obfuscation is
applied at the time of data dissemination by means of a one-time pad partial encryption. The
proposed solution was then tested on a large-scale urban vehicular mobility dataset. The result
confirmed that complexity of our watermarking-based privacy preservation framework is very
modest and well-suited for IoT-constrained environments.
The thesis has thus demonstrated the novel use of non-media data watermarking for a wide
range of applications.
7.2 Conclusion and Future Directions
Overall, the significance of this research lies in the novel settings proposed for data stream
watermarking. In contrast to conventional watermarking, we described how watermarking can
be used for secure data outsourcing, provenance transmission, data synchronisation and obfus-
cation. For many of the watermarking schemes presented in this study, their judiciously-chosen
lightweight operations make them suitable for environments with tight resources. In particular,
we attempted to suggest stream watermarking as opposed to stream cryptography for appli-
cations where data integrity is sufficient for data protection. In fact, combining watermarking
with encryption allows ensuring a priori and a posteriori protection at the same time. However
there are limitations to the watermarking solutions we have proposed in Chapters 3 to 6. In
this final section, we describe these limitations and propose some areas of interest for future
research in the digital watermarking domain.
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7.2.1 Limitations of the Study
Although much has been accomplished in this study, there is (as always) much more to be
done. We make some recommendations for future works related to this dissertation.
In Chapter 3, we presented our watermarking solution as a lightweight provable data posses-
sion model for a streaming user who cannot store its full data or perform the full computation
itself. The presented solution, however, does not support data updates on the outsourced data
to maintain data possession guarantees. In fact, if some parts of data need to be updated,
the corresponding watermarks need to be re-calculated as well. Because we have employed a
sliding window to track extreme points, the watermark for the entire window needs to be up-
dated. This might not be cost-effective when the amount of remote data is large. Of particular
interest would be a watermarking solution that is adaptive to data updates without incurring
too much complexity. Another avenue for further research related to ECG watermarking is in-
corporating real-world data models, such as standard communications protocols for computer
assisted ECG (SCP-ECG).
In Chapters 4 and 5, mergeable hiding codes were thoroughly studied. These codes were
only capable of generating verifiable answers for queries of type linear aggregations such as
summation or average. Although these are the most rudimentary aggregation measures that
are needed in many applications, there are other situations when these measures may not be
enough. In particular for gaining sensitive information from multiple data streams and reason-
ing about continuous data, performing other sophisticated queries such as median, quantile,
k-top queries, k nearest neighbours, or other multi-dimensional selection and aggregation op-
erations are of interest. An extension of the suggested mergeable hiding codes to support a
wider range of queries would be an interesting area to explore.
The synchronisation-invariant version of mergeable hiding codes was achieved by restricting
the possible amount of drifts among data streams. Work in future along this line would
involve solving the asynchrony problem for a general case. This requires further investigation
of orthogonal patterns that do not require tight synchronisation for a successful detection.
Additionally, having data sources with different sensing modalities makes the problem more
challenging as the contributions of data samples in the aggregated data stream is not equal for
different data sources.
The main achievement of Chapter 6 was flexible privacy protection of IoT data. We showed
that the watermarking solution for the spatiotemporal data performed well for large data but
we could not test the model with actual big data (e.g. petabytes) due to data unavailability
Conclusion and Future Directions 227
and lack of resources. In fact, data generated by IoT applications constitutes big data that is
difficult to be processed with real-time constraints. In order to be sure about the applicability
of this framework for an actual big data system, more quantitative performance studies are
required.
7.2.2 Research Gaps
The domain of non-media watermarking is still not nearly as mature as that of for media
watermarking. Apart from the limitation of conducted research in this study, there are still
challenges in harnessing the potential of data watermarking. In the following, we address four
main research gaps for potential future studies.
Firstly, there is still little consensus about quality metrics (beyond the mean square error or
in its various application-based guises), between competing techniques for any given data type
or application domain, making the comparison somewhat ad hoc. In particular, for applications
such as ECG watermarking where we do not wish to rely on human subjective judgments of
quality for cardiac diagnosis preservation, an automatic quality assessment model is required,
preferably without having access to the pristine reference data. This is reminiscent of media
watermarking in its early days.
Secondly, many watermarking schemes are suggested with inherent domain-specific assump-
tions to make the problem easier to solve. Some of these assumptions would be barriers to
adoption and make those schemes arguably disconnected from the real world [Ker et al., 2013].
An example of such assumptions was perfect synchronisation for the aggregate data authentica-
tion, studied in Chapter 5. The other example is missing or uncertain data that are hurdles for
successful watermark detection. For uncertain data, the major challenge is that each data item
is represented as sample distributions but not as single values, so most existing watermarking
techniques cannot be directly applied as the changes to distributions are less acceptable than
a numerical value. To the best of our knowledge, there is still no watermarking solution for
this type of data.
Thirdly, exploring watermarking techniques which are compatible with privacy-preserving
data mining goals is still missing. Data privacy is no more an optional feature for many of
today’s applications. It is a requirement for any data management system to preserve the
privacy of the data related to the users of that system. If watermarking techniques are going
to be used for this purpose, such as the one presented in Chapter 6, the robustness property of
designed watermarks should be aligned with the ultimate data usage; otherwise, watermarking
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of such data may be discouraged if the watermarks cannot survive the subsequent data cleaning
or data mining operations
Fourthly, within the area of big data, an important question has been left unanswered: can
we watermark all types of data that come from multiple, heterogeneous, autonomous resources
without affecting complex and evolving relationships among collected data, in a real-time fash-
ion? This is a very hard question that presents an open topic for future research. We anticipate
that data hiding techniques in general and digital watermarking in particular will be integrated
with other security mechanisms in different layers of the IoT model as a lightweight security
mechanism to ensure authenticity and completeness of the collected data. Also, watermark-
ing and fingerprinting techniques could resolve the issue of data ownership in the network of
collaborative clouds of things. The main requirements for such data hiding techniques in-
clude low complexity, scalability and the ability of distributed cooperative computations. Due
to the importance of this problem, we close this chapter with a brief discussion on big data
watermarking.
7.2.2.1 Big Data Watermarking
The exponential growth in the amount of generated data through different services such as
social networks, monitoring applications, biological investigations and financial systems makes
everyone worry about the current state of the developed systems in terms of networking,
computation, data storage, etc. Likewise, the task of ensuring data security is harder as the
amount of information is multiplied. The term big data was coined to capture the meaning
of this emerging trend. To aim at embracing big data, the design of digital watermarking
techniques must be revisited in order to address the challenges that this new trend will face.
Big data are not considered to be persistent tables, but they are usually generated in the form
of transient data streams from various heterogeneous sources. More precisely, the features of
big data are characterised by 5V’s: huge Volume, high Variety, high Velocity, low Veracity and
Value [Simon, 2013]. A watermarking system that is adapted for big data environments should
address the 5V’s in its design as follows. We address each of the 5V’s in turn.
Addressing big data challenge - 5V’s
Volume: The most difficulty in coping with the huge amounts of data to be marked is addressing
the scalability aspect of a watermarking scheme. Watermark scalability has various definitions
in different contexts. For example, in fingerprinting applications, a watermark needs to be
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unique in the sense that it has to uniquely identify each watermarked copy. Thereby, scalability
is equivalent to the maximum number of different watermarks that can be distinguished reliably.
An explicit notion of scalability for watermarking of pseudo-analog data such as natural
images or videos, first appeared in the work of Tirkel and Hall, whereby a unique watermark is
generated for identification of every image/video at the acquisition hardware of standard cam-
eras [Tirkel and Hall, 2001]. In their construction, a watermark is generated from a collection
of various cyclic shifts of a suitable sequence.
Following the above definition, a line of research in designing data hiding codes and math-
ematical models capable of scalable watermarking has been conducted in particular for the
multimedia domain. The Moreno-Tirkel construction that was studied in Chapter 4 is one
of such effort to increase the possible number of watermarking codes at the cost of reduction
in detection accuracy. Apart from that, the data colouring method presented by [Liu et al.,
2011], not only aims to uniquely identify data, but also marks all pieces of the data in a way
that the watermark is detectable even from part of it. Obviously, this increases concerns of
the scalability of the data colouring method for very large data volumes as the number of
unique watermarks required for each piece of data can easily increase beyond the limit of the
watermarking system.
In [Gross-Amblard, 2011] scalability is defined as a large hidden capacity for query-preserving
watermarking of databases and XML documents, where watermarked data is partially avail-
able through a set of queries . In this setting, the authors showed that the largest possible
watermark message is linked to the Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension of the sets1 defined
by queries. This means that watermarking on arbitrary instances is not possible, and there
exists a scalable watermarking protocol for structures with bounded VC-dimensions. However,
it is unclear whether the VC-dimension is sufficient to obtain a scalable watermarking protocol.
Apart from scalability, the ability to watermark a large collection of high dimensional data (i.e.
datasets with hundreds of thousands of features) with respect to efficiency turns out to be a
major challenge, but that has received little attention so far.
Variety : Exploring big data is equivalent to aggregating heterogeneous information from
different sources to draw a best possible picture in a real-time fashion. In such an environment,
the application often needs to deal with various complex types of data such as structured data,
semi-structured data and data streams. Many of the existing digital watermarking techniques
are rigidly bound to a particular data structure and cannot be used for generic types of data.
1The Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension of a set V is the size of the longest index sequence I that is shattered
by V [Blumer et al., 1989].
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In order to cope with such an heterogeneous environment, the need for a content-aware wa-
termarking method to retain the information of interest for various data types is paramount.
The scheme proposed by [Sion et al., 2003] for watermarking semi-structures is an example
of such methods. In that work, multi-types of content are marked based on the overall data
structure whereas a content-specific mark encoding is used to embed parts of the watermark
in the content itself. In Chapter 2, we attempted to look at the most common data types used
today to give an insight how watermarking techniques can be designed based on the specific
characteristics of the host data.
Apart from the diversity of generated data types, the application requirements can change
in a big data environment. For example, in a mobile health application, sharing sentiment
information with untrusted parties requires more privacy consideration compared to the shar-
ing with trusted parties, and a context-aware data anonymization method should adjust the
level of obfuscation depending on the current context. (See Section 6.2.3 of Chapter 6 for an
example). A major shortcoming of standard watermarking approaches is the inability to adjust
embedding parameters because of the predefined setting. Recently, a new trend called intel-
ligent watermarking has emerged to determine embedding parameters based on evolutionary
computing and genetic algorithm techniques. For instance, [Usman and Khan, 2010] developed
a watermarking system based on genetic programming that is capable of adaptively selecting
both frequency band as well as watermark strength in a context-aware manner. As such, the
use of intelligent watermarking is highly desirable in context-aware applications where water-
marking requirements such as transparency and robustness requirements constantly change.
Velocity : The timely response requirement for big data necessitates the existence of on-the-
fly data encoding and decoding techniques for watermarking as well. As already stated water-
marking of streaming data is usually based on a window model that makes history-dependent
computation cumbersome [Sion et al., 2006]. Additionally, for time-limited data processes,
watermarking should have low embedding complexity in order to keep up with the incoming
data rate and low detection and retrieval complexity of watermarks before it becomes too late
to detect tampered labels. For this reason, hardware assisted watermarking such as FPGA
implementations [Kougianos et al., 2009] is advocated as opposed to software watermarking
schemes. For instance, the Moreno-Tirkel multidimensional arrays can be produced on the fly
in the most compact LFSR’s implemented in FPGAs [Moreno and Tirkel, 2011]. Addition-
ally, using a pipelined and parallel architecture such as MapReduce could be advantageous to
alleviate the processing overhead of watermarking operations [Zhang and Yu, 2011].
Veracity : This property of big data translates into incomplete/complete information and
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uncertainties/ certainties in the captured data from heterogeneous sources. Digital water-
marking techniques are useful tools to ensure high data veracity and fraud detection during
the whole data lifecycle. One of the critical questions for watermark embedding is, at what
point in the data lifecycle should watermarks be embedded? The data lifecycle includes its
capture, storage, update, transmission, access, archive, restoration, deletion and purge [Kim
et al., 2005].
Traditional watermarks are usually embedded in a transform domain such as DFT or DCT,
leaving data vulnerable to tampering before the transformation. Authors in [Tirkel and Hall,
2000] suggested that watermarks be embedded at a very early stage of capturing data, i.e.
point of origin before the distribution phase. For this purpose, watermarks are embedded in
the spatial domain where the captured data first appears at a charge-couple device sensor’s
output. In contrast, in [Chong et al., 2010], authors argued that it is preferable to mark
transformed data in standard units rather than to mark raw data; otherwise the embedding
scheme would have to be robust to arbitrary transformations, which is difficult to achieve in a
real scenario.
In fact, both points of view are valid and for this reason dual watermarking is desirable
– a spatial one to safeguard the data at its origin or for other purposes such as constructing
synchronisation patterns (watermark registration), and a second one in the transform domain to
resist domain-specific data manipulations. Therefore, the choice of lifecycle stage for embedding
a watermark could affect the veracity feature of big data.
Value: This property deals with the monetary decision-making of big data for a certain
business model. A watermarking solution must be designed with particular respect to the
economics of watermark computation such as memory efficiency or power efficiency to ensure
low cost implementation, while still offering the required security level. Applying a stringent
secure and robust watermarking scheme that poses huge costs for implementation is not a
prudent decision. If a watermarking scheme is designed for marking such volume of data, the
computational costs of watermark generation, insertion, and detection should be reasonable.
This cost could be associated with hardware implementation complexity of the watermarking
scheme such as the required space for storing hiding codes or required memory space for
processing.
According to the above discussion, the ambition to leverage digital watermarking for big
data faces several challenges to address the 5V’s attributes that future research might be
able to find the answers to. It necessitates re-thinking digital watermarking procedures and
requirements to be adopted for big data generated from distributed heterogeneous sources
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such as the IoT. However, we do not yet have enough experience to be certain one way or the
other on how best to watermark this big volume of data. We hope our discussion promotes an
interesting future path for big data watermarking.
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